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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis addresses the complexity of the experiences of severely 
distressed contemporary combat veterans in the Western world. It examines the specific 
features of their affliction that is not accounted adequately for either by the 
existing psychiatric approach to mental health disorders or by the complementary 
psycho-philosophical “moral injury” paradigm.  Following a systematic review of the 
relevant literature, a new approach is proposed to address these distressing phenomena 
of combat-related disorientation based on thymos, an ancient Greek anthropological 
concept. The “moral injury” paradigm has previously examined the relevance 
of thymos in contemporary veteran care, but has limited its consideration to Homeric 
material, and has also cross-interpreted the concept through modern psychological and 
physiological lenses in order to develop clinical applications. The original contribution 
of this thesis is the provision of a diachronic lens for investigating thymos in its organic 
philosophical context from Homer through the Golden Age of Greek philosophy, 
the teachings of early Christianity, and its current use in Eastern Orthodox 
Christian monastic tradition.     
  
This diachronic perspective provides an existential understanding of certain features of 
such combat-related disorientation that were previously unidentified. More specifically, 
it discerns a systemic dysregulation of three essential capacities for human flourishing 
that can occur, often sequentially, after exposure to intensely adverse events in combat: 
primary emotion, instinctive motivation to action, and moral intuition. Moreover, it 
develops a comprehensive account of two distinct features that are previously not 
addressed sufficiently: (1) the enduring sense of self-horror after a perceived 
“absorption of evil” in battle, and (2) radical loss of the ability to attribute meaning to 
events or to maintain narrative coherence of life’s experiences. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION: A PHENOMENON SEEKING UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
Human responses after exposure to extreme forms of adversity vary according to 
a number of factors, including the type of adversity experienced, its severity, a 
survivor’s prior exposure to similar and dissimilar forms of adversity, the human and 
material resources a survivor has at his or her disposal before and after exposure, a 
survivor’s physiological, psychological, and systemic behavioral predispositions to 
certain responses to adversity, the philosophy or approach of community and caregiver 
responses during and after a devastating event, the extent that a survivor is affected by 
environmental and ecological changes during and after the event, and social, cultural, 
and spiritual presuppositions or post-event formulations present among survivors and 
their neighbors and caregivers which affect meaning attribution.  Due to such varied 
factors, which represent all of the dimensions of human experience, survivor responses 
are not easy to predict or categorize, and as a result caregiver efforts require a great deal 
of epistemological complexity and a vigilance to protect against sweeping responses 
that seek to quickly respond to survivors in a unified manner, regardless of the wide 
variance in survivor responses, and in survivor needs.  Research suggests that, of all 
adversity survivors, those surviving “[chaotic] interpersonal violence” such as killing, 
sexual assault, mutilation of bodies, desecration of corpses, and brutality that seems to 
have no objective” are the most likely to develop serious and long-lasting impediments 
to health and well-being when their initial caregivers do not adequately understand their 
needs (Friedman, 1999, p. 5). 
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In the modern Western world, the dangers of epistemological over-simplicity 
when responding to adversity survivors is not always apparent, and therefore not 
protected against in crisis response either at home or abroad.  As a result, care agencies 
and professionals often lean heavily on reductive assumptions about survivor needs that 
can both blind them from the complexities of those needs and leave them with a lack of 
commitment to eliciting reliable feedback from survivors on their own sense of what is 
most needed in the aftermath of their exposure to adversity (Papadopoulos, 2002).  One 
common extension of this epistemological failure in approaching survivor care is the 
further lack of commitment by agencies and professionals to eventually elicit feedback 
on what care was provided, in order to offer opportunities to adjust the provision of 
future care.  This tendency applies equally in the global West to (1) private and 
governmental international relief and aid agencies focused on emergent work in the 
developing world, (2) domestic relief and aid agencies focused on emergent work 
among internal populations, and (3) circles of professional caregivers providing long-
term psycho-social care for adversity survivors in internal populations.  This 
phenomenon of connecting epistemological failure in caregiving to a lack of concern for 
feedback from survivors – both on and in their own terms – should briefly be expanded 
for consideration here, in each of these three milieus mentioned in the previous 
sentence. 
A March 2007 recording from the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Unites 
States House of Representatives preserves an enlightening discussion on Iraqi internal 
refugee care offered by American agencies during the height of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, and in this discussion two prominent statesmen remarked on the dearth of any 
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feedback coming from the refugees themselves on the care they were offered 
(Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2007).  In the recordings the committee was exploring 
at length several troubling realities that had become evident in the work, including 
rampant miscommunication with refugees, the duplication of effort in services 
provided, the tensions in host nation agency collaboration, the suboptimal resource 
management, and the ultimately suboptimal care of vulnerable people in areas that 
demanded American intervention because of its unintentional involvement in their 
dislocation (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2007).   One conclusion reached by these 
statesmen, which eventually resulted in the ordering of changes in Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) defense policy, was that the primary cause of 
some or all of these troubles had been a continual dearth of feedback from the 
involuntarily dislocated population – before, during and after the provision of care.  
However, this phenomenon is not limited to government agencies. Scott Lawson, an 
administrator with a prominent Western non-governmental organization (NGO) for 
international aid, development, and relief, who himself served for over twenty years as a 
field director in Africa and South America, notes the long-standing propensity for 
similar epistemological failure in private Western aid agencies engaged in international 
relief projects: 
“After a major crisis, the entire focus of an aid agency is invested in patterned, 
pre-organized, speedy response based on pre-conceived ideas of the common 
needs of victims.  There is the sense that time should not be wasted in long, 
customized assessment, and so there are general response plans designed in 
advanced for various regions, various countries, various people groups and 
various types of crises.  Once a crisis has occurred, or has begun, it is almost a 
simple matter of putting the shipment together and getting materiel and 
appropriate personnel on the ground.  This works for us, but unfortunately the 
mindset that gets us there quickly and with a reasonably appropriate arsenal of 
materiel and personnel can keep us from something just as important as anything 
 4 
else – really seeing the human element of the crisis.  Every victim is unique, and 
every family, tribe, and community has unique needs.  That is where the 
engineering of crisis response can break down.  The workers can be so focused 
on competently delivering the set of interventions prescribed, including 
psychological interventions and etc., that they can simply forget to slow down 
and ask victims how they are understanding what has happened to them, and 
how aid workers can best offer help” (interview, 2014). 
 
Although Lawson notes that there are changes occurring in this arena, the 
overwhelming balance of his experience has been that care agencies struggle to focus 
on all of the aspects of the needs that they will encounter both at home and abroad, and 
that they are not always willing or able to “take seriously” the needs of individual 
adversity survivors or survivor families as articulated by these individuals and families 
themselves.  He also notes anecdotally that, in his experience, those most grievously 
affected by inadequate or unprofessional care are those who have witnessed, 
participated in, or been victims of the war atrocities (Lawson, 2014). 
 Domestic aid agencies and care professionals are often in a better position to 
elicit feedback from care recipients, due to the fact that such professionals often 
experience a lower number of linguistic and cultural barriers between themselves and 
the population in need, and are often able to integrate into existing local community 
organizations – adding a degree of credibility, familiarity, and trust to their offerings.  
However, even given this better position, there is a constant danger of over-simplifying, 
misunderstanding, or minimizing the needs of adversity survivors as expressed both on 
and in their own terms.  Yonina Creditor, a Disaster Action Team leader with a 
prominent domestic American aid and relief agency, notes the strong emphasis that her 
agency now places on “customer feedback” at all levels, and how urgently and 
distinctly this feedback has been developed over the last ten years: 
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“Things are changing quickly in domestic emergency response…at times in the 
past it has been painfully clear that, systemically, our primary focus was on the 
simple delivery of food and shelter, our secondary focus was on providing 
simple social services, and a limited, tertiary focus was to provide a generalized 
psycho-educational approach to mitigating the onset of major mental health 
concerns and to promote resilience among survivors.  However, with the rapid 
development of disaster mental health resources and their consultation to our 
processes, we are coming to appreciate the unique way that each individual 
responds to crisis, and the need for a strong human element and a listening ear 
present throughout our provision of aid, from food line workers to shelter 
managers and even welcome and registration personnel.  We have especially 
been able to elevate this aspect of our care through the nearly 500,000 customer 
surveys we received after the Hurricane Katrina disaster” (interview, 2014). 
 
Creditor also recognizes a dilemma in taking seriously the needs of distressed 
individuals and families after a crisis, noting that “there has been in the past a sense that 
people in crisis are not seeing things rationally or in an adaptive manner, and that their 
sense of their own need may be compromised in some way.  But we also see the 
negative effects of not asking how they see their own need.  A balance is being sought 
now, as much as possible” (Creditor, 2014). When asked about any sub-population of 
adversity survivors that may be at greater risk of long-term complications when their 
own sense of what they need cannot be considered adequately, Creditor responded in 
this way: “keeping in mind that, in domestic emergency response, our primary focus 
must still be on the delivery of food, shelter, and safety, we have been strenuously 
educating our staff in recognizing the signs of traumatization, knowing that these are the 
most vulnerable people in terms of human interaction and human need” (Creditor, 
2014). 
Having very briefly examined the dangers of epistemological over-simplicity among 
Western caregivers and agencies focused on emergent aid and relief work in both the 
developing world and in Western domestic populations, it is now important to recognize 
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similar dangers present among professional caregivers providing long-term psycho-
social care for adversity survivors.  
Longer-term domestic psychosocial care organizations and helping professionals are 
perhaps in the best position to avoid oversimplification and to elicit constant feedback 
in their approach to human suffering, given their more common tendencies towards 
individual assessment and treatment, their often greater exposure in care to persons with 
unusual features that defy easy categorization, and their generally person-centered 
therapeutic orientation towards persons in crisis.  However, there are also dangerous 
trends in this paradigm of post-adversity care which influence caregivers towards 
oversimplification of client needs and over-reliance on pre-conceived response 
packages.  In contemporary Western culture, adversity survivors who develop any kind 
of painful or disorienting response – even when such a response may be considered a 
normal result of exposure to adversity – are, on the occasion of a referral to a mental 
health agency or professional, increasingly placed into summary social care programs 
which address their responses as mental illnesses, determined by criteria from the 
traumatic stress disorders spectrum of the most contemporary psychiatric paradigm 
(Papadopoulos, recorded lecture, 2014).  The most common psychiatric disorder 
assigned to adversity survivors is post-traumatic stress disorder, the cardinal symptoms 
of which are (1) intrusive memories and thoughts relating to the adversity, commonly 
followed by a patterned attempt to avoid people, places and things associated with the 
adversity, (2) psychic numbing, and (3) hyper-arousal of the autonomic nervous system 
(Foa, Keane, Friedman & Cohen, 2009). 
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 Although it is certain that many survivors of adversity do experience one or 
more of these symptoms, and that many adversity survivors do in act qualify for a 
psychiatric diagnosis of PTSD, the total number of such survivors in any general 
category of adversity does not in any current research total more than 20% 
(Papadopoulos, 2015b).  This leaves a cross-section of at least 80% of adversity 
survivors whose responses to adversity can not be summarily addressed by the 
psychiatric paradigm.  Renos Papadopoulos argues convincingly that post-traumatic 
stress disorder has transcended the psychiatric paradigm to become a part of modern 
parlance in many forms of psychosocial care, and that as a result the label is often used 
imprecisely by political leaders, aid organizations, and community resource centers 
(recorded lecture, 2014).  He notes that in response this reality and the commonly 
corresponding criteria for levels of aid and treatment available to survivors, survivors 
are often considered for their eligibility for the diagnosis of PTSD before their 
disorientation can be fully understood or adequately addressed.   Much more notably, he 
notices that this can result in an indirect pressure applied upon adversity survivors by 
social care agencies to present certain symptoms of PTSD in order to be diagnosed as a 
prerequisite for receiving care - creating a potential crisis of the pathologization of 
normal responses to adversity and the potential for an awakening of a victim response in 
survivors (Papadopoulos, recorded lecture, 2014).   
There is one specific potential danger of the premature introduction and 
application of psychiatric criteria to all painful or distressing responses to adversity that 
Papadopoulos does not directly discuss, and which will serve as the primary focus for 
this thesis: among combat veterans of coalition forces returned from the recent wars in 
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Iraq and Afghanistan, PTSD is commonly being used and even expanded for use as a 
broad and overly simplistic label to classify unusual forms of combat-related 
disorientation.  These unusual forms of disorientation, which include extreme and 
sometimes bizarre experiences of inner and social confusion, self-alienation, sensed 
connection with personal forms of evil, and disconnect with societal norms of proper 
and humane behavior, seem unique in that they are not commonly experienced together 
by adversity survivors who have not been exposed to intense military combat, and in 
that they are also not adequately capable of description by or inclusion in the diagnostic 
criteria for PTSD or any other psychiatric disorder common to the current diagnostics 
and statistical manuals used in the West.  This particular phenomenon – composed of a 
growing number of cases containing such unusual features and a growing understanding 
of the resistance of these features to psychiatric diagnosis – has been gaining notoriety 
in American society, and especially in conjunction with an expansion in both research 
and practice around the philosophical-therapeutic category of “moral injury,” first 
pioneered by Jonathan Shay (1994).  Although Shay and later writers have successfully 
used the moral injury paradigm to challenged the efficacy of any exclusive use of the 
psychiatric model to treat all disoriented combat veterans, not all researchers and 
practitioners who share a belief in the need for such a challenge have been comfortable 
with the category of moral injury either, rather expressing concern over the limits of the 
moral injury paradigm – even as a complementary approach to the psychiatric paradigm 
– to adequately account for all of the unusual features of some combat veterans 
(Schaller, 2012).   
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Although this particular phenomenon in veteran care is quite specific, it bears 
significant connection with the difficulties present among all caregiver agencies and 
professionals dealing with survivors of all kinds of adversity, namely that 
epistemological failure is common when attempting to approach survivors with an 
underlying framework for understanding them that is overly simplistic but which 
promises a greater ease of categorization or follow-up patterned treatment.  Such 
frameworks are obviously seductive in their promise of quick and tidy responses, 
especially on a large scale when speed and organization seem essential, but they can be 
devastating in terms of caring for actual people whose needs are inevitably unique and 
complex. 
 
The CTAR Corrective 
 At the Centre for Trauma, Asylum, and Refugees (CTAR) at the University of 
Essex, Renos Papadopoulos has developed an approach to psychosocial care to 
adversity survivors that aims to limit the dangers of epistemological failure and which is 
cross-contextually applicable to inform and protect agencies and caregivers involved in 
any milieu of human care.  Although the CTAR approach has far greater scope and 
nuance than can be addressed in this thesis, given its precise focus, four elements of the 
CTAR approach may be helpful when examining combat veterans experiencing the 
most unusual forms of disorientation upon homecoming, as briefly addressed above, 
and may be used in a complementary fashion with both the psychiatric and moral injury 
paradigms: (1) avoidance of oversimplification through pre-conceived caregiver biases 
by taking as seriously as possible the totality, complexity, and uniqueness of the actual 
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experiences of adversity survivors, using their own contextual understandings and 
languages of orientation as much as possible, (2) use of the widest possible 
epistemological base for understanding the experience of adversity survivors, 
accounting for the “onto-ecological” complexity of this experience, which will include 
psychological, physiological, social, emotional, behavioral, cultural, spiritual, and 
meaning-attributive dimensions, (3) understand the adversity in terms of a survivor’s 
sense of potential changes to both tangible and intangible forms of self-identity, which 
may effect onto-ecological settledness and activate nostalgic disorientation, and (4) 
making collaborative use of the Trauma Grid with survivors in any assessment, which 
will attempt to understand all responses to adversity in terms of what may have been 
lost, what may have been retained, and what manner of growth may have been – or may 
yet become – activated in the aftermath of the adversity (Papadopoulos, 2015b). 
 This thesis will attempt to understand and apply these four elements of the 
CTAR approach to psychosocial care for adversity survivors in relation to the emerging 
phenomenon in veteran care introduced above, in order to aid caregivers of combat 
veterans – working from any therapeutic orientation – in better understanding veterans 
experienced these unusual and disorienting features, and to help them to avoid some of 
the common epistemological failures common to veteran care.  In order to accomplish 
this, this thesis will first examine the specific distressing and disorienting features of 
these combat veterans in detail, making use of first and second-person interviews with 
both effected veterans and their caregivers.  The thesis will then examine both the 
psychiatric and moral injury paradigms in their approach to these features, and will 
assess the ability of each of these paradigms, whether used separately or together, to 
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account for the complexity, uniqueness, and totality of these features, paying attention 
to potential epistemological failures present in their relative underlying philosophical 
assumptions.  Next, wherever these paradigms are unable to address one or more 
elements of the onto-ecological complexity of the features of the veterans under 
consideration, this thesis will engage in further exploration in search of an expansion of 
epistemological presuppositions that will better or more fully provide an account of that 
element.  Finally, the thesis will provide a summary of the ways in which the CTAR 
model can helpfully engage contemporary psychosocial care to combat veterans, and 
will make suggestions for future research and consideration on the subject. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
EXAMINING THE PHENOMENON IN DETAIL 
 
In order to properly understand the complexity, uniqueness, and totality of this 
phenomenon experienced by survivors of intense combat, and in order to discern 
whether the phenomenon can be adequately addressed within existing paradigms of 
psychosocial care, it will be necessary to avoid the initial assumption of any particular 
paradigmatic lens, and to rather consider the direct accounts of the relevant combat 
survivors and their caregivers in a theoretically neutral manner.  Direct accounts from 
relevant combat survivors and their caregivers will be listed here in the language of 
their own experience, after which it will be possible to consider what is an adequate 
understanding of the interconnectedness of the various elements of their experience, and 
to consider how these various elements may be adequately organized in order to best 
understand the group of survivors both individually and as a whole.  Following this, it 
will be possible to consider the efficacy of various available psychosocial approaches to 
the phenomenon, and if no available approach proves efficacious, to determine the 
direction for a search into other disciplines.  
 
First-Hand Accounts 
A Marine Lance Corporal whom we will call Richard Howard deployed with his 
infantry Battalion to Afghanistan in the summer of 2008.  He had been with the same 
battalion during two previous deployments to Iraq, including once during the hardest 
season of fighting in Fallujah, in which he and his comrades had seen constant and 
brutal urban combat (Howard, interview, 2014).  During his time in Iraq, Richard had 
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served as a squad machine gunner, and had killed dozens of enemy combatants, often at 
close range, and sometimes close enough to come into close contact with their remains.  
His leaders referred him to a mental health professional soon after arriving in 
Afghanistan because he was not able to maintain close relationships with his comrades.  
He remained aloof and remembers feeling “spaced out” most of the time, not 
responding to orders and being generally slow to respond when people addressed him 
(Howard, interview, 2014).  He claimed in that initial interview that he felt like a 
“ghost” in his own body, and also claimed that he had not “felt like [himself] in about 
three years” (Howard, interview, 2014).  Specifically, Richard said that he felt like there 
was a part of him that was “locked away from the world around [him],” and he also 
claimed that he sometimes felt he was watching his life happen as if from a distance, 
and that he was “locked away from [his] own body” as it moved through its motions 
(Howard, interview, 2014).  Richard’s self-description of “walking around like a ghost,” 
disconnected from his own body, not only suggests a radical loss of contact with some 
former inner vitality but also suggests his full awareness of that lost contact in the 
present moment.  This condition frightened him, as it represented a separation between 
consciousness and felt sensation that was fully self-evident to him in his daily routine, 
resulting in a sense of “constant haunting” (Howard, interview, 2014). 
In addition, Richard mentions that his squad mates experienced him as 
“paranoid” around the forward operating base (FOB), describing him as a “loose 
cannon” who could suddenly come out of an apparent malaise to attack his peers 
verbally and even physically, and then suddenly seem to “come to his senses,” and ask 
what had happened (Howard, interview, 2014).  According to Richard, his squad mates 
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also acted as if his general outlook towards his responsibilities in warfare made them 
uncomfortable, especially when he discussed his disappointment that there was not 
“enough killing in Afghanistan to keep [him] happy” (Howard, interview, 2014).  He 
remembers saying to them: 
“my body count is too low…I’ve only killed 12 people these last two months.  
In Fallujah I averaged one kill for every 100 rounds…but here, I've wasted a lot 
of ammunition. The only reason I reenlisted was for a chance to come to 
Afghanistan and kill these fuckers. I mean where else can someone get a job 
where they're paid to kill people? I thought I was pretty good at my job, but 
since coming here I've been a disappointment to my platoon and to myself" 
(Howard, interview, 2014). 
 
As Richard recalls, his peers described his attitude about killing enemy combatants as 
“chilling and playful,” and although they often shared in dark humor themselves, they 
seemed to be uncomfortable when he joined in, and expressed the opinion that he 
exceeded the limits of what even Marine infantrymen in combat should find humorous.  
He remembers being described by his peers on a number of occasions as being “not 
right” and “sick” in some way (Howard, interview, 2014). 
A Marine Sergeant whom we will call Nathan Everly returned from Iraq in the 
winter of 2005, where he had participated in intense urban combat operations with the 
Marine Corps for over 7 months, losing a significant number of his comrades to injury 
and death (Everly, interview, 2010).  Upon his return from Iraq, he held various 
stateside positions with the Marine Corps, and as he recalls, gained a reputation as a 
loner and heavy drinker, not speaking often and occasionally getting into physical 
confrontations with his peers.  He was referred to a behavioral health clinic in 2010 
after shattering the windows in his barracks room with an empty liquor bottle, causing 
injury to his hands and arms and causing significant damage to government property 
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(Everly, interview, 2010).  As he rampaged, his peers later informed him that he had 
threatened every one he saw with murder.  “I wanted to kill every God damned one of 
‘em,” he later recalled, but he could not recall any reasons for wanting to kill anyone, 
and claimed to feel “nothing but numbness” in the aftermath (Everly, interview, 2010).  
After experiencing this first episode of anger and violence, Nathan claims that his life 
was overrun by a  “constant, mindless rage sleeping just below the surface,” which 
surfaced unexpectedly and was often beyond his control in managing (Everly, 
interview, 2010).   
Although he can sometimes attribute ongoing episodes of angry, unpredictable 
violence to specific feelings of either helplessness or perceived disrespect by someone 
he meets during the course of his daily routine, Nathan displays a far more complicated 
and consistent pattern of what he calls “blackout rage” that cannot always be mapped to 
certain triggers (Everly, interview, 2010).  When he begins to enter an episode of such 
rage, he claims to experience an “uncontrollable and consuming hatred for everything in 
the world,” and becomes like “an animal, and not a human,” wanting to devour and 
destroy everything in his environment (Everly, interview, 2010).  Although he uses the 
phrase “blackout rage,” he does not claim to have experienced an actual loss of 
consciousness during his violent episodes.  Far more disturbing to himself, he claims to 
experience a loss of contact with what he calls “the good side of me.”  During his 
episodes of rage, his experience of himself is that “there is no human-ness in me, and 
there are no rules, only blackness and blood and death…only evil” (Everly, interview, 
2010). 
 16 
A Marine Sergeant whom we will call Harold Miller was a member of special 
operations team in Iraq during the second battle of Fallujah, conducting high-risk 
raiding operations in a politically and militarily unstable quarter of the city, and coming 
almost daily into close contact with the enemy (Miller, interview, 2014).  According to 
Harold, in battle he was considered by his peers to be a “good-luck charm,” because he 
fought with reckless abandon, and performed physical feats that astonished himself and 
others (Miller, interview, 2014).  He received valorous awards for his actions, and 
remembers his teammates expressing surprise and awe after certain engagements, 
wondering at his strength, athleticism, and brutal attacks on enemy troops, and also 
commenting that upon his return that he did not appear to have perspired like the rest of 
them.  As he describes it, “I did three things for that year – sleep, eat, and fight.  I don’t 
remember breathing.  It was all a high, and I was flying, baby” (Miller, interview, 
2014). 
Upon Harold’s return to his permanent duty station from his tour in Iraq, he 
claims to have felt like “a stranger to [himself].”  He became verbally and physically 
brutal with his wife, necessitating a formal separation from her and from his children 
under a court-issued protective order.  Harold notes a self-realization that occurred in 
the months following his return, which caused him some concern: when he was not 
feeling “keyed up,” he was feeling “nothing” (Miller, interview, 2014).  Harold was 
involved in two motorcycle crashes and a number of high-speed chases from police in 
the first two years after his return, contributing to the eventual end of his military 
career.  As he understands it,  
“I can only feel when I’m flying.  Otherwise I feel nothing.  Like my soul is 
covered under something.  I’m in my body but I’m not.  I’m like a tiger in a 
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fucking cage, man, that’s what my whole life feels like…I hate it, though.  I 
have no interest in my own kids…they are so boring to me and I don’t feel 
anything for them at all even though I know I’m supposed to.  I can’t feel shit 
for anyone.  I’m damaged goods” (Miller, interview, 2014). 
 
Aside from feeling like “damaged goods,” Harold experiences something that he 
considers to be far more disorienting: the feeling that he has become a “monster.”  
“I became some kind of predatory animal out there, I guess.  Or maybe the 
animal – the monster – is in me.  [I’m] not quite human anymore since the ol’ 
Iraqi hunting trip…I did things over there that are unforgiveable, and I’m glad 
my kids don’t know me now.  I would fuck them up.  I am bad now.  Something 
bad has happened…” (Miller, interview, 2014). 
 
Harold’s sense that “something bad has happened” to him serves as a self-summary for 
his experience of life after combat.  He does not claim only to see his current behavior 
or condition as “bad,” or his decisions in combat to have been “bad,” but rather he feels 
as if he has become actually and personally bad, as the result of a personal 
transformation in and after combat. 
These three American war veterans have each been exposed to extreme forms of 
adversity during their service in combat, which, from the descriptions of the aftermath 
of their own responses to this adversity, have resulted in significant personal and social 
disorientation and in impaired ability to make coherent meaning of their experiences.  
The features of the disorientation that these three veterans are experiencing do contain 
similar elements to the disorientation of other types of adversity survivors, but they 
concurrently contain elements that are unique, and which resist common categorization.  
For instance, they each exhibit a personal sense of self-fear or self-horror in the 
aftermath of combat, articulated adjacent to a lost sense of who they had once been and 
who they have now become at an essential level of personal existence.  This personal 
sense of self-fear or self-horror appears not only related to an experience of guilt or 
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shame resulting from specific actions they have perpetrated in combat, but also to an 
experience of having – through their actions and witness – assimilated into themselves 
something evil or malicious that was present in the combat zone.  For two of the three, 
this includes the sensation and belief that there is now what they can only describe as a 
monster or animal existing within them, which they are not able to avoid or extract. 
Secondly, they have each voiced a loss of the experience of being fully alive and 
present in the world, either marked by a lack of the sensation of mind-body unity, an 
internal deadening of felt sensation altogether, or the sensation that they have become 
less than fully human – resulting in the loss of the ability for humane action and moral 
reasoning.  In Richard’s case, the sensation is that he does not feel alive, and that 
experiences his daily life as the activities of “a ghost” (Howard, interview, 2014).   
Nathan claims the sensation of feeling detached from his ability to reason when he 
experiences a suddenly rage; when he comes back into awareness of his environment, 
he claims to feel that he has no connection with who had become during his “blackout” 
(Everly, interview, 2010).  They each are aware of and deeply concerned by a loss of 
felt sensation or of being alive, and despite extensive psychotherapy, this experience of 
loss persists. 
Third, all three veterans have experienced an erosion of their social capacity to 
remain engaged with others in their personal and professional lives, and this erosion 
appears to be connected to a persistent and socially debilitating form of mistrust.  For 
Nathan, having claimed to experience neglect and mistreatment by some of his leaders 
in combat, and having claimed to experience betrayal by comrades both in combat and 
after returning home, he now articulates a profound fear to extend trust to anyone in 
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relationships, and admits that he displays bizarre behavior aimed at dominating and 
controlling others (Everly, interview, 2010).  Harold Miller claims to desperately 
attempt to avoid significant encounters with other people, so that they will avoid close 
proximity to him and thus avoid the potential that they might be effected by the 
“badness” that he feels is present in him (Miller, interview, 2014).  Richard claims to 
deeply desire a connection with other people, but he notices that he cannot develop or 
maintain an emotional connection with anyone, and that, while he occasionally comes 
close to others in physical proximity, he rarely experiences any feelings he previously 
associated with closeness in relationships.  Making progress towards goals in these 
areas of social engagement has been a specific focus for each of these three veterans in 
psychotherapy since returning from combat, but none has experienced lasting change.  
Each in some way expresses the sense that he is too deeply disoriented to change, and 
that his caregivers do not seem to adequately understand his disorientation enough to 
address it and to develop an efficacious response. 
Fourth, Richard and Harold have each experienced significant loss in their 
ability to make meaning of their adverse experiences and to place these experiences 
within the context of a coherent worldview – a phenomenon which seems to resist the 
simplistic explanation that the adversity they have suffered has effectively shattered 
previously-held beliefs that were naïve and inherently vulnerable.  Richard explains 
that, from his own perspective, the entire narrative structure of his life before the world 
is disconnected from the narrative structure of his life after the war, and he claims to 
resent that others have insinuated – particularly when making use of the psychiatric 
paradigm for mental health diagnosis – that this disconnect is because he must have 
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previously maintained a “delusional belief about the world being a good place, where 
good always wins and where people are happy if they do the right thing” (Howard, 
interview, 2014).  Richard’s sense is that he has indefinitely lost the ability to live a 
meaningful life, with purpose and with connection to goals and important relationships.   
Although he claims to have no gaps in memory, he cannot easily attribute meaning to 
the adversity he experienced in the war, and has no emotional connection to his 
memories other than to occasionally re-experience the felt sense of contentment and 
accomplishment that he had when he was killing combatants in the war zone (Howard, 
interview, 2014).  Harold mentions that he previously believed in the existence of God, 
and that he still experiences a desire to believe in God.  However, he senses now that 
the changes he has undergone in and after combat prevent him from having any 
connection with God, and he does not expect the situation to change.  Specifically, 
Harold has always believed that God is active in the affairs of the world, and that God 
has a loving plan for all people; since his return from combat Harold claims to have a 
painful sense that God’s plan for a person can be derailed, after which a person’s life 
becomes chaotic and dangerous, and has no purpose (Miller, interview, 2014).  This, he 
senses, is what has happened to him after returning from combat. 
This inability to access the previous forms of meaning-making they had 
developed before exposure to combat, concurrent with an inability to accept or develop 
new forms of meaning-making after exposure to combat, keeps both Richard and 
Harold from being able to process the adversity they have experienced, and also keeps 
them from being able to reintegrate to their communities upon homecoming.  However, 
their experiences seem to extend beyond the well-documented tendency among 
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adversity survivors to feel profoundly unsafe or unprotected after being exposed to 
horrifying acts in a seemingly chaotic situation.  In the cases of Richard and Harold, 
there is not only a sense that good does not always triumph over evil, or the removal of 
fantasies of being protected in an unpredictable world.  Rather, there is a sense for both 
of these veterans that there are no rules in the cosmos, no purpose or meaning available 
in life and no essential principles of good and evil at all - nothing that is forbidden to 
human beings who wish to keep their humanity (Miller, interview, 2014).  They 
articulate the impression that at times society’s understanding of the meaning of life 
seems absurd to them, leaving them unable to share common social foundations for 
relationships, trust, and morally normative behavior. 
Lastly, both Richard and Nathan have experienced moments of wild, 
uncontrollable rage in their military service, in which they felt disdain for human beings 
and human bodies, and in some cases could not recall afterward exactly what they had 
said or done when acting in extreme violence (Everly, interview, 2010).  In Richard’s 
case, he seemed to feel almost joyful when amidst combat-related carnage, and felt an 
exhilaration when engaged in the frenzy of close-quarters battle, acting without personal 
restraint and occasionally having to be forcibly restrained by his comrades from 
committing acts of inhumanity (Howard, interview, 2014).  Nathan describes his 
experiences as “blackout rage,” which he says first took place in combat, but which has 
also continued in his experience upon homecoming, as often as once per week (Everly, 
interview, 2010).  In this state he feels murderous, and feels a strong longing to kill and 
maim, with very little sense of compassion or restraint.  Nathan claims that when he is 
not in this state of rage, he sometimes is capable of feeling compassion for other people, 
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even though it rarely lasts, and he rarely acts on such feelings (Everly, interview, 2010).  
Richard expresses frustration that he does not feel compassion for anyone, and wants 
this to change, although he does not know how change could occur (Howard, interview, 
2014).  Both Nathan and Richard experience a sense of rage “lurking below the 
surface,” believing that is now a part of their condition, and a phenomenon that they 
must become used to, because after years away from combat, the phenomenon has 
continued to abide (Everly, interview, 2010). 
 
A Summary of Five Related Features 
Richard, Nathan, and Harold represent many contemporary veterans who have 
experienced troubling and debilitating forms of combat-related disorientation upon 
homecoming, in addition to physical injuries they have sustained.  These three have 
each been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder under the psychiatric paradigm 
of care, and have undergone psychiatric treatment for years, but the some of the 
particularly unusual features of their disorientation, as described above, have proven 
resistant to treatment, and have posed a complex question to their caregivers.   Looking 
closely, there appear to be five unusual features, seemingly related, and which are 
described – in the words of these veterans’ own experience – as follows: (1) a self-fear 
or self-horror after exposure to and perceived absorption of a devastating sense of evil 
in combat, (2) a conscious disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation which features 
an experience of internal deadness and a longing to feel alive or lively again, (3) a 
persistent and socially debilitating mistrust of people in authority and others whose help 
might be needed in times of trouble, or else a persistent mistrust of oneself around 
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others, extending out into nearly all personal and professional relationships and yet 
combined with an intense longing to want to connect with someone again, (4) a radical 
dissolution of the ability to make meaning of one’s experiences, or to retain a sense of 
coherence in the world in general, which leads to an extreme social and moral 
disorientation that potentially leaves one absurdly disconnected to societal norms, and 
(5) occasional moments of lustful, exhilarating, murderous rage in which no sense of 
humanity and compassion is present, and which is often marked by a loss of ability to 
self-restrain one’s physical actions.   
 
Complementary Accounts 
Each of these five features are distinct, and yet all five appear to be related, in 
that each of the five features are shared in the experience of at least two of the three 
veterans whose disorientation has been described in this chapter.  In order to further 
examine these features, and to further explore their potential relationship to one another, 
it will be necessary to widen the sample size of veteran accounts that contain similar 
forms of disorientation.  This will be done by making use of more first-hand and 
second-hand accounts, as related by veterans, their families, and their professional 
caregivers. 
 
Accounts of Self-Horror at the Perceived Absorption of Evil 
Tim Segrest, in his personal reflections of homecoming after serving in combat 
as a sniper in the Middle East, describes how, upon trying to reintegrate with his friends 
and family, he found an “evil” lurking in him, which he feels took up residence in him 
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during the war (Segrest, 2008, p. 198).  During his daily interactions with people, he 
experiences this sense of violent and implacable “evil” within, encouraging him to 
murder persons whom he describes as selfish or who represent a barrier to his 
accomplishing a task.  He expresses self-horror at this tendency, and claims to only be 
able to find relief from self-horror by using fantasy – fantasies in which, from his own 
perspective, he justifiably murders persons whose behavior he judges to be equally evil 
(Segrest, 2008).  On such occasions, his inclinations towards violence can grow in 
strength and number, and from his perspective he claims difficulty in opposing them, 
because the “evil” he believes to be resident in himself identifies with the “evil” he 
senses in the other: “I can feel my anger come – anger at all this damn evil [around 
me]... can’t I just fucking kill them all?  Burst their heads open?” (Segrest, 2008, p. 
198).   
Tim believes that in the course of his role in the war, a tangible form of “evil” 
attached itself to him – an evil that enjoys both the witness of suffering and the 
infliction of pain onto others (Segrest, 2008).  His exposure to and the subsequent 
attachment of this tangible form of evil is something over which he remembers having 
no control.   He articulates the experience as a process of being “fastened” to this 
tangible form of evil, and describes his current condition as a futile attempt to reverse 
the phenomenon, which attains no success (Segrest, 2008, p. 198).  Tim has been 
formally diagnosed with PTSD, and has undergone intensive psychotherapy, but claims 
to experience little progress in psychotherapy, and believes that the kind of 
psychotherapy he has undergone does not adequately address his most distressing forms 
of disorientation.  Specifically, he addresses this issue with his caregivers using the 
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following terms: “…[you] can’t train me how to reverse this mother fucking sadistic 
fucker hiding within my mind” (Segrest, 2008, p. 198).  Tim claims that he does not 
always clearly sense the evil that he knows to be attached to him, but rather feels it to be 
sometimes present and sometimes hiding somewhere close by, waiting to remerge 
(Segrest, 2008).  Tim experiences an intense hatred of the condition in which he finds 
himself, and which he believes will extend the indefinite future, and he finds himself 
constantly condemning both himself and the presence of the tangible evil within him: 
“…you truly are a son of a bitch and I hope you rot in hell” (Segrest, 2008, p. 198).  
John Wolfe describes his experience of serving in combat operations in Vietnam 
in a manner that bears similarities to Tim’s experiences.  He discusses the horror of war 
as an entity that a warrior absorbs or ingests, which devastates his inner life and sense 
of self, and which – although the warrior may try to silence or avoid it – inevitably must 
be faced interminably, and can never be silenced or avoided: 
“…a combat veteran’s intervals will be filled with rubbery Halloween mask 
heads housing skulls shattered into tiny shards, scheme-less mutilations, and 
shocked, pained expressions that violent and premature death casts on a dead 
boy’s face.  These images are war’s graffiti.  They are scrawled across the 
veteran’s mind defacing the silence and peace that others enjoy” (Sherman, 
2011, p. 27). 
 
In Wolfe’s experience, witnessing horrible, violent and apparently meaningless acts can 
leave an abiding imprint on the warrior’s inner life, resulting in his experience of a 
lifelong connection with the horror and the devastation he has endured.  From this 
perspective, the horror and devastation can seem to become a part of him, and he can 
feel as though the absorption of this horror has changed him indelibly: “at times the 
images may seem to fade, but an unguarded glance into the gloom is sufficient to 
exhume them” (Sherman, 2011, p. 27).   
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Wolfe’s discussion of his own devastating experience in combat – which in his 
case involved a dead, mutilated young boy – includes a powerful belief that he has been 
associated not only with a horrifying incident but with all that is wrong in the world, 
and that it has left him changed forever, keeping him from the “silence and peace that 
others enjoy” (Sherman, 2011, p. 27).  Wolfe describes himself as being unmistakably 
changed by defilement through the devastation he has experienced, and subsequently 
self-horrified at the result of the defilement.  Although he does not specifically use the 
word “evil” in recounting his experiences, Wolfe’s belief that he has become disgusting 
through the absorption of the inhumanity associated with his experiences in combat 
connects with Tim’s experience of self-horror at a sense that there is a tangible form of 
evil now present inside of him. 
Amaya Muruzabal, writing from the perspective of her work with combat 
veterans from the Vietnam era who have experienced unusual forms of disorientation 
following homecoming, suggests that “war teaches the veteran to be a monster…a 
zombie…the ex-combatant is a kind of living dead.  Estranged from society…he 
[believes] he has lost his humanity forever” (Muruzabal, 1996, p. 28).  In Amaya’s 
experience, the act of killing human beings, especially when accomplished over and 
over again, seems to activate in the warrior a preoccupation with the deaths he has 
caused that can persist indefinitely.  Amaya argues that “the knowledge of evil cannot 
be [simply seen as something] assumed psychologically,” but goes much deeper 
(Muruzabal, 1996, p. 28).  In her view, the warrior who has been engaged in intense 
combat has “ingested a pollutant” of some kind that invariably effects every area of a 
veteran’s inner life (Muruzabal, 1996, p. 28).  In her view, there are horrors found in 
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certain human events which, when experienced, are not forgotten.  From her 
perspective, the knowledge that these horrors once existed, and could conceivably exist 
again, alters the worldview of a veteran who has been a witness, victim, or agent of 
such things, and when the veteran believes that he has become linked to the horror he 
has experienced, he may develop a powerful sense of self-loathing or self-mistrust, 
believing that the process has changed him or her forever (Muruzabal, 1996). 
D. C. Hoop, a veteran of recent conflicts in the Middle East, says this, about his 
experience in war: “The monster got loose in all of us.  He devoured our dreams, he ate 
through our souls, and left an empty shell…” (Hoop, 2010, p. 56).  Hoop’s experience is 
very similar to the experience of a long-time patient of Robert McLay whom he calls 
Lois (McLay, 2012).  “Lois” is a female veteran who not only experienced horrific 
events in a combat zone, but was also raped by her own teammates in a combat 
environment.  Diagnosed with “complex PTSD,” Lois experienced something that she 
describes as a monster that entered and “got loose” in her enemies, her teammates, and 
eventually in her, by contact (McLay, 2012, p. 95).  She expresses the idea in these 
words: “[everyone became] a monster – them, us, men, women, hell even the kids. 
[Even an innocent] boy jumped the fence strapped with explosives (McLay, 2012, p. 
95). 
In the process of witnessing intense violence and being sexually assaulted, Lois 
believes that she has been forever changed.  Once seeing herself as a strong woman 
with a sense of direction and purpose and a love for beauty, she now experiences a 
profound self-doubt and self-disgust.  On the basis of this doubt and disgust, and upon 
reflection about its beginnings, she has come to believe that she may have 
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fundamentally changed from a “good” person to an “evil one” (McLay, 2012, page 95).  
Specifically, she suggests that she may have undergone a personal transformation into 
something evil as a result of her experiences: “I [once] had this idea of myself as strong 
and good.  But I have seen what I have seen, and now I have to ask myself…have I 
[become] evil as a result?” (McLay, 2012, page 95).  Lois’ sense of having become evil 
through witnessing and experiencing actions that she believes to be evil cannot and 
should not be simplistically dismissed as a mere metaphor.  Along with D. C. Hoop, she 
has experienced a powerful change in her self-identity, and like D. C. Hoop, this change 
has been accompanied by a belief that she has absorbed or become the evil she has 
witnessed in combat. Both Lois and Hoop have undergone extensive medical and 
psychotherapeutic interventions regarding this distressing change in self-identity, and 
yet the new self-identity endures for both of them, and seems irreversible to both of 
them.   
Leah Wizelman, in her book When the War Never Ends, captures the experience 
of the wife of a combat veteran of the Iraq War (2011).  When her husband first began 
displaying symptoms of PTSD, she found it difficult, but as his struggle became more 
pronounced, she began to see changes in his personality that she considered to be dark, 
“evil,” and “ugly” (Wizelman 2011, p. 58).  She felt that he had changed in a profound 
manner, and tried to force herself to remain positive and to convince herself that he was 
still the man she knew and loved, even though he seemed unrecognizable to her.  
Specifically, she came to believe that through his experiences, her husband had become 
attached to the monstrous things that he experienced in combat, and she claims that 
although she has tried to account for his changes in a different way, it is as if he met a 
 29 
“terrorizing monster” in battle, and brought the monster home (Wizelman, 2011, p. 57).  
Although Leah does not comment at length on her husband’s self-perception, or address 
whether considers himself as a monster or as someone who has become evil, she does 
mention that he seems disgusted by the changes he sees in himself, and seems confused 
about the nature of these changes (Wizelman, 2011).  In her narrative, Leah is not 
simply stating that she experiences fear or discomfort about her husband’s actions after 
homecoming, or that he is a terrorizing presence in the house because of angry 
outbursts.  From her perspective, he has changed profoundly in his inner life, and in 
spite of herself she experiences him now as a “monster” who has at least in part become 
dark and connected with evil (Wizelman, Ed., 2011, p. 58). 
 Tim, John Wolfe, Hoop, Lois, and Leah’s husband each had distinct experiences 
in combat, and they each have distinct experience of difficulty and disorientation upon 
returning home.  However, they share something in common that goes beyond their 
diagnosis with PTSD.  Along with Nathan and Harold they each have, in exposure to 
intense combat, experienced something they call evil or monstrous connected to the 
devastating violence and death they have witnessed, and they have become in their own 
view connected with this evil, causing them to mistrust or loathe themselves.  The effect 
of the horror of their experiences and their self-horror at the sense of how their 
experiences have impacted or changed them is overwhelming, and each of them has 
struggled to keep from becoming continuously preoccupied with their self-horror.  They 
have also each attempted to keep friends and precious others at a distance from them, 
for fear of passing on the evil they have known, or acting under the influence of evil to 
hurt them in some way. 
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Accounts of a Conscious Disconnect from Emotion and Bodily Sensation 
In 1985, Arthur Egendorf wrote on his work with an American soldier named 
Jim who realized soon after his return from Vietnam that “something wasn’t right with 
me…I felt a deep emptiness that had begun like a gnawing in my gut [even] as I was 
leaving Saigon” (p. 22).   This “gnawing” feeling that “something wasn’t right” had 
been steadily developing in Jim’s experience for years following his tour in Vietnam, 
and he noticed its development growing in proportion to an equally steady decline in his 
ability to remain in conscious contact with his physical senses and to experience the full 
range of his emotions.  By his own account, this phenomenon had begun soon after his 
involvement in a specific combat operation, in which he had witnessed and participated 
in the killing, dismemberment, and bodily desecration of both combatants and civilians.  
Jim’s distress was most pronounced and clear to him whenever he attempted to engage 
in intimate relationships, because from his perspective he noticed a profound difficulty 
in relating openly with the opposite sex, and although he physiologically experienced 
sexual arousal, he did not experience sexual pleasure or stimulation in a way that 
compared to sexual encounters that he experienced before his exposure to combat 
(Egendorf, 1985).   
Jim’s unfulfilling sexual encounters served to strengthen his feelings of inner 
emptiness even further:  
“With a woman I was both more aloof and hungrier to be involved than ever 
before.  Sitting next to [a woman named] Linda, I felt her scent draw me to her 
again.  We were together that night and for many nights afterwards.  I wanted 
her to hold me.  Tenderness and touching relieved me, but it didn’t make the 
gnawing go away.  I kept yearning for something more” (Egendorf, 1985, p. 23). 
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Jim also noticed that in general, since his homecoming, he did not feel able to 
relate to other people in simple conversations and social interactions.  This experience 
of being unable to significantly relate to significant others eventually came to be 
combined with an increasingly intense longing to relate to anyone at all, and 
simultaneously activated a profound sense of fear for Jim that his life was forever 
altered (Egendorf, 1985).  Complicating and frustrating his clinical treatment for PTSD, 
his primary suffering, as Jim saw it, was a sense of not being whole, and of being 
unable to connect with a part of himself he had once known.  This phenomenon was not 
easily categorized in the behavioral diagnosis of the mid-1980s.  In fact, this painful 
sense of fragmentation persisted even after 10 years of intense psychotherapeutic 
treatment, at the hands of various therapists with various orientations (Egendorf, 1985).  
Jim claimed that even after these years of treatment the “images of shattering brutality 
stay fixed in my mind,” and expressed an inability to be able to feel human compassion, 
kindness, joy, sorrow, or anger when faced with common encounters in the “business-
as-usual reality [of life at] home” (Egendorf, 1985, p. 6).  This spiraled into further 
alienation, at the very time when Jim most longed to connect with his family and 
community.  Egendorf describes Jim’s approach as a patient in the following way: 
“after years of taking pills and having therapists interpret his past and try to modify his 
behavior, Jim [really just] wanted to relate” (Egendorf, 1985, p. 6). 
This is a perfectly adequate summary of Jim’s disorientation – he could not 
relate.  He claimed that he had expected to “return as somebody’s hero,” and that he had 
hoped to make meaning of the violent and inhumane actions that he had witnessed and 
himself enacted by receiving adulation and recognition as a hero to his family, 
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community, and country (Egendorf, 1985, p. 6).  However, when he returned, no one 
even asked Jim about his experiences of war, and over time he began to realize that his 
actions were perhaps not heroic, and that they perhaps should bear scrutiny.  He began 
to believe that the brutality he had witnessed and carried out was not for some 
universally noble cause, but was perhaps just brutality (Egendorf, 1985).  Jim went from 
experiencing himself as a hero who was constrained by honor and country to do violent 
things to a person who had willingly chosen to do violent things.  Only a few months 
after returning, Jim no longer felt fully alive, and no longer felt whole (Egendorf, 1985).  
He felt as if he was a stranger to himself, his family, and society in general.    
Edward Tick worked extensively with a client named Art, who was a U.S. 
Marine infantryman that fought at Khe Sanh and elsewhere in Vietnam.  Art’s 
experience of social alienation and the loss of an ability to experience both emotion and 
felt sensation after combat is self-addressed in spiritual terms, and is particularly 
striking.  Art describes one particular moment in combat where he experienced what he 
calls a split between his soul and his body:  
“Let me tell you what it’s like.  You can feel the connection between your soul 
and body when it starts to break.  It’s like a thread that starts fraying.  I tried so 
hard during those long nights, the earth shuddering, my hands over my ears.  I 
concentrated to keep that thread from snapping.  But I could feel it getting 
thinner and thinner.  One day the enemy was coming up the hill.  They were 
thick that day…then mortars started falling on us…this time they were [going to 
overrun our position].  We had to hold the perimeter.  I was shooting and 
screaming.  I called for more ammo belts.  I looked around.  I was the only one 
left…I flew out of that foxhole.  My feet were pounding the mud. Bullets were 
whizzing by me, and I was a goner for sure.  That’s when it happened…I felt it, 
Doc.  The cord snapped.  My soul ran right out of my body.  It ran faster than 
me…[once I stopped running] I saw my soul shake its head.  There was no way 
it was going to move back inside my body” (Tick, 2005, p. 15). 
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Art’s description of his life following his combat tour in Vietnam is one full of such 
spiritual language.  He claims to be “living without a soul,” and although he sometimes 
experiences his soul as being in close proximity, he has not felt whole now for more 
than 30 years (Tick, 2005, p. 15).  What he describes as living without as soul is, for 
Art, a terrifying experience.  He claims to see the ghosts of the people he has killed 
almost all of the time, and senses his death so imminently that he has numbed himself to 
the fear of it, even though he is still preoccupied with his death and the deaths of the 
people he knew in combat constantly (Tick, 2005).  Tick describes his condition as the 
“removal of [Art’s] center of experience from his living body,” and notes that Art is not 
able to fully experience anything that happens to him in the present, and can make no 
continuous meaning of his life as it courses – for Tick, it appears that Art lives through 
the course of his life “without differentiation or continuity” (2005, p. 15). 
 What Art describes as an internal break between his soul and body occurred, 
from his own perspective, after prolonged fear of death and continuous exposure to 
violence and seemingly chaotic circumstances in combat.  He claims that his soul was 
no longer able to endure the devastation he was experiencing, and that it eventually it 
fled his body, leaving him existentially fragmented.  It is important to note that 
survivors of a number of types of extreme adversity have described the sensation of 
experiencing a break in mind-body or soul-body coherence during or after their 
exposure to adversity.  “Nichole Fox,” a survivor of aggravated sexual assault, claims 
that during her rape she felt a break within herself (interview, 2012).  She claims she 
was “overcome by my attack,” and felt that the event “choked my soul out of my body 
completely” (Fox, interview, 2012).  Similar to Art, Nichole describes the aftermath of 
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her exposure to adversity as a process of struggling to recover a lost part of herself 
which she is fully aware of missing, and which seems to her to be connected with both a 
loss of contact with the full range of her emotions and the loss of her ability to relate to 
other people (Fox, interview, 2012).   
In their 2001 work on veteran care, Friedman and Lindy describe working with a 
Vietnam veteran named John.  As John struggled to reintegrate with his friends and 
family in the years following his homecoming from war, he described an inability to 
regain any closeness with them, and in his description of this experience he claimed that 
when he was with others who had once been precious to him, only his body now 
seemed to be in the room with them – his emotional connection with them and his inner 
vitality in general seemed to him to be missing (Friedman & Lindy, 2001).  His family 
described the situation as having lost “the real John,” and from their perspective, he was 
only partly with them: “what we saw was his ghost” (Friedman & Lindy, 2001, p. 343).  
Victoria Beckner and John Arden describe their work with a contemporary combat 
veteran named Dan, who claimed to experience himself as “a shell” of what he had been 
before his time in a war zone: “…everywhere he went, he was like a ghost” (Beckner 
and Arden, 2008, p. 243).  Dan, like Jim, wanted to reconnect with his friends, his 
family, his hometown, and even himself, but he did not know how, and dealt with a 
constant sense that he was no longer whole as a human being.   
Scott Blake, a British combat veteran of the recent war in Afghanistan, and Tim 
Segrest, an American combat veteran, both relate to this “ghost-like quality” of living in 
the aftermath of war without being able to contact inner compassion and vitality (Blake, 
2008, p. 5).  Scott Blake, upon his homecoming, describes his return in terms of 
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becoming like the “living dead” (2008, p. 5).  From his perspective, he “walked around 
like a zombie” during the day, wishing he was dead, and not feeling either emotionally 
or socially connected to his environment (Blake, 2008, p. 5).  Tim Segrest finds it 
difficult to explain his profound sense of “emptiness from [within]” after combat, but in 
his attempt to explain, he describes a separation between what he identifies as his 
essential self and his continued experience of living within his own body – a 
“separation…[and the] loss of who I am” (Segrest, 2008, p. 198).  Segrest claims that he 
began to experience this separation between his body and his self-identity after shooting 
a young girl in a very complex combat scenario during his time in the Middle East.  Of 
the experience, he remembers this: “I was ordered to shoot…we never met…we never 
spoke…I just killed her” (Segrest, 2008, p. 198).  In the aftermath of this action, Tim 
has not only experienced a separation between body and self-identity, but from his own 
perspective, he no longer feels anything except a profound emptiness (Segrest, 2008). 
 Jim, Art, John, Dan, Scott, and Tim each describe a fully self-conscious loss of 
emotional connection with precious others and a simultaneous loss of connection 
between their physical sensations and their experience of themselves.  This evidences a 
conscious lack of the felt sense of being alive, and for each of them includes a feeling of 
profound emptiness, a ghost-like or zombie-like sensation, and an inability to 
significantly relate to other people and to access the inner vitality that makes life seem 
interesting, beautiful, and worth living.  This loss of feeling alive, combined with a 
sense of not being whole, results in a feeling of being self-haunted, and has proven 
resistant to intense psychotherapy. 
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Accounts of a Persistent, Socially Debilitating Mistrust  
 Jonathan Shay writes about his work with a Vietnam veteran who describes the 
gradual dissolution of his entire sense of social understanding and public safety after his 
experiences in combat (1994).  The veteran felt a deep sense of betrayal during the war, 
believing that his leadership was neither honest with him as he prepared for deployment 
nor responsible in adequately supporting him with the tools and direction he needed to 
face the challenges he met once he was there.  In the years following his homecoming, 
his loss of trust in combat leadership expanded into a profound skepticism about the 
lessons he had received throughout his life by people in positions of power.  He began 
to adopt the believe that life has no possibility of a coherent structure, and that there is 
no reliable way of knowing anything except by personal experience, because “nothing 
is what it seems” (Shay, 1994, p. 170).  His own description of the process of losing 
meaning and coherence in his life – which, from his own perspective, was activated by 
the loss of an ability to trust any authority structure – includes ideas that represent a 
profoundly disorienting epistemological confusion: “that mountain there – maybe it 
wasn’t there yesterday, and won’t be there tomorrow.  You get to the point where 
you’re not even sure there is a mountain” (Shay, 1994, p. 170). 
 Sergeant Nathan Everly, a veteran of the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, has 
experienced a similar evolutionary process of lost trust in military leadership leading to 
the loss of an ability to trust anyone or anything of significance in his life.  He feels that 
his military leadership has failed him overall, but most especially in the combat zone, 
and that he doesn’t trust any person in authority since his first homecoming (Everly, 
interview, 2010).  He says that he doesn’t believe in “anyone or anything, not my 
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leaders or God or even my own mother – and definitely not myself.  I don’t trust myself 
at all.  I barely exist” (Everly, interview, 2010).  Everly’s loss of trust in his leadership 
is also connected to an inability to make meaning of his own actions in combat, and 
these losses have led to a significant loss of function in his personal and professional 
life.  He describes himself as being unable to build relationships in romantic love 
because “I get so jealous, and I know I shouldn’t, but I start screaming every time I get 
jealous and she just says my eyes look creepy and that I’m really scaring her and then 
she leaves… I know [the girls I’m with] probably aren’t cheating, but I can’t shake the 
feeling that they are.  I just can’t trust anybody” (Everly, interview, 2010).  He also 
describes himself as unable to lead Marines in a conscientious way, because he thinks 
the military emphasis on values such as honor and duty is “completely bullshit,” and 
having himself lost the ability to attribute any meaning to such terms, he refuses to hold 
anyone else accountable for living under the influence of such terms (Everly, interview, 
2010). 
 Everly’s loss of religious faith is connected to his loss of faith in the Marine 
Corps, in his judgment.  He claims that the things he has seen have made him question 
whether there is anything true, honest, or even real in the universe, and whether there is 
any “meaning behind anything” (Everly, interview, 2010).  No longer holding religious 
faith, which once informed his thoughts and behavior, he has difficulty restraining 
himself when aroused in anger or sexual attraction.  When he experiences anger towards 
someone, he claims to immediately want to kill them and mutilate their bodies.  About 
his ability to restrain himself from acting on such impulses, he says, “I don’t stop 
myself because I think it’s wrong.  I don’t feel like anything is right or wrong, although 
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I think I probably should.  I only stop myself because I don’t want to be in 
jail…although sometimes I don’t care much about that either” (Everly, interview, 
2010). 
 Hautzinger and Scandlyn discuss the difficulties in homecoming of a soldier in 
the Iraq War named John Needham, who subsequently died by suicide a few years after 
returning from combat – a death that they describe as “a fatal moral injury” (2013, p. 
112).  John witnessed brutal violence against civilians in Iraq, which he sensed was 
condoned and even encouraged by his military leaders.  He claimed to experience a 
direct “betrayal by his peers and superior officers,” who had taught him about an ethical 
code of war fighting but then encouraged and even compelled him to kill civilians once 
they encountered heavy troop casualties in combat – an act tantamount in his own mind 
to murder (Hautzinger & Scandlyn, 2013, p. 111).  John felt powerless to stop the 
inhumane actions of his unit, and after returning home and being diagnosed with PTSD, 
he attributed the source of his profound disorientation to this betrayal.  John had 
difficulty, before his death, trusting anyone, or allowing himself to become emotionally 
close with anyone, and at one point, in what investigators described as an apparently 
paranoid state, he murdered his girlfriend (Hautzinger & Scandlyn, 2013).  This use of 
the term paranoia was an attempt by civic officials to describe the extreme state of 
mistrust that characterized John’s relationships in the months before his homicidal and 
suicidal actions. 
Cantrell and Dean relate their work with a veteran of American Special Forces 
who killed a large number of armed political antagonists outside of a status of declared 
war in classified combat operations in South America during the 1980s (2005).  This 
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soldier describes what he considered to be an unforgivable betrayal by the allies he was 
supposed to be helping and advising during one combat engagement, and he also 
describes how, in the process of extricating himself from the skirmish, he received a 
severe physical wound.  His gradual loss of trust in his comrades in arms, in society at 
large, and in God over the next three decades was expressed as an evolution, and in this 
sense bears a similarity to the narratives of both Shay’s veteran and Everly, as 
recounted earlier in this section.  First, he felt betrayed by the indigenous allied force 
with whom he had been partnering, and attributes to this betrayal his difficulty in 
trusting anyone in almost any situation “to this day” (Cantrell & Dean, 2005, p. 65).  
Secondly, the classified nature of his missions kept him from receiving some of the 
follow-up medical care he needed after being separated from the military because of his 
wounds.  He claims that he had always previously believed the military would care for 
him in any way necessary after he served his country in combat, but that eventually he 
came to believe he had simply been “deceived, [after which] bitterness set in with a 
vengeance” (Cantrell & Dean, 2005, p. 65).  Third, he eventually began questioning the 
moral and ethical clarity of many of the missions that the military had ordered him into, 
especially in light of the fact that he had been asked to engage persons in combat 
without a formal declaration of war: 
“I had been brought up in a church believing the human life was sacred, and 
now I was faced with the fact that I had [acted against all of] that…I really 
didn’t know what God thought about me killing people, and I wasn’t sure that he 
would forgive me for it.  My life has become an array of shattered dreams.  If I 
did all those things for God, duty, and country, then why have I been [left] like 
this?” (Cantrell & Dean, 2005, p. 66) 
 
The last sentence of this quote is a brief acknowledgement of the severe forms of 
spiritual, emotional, psychological, and social disorientation that this soldier has 
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experienced in the decades following his homecoming, the totality of which he does not 
discuss in his interview. 
 Shay’s Vietnam veteran, John Needham, Cantrell and Dean’s special forces 
soldier, and Sergeant Nathan Everly have each experienced a persistent and socially 
debilitating sense of mistrust after their experiences in combat, leaving them unable to 
enter into and maintain meaningful relationships.  Shay’s veteran felt so betrayed and 
disoriented by those he trusted that he found it difficult to assign stability or 
permanency to almost any object, much less any person (Shay, 1994).  John Needham 
murdered his girlfriend and killed himself after living for years with what he considered 
to be “the venom” of betrayal in war (Hautzinger & Scandlyn, 2013, p. 92).  Cantrell 
and Dean’s special forces soldier calls his life after war a series of shattered dreams, and 
claims to be unable to trust anyone in his life, and unable to maintain belief in God or 
an absolute, permanent good in the universe (2005).  Everly’s mistrust is combined with 
extreme agitation and feelings of murderous aggression, and it has kept him from 
connecting in love, with family, and at work.  He has also lost faith in God, and 
experiences that vacuum as a painful absence of safety and order in the world (Everly, 
interview, 2010). 
 From their accounts, it appears as if a radical loss of trust in people and in 
previously held belief structures is activated by an experience of betrayal by leadership 
or comrades in combat, and may eventually culminate in a veteran’s belief that his own 
actions in combat were not justified, and were perhaps tantamount to murder.  The 
extreme social, psychological, emotional, and spiritual impact of this disorientation of 
trust does not seem to extend only to a persistent distrust of authority figures, but rather 
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appears to culminate in a condition in which the veteran cannot relate to anyone who 
might be able to hurt or betray him, and protects himself from such persons as if his life 
depended on it. 
 
Accounts of a Radical Dissolution of Moral Intuition and Narrative Coherence 
 
Edward Tick, in detailing his therapeutic work with an American veteran that 
participated in the infamous war crimes at My Lai in the country of Vietnam, describes 
his subject as a man who simultaneously experienced both a profound loss of moral 
meaning and a profound loss of narrative cohesion in his worldview:  
“…the predominant…tone [with this veteran] is all-encompassing absurdity and 
moral inversion.  The absurdity has to do with being alien and profoundly lost, 
yet at the same time locked into a situation as meaningless and unreal as it is 
deadly.  The moral inversion, eventuating in the sense of [his having become 
united with] evil, has to do not only with the absolute reversal of ethical 
standards but with its occurrence in absurdity, without inner justification, so that 
the killing is rendered naked” (Tick, 2005, p. 113). 
 
Tick’s use of the term “moral inversion” attempts to account for his client’s 
development of such an extensive moral disorientation that all existing moral codes 
seem to him to be not only arbitrary but also comical – a condition ultimately 
culminating in a position toward the world in which any action was no less moral in 
reality than any other (Tick, 2005, p. 113).  When this veteran entered pre-combat 
training for the war in Vietnam, he had held a strong internal sense of right and wrong, 
and had also adopted a belief in the just nature of American warfare, as taught to him by 
his community leaders.  During his initial months of service in combat, these moral 
structures remained intact, and had a direct impact on his martial decision-making, 
especially when considering discrimination and proportionality in his actions (Tick, 
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2005).  However, he eventually began to see hypocrisy in his military leadership, and to 
overhear conversations in which his leaders discussed the conflict in Vietnam as a 
meaningless, political venture.  As he questioned the just nature of the conflict, he 
realized that almost none of his comrades in arms or leaders believed it to be just in any 
way, even as they continued to encourage him to act in violence anyway (Tick, 2005).   
This is the setting for what Tick describes as his descent into a position of being 
“profoundly lost,” and also the development of his sense of being “rendered naked” in 
his acts of killing – a metaphor that describes his growing belief that the men he had 
killed had actually been unjustly murdered (Tick, 2005, p. 113).   
Shannon French argues that “believing you are on the side of right in combat 
could be the difference between keeping your humanity and character intact, or losing 
yourself to the savagery and psychological trauma of human conflict” (French, 
unpublished lecture, 2007).  This veteran of My Lai suffered just such a loss of his 
humanity, and in its aftermath has experienced just such a loss of self.  As he came to 
believe that none of his killing could be justified, and was yet continually compelled to 
kill Vietnamese insurgents, he experienced the dissolution of his previously functional 
moral intuition and the activation of a profound sense of the meaninglessness of his own 
life and actions (Tick, 2005).  By the time he entered the village of My Lai, Tick argues 
that he had no ability to discern moral and immoral actions in combat – and in fact such 
categories seemed to him to be “all-encompassingly absurd” (2005, p. 113).  Nancy 
Sherman discusses a similar situation with the four Marines charged with murder after 
their actions in Haditha, Iraq led to the death of 24 innocent civilians (2011).  The 
experience of a rapid loss in the efficacy of their moral intuition began before they ever 
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reached Haditha, and when one Marine opened fire into the innocent crowd, the others 
quickly followed suit, and did not stop amidst the cries of the men, women, and children 
whom they were shooting (Sherman, 2011). 
Eugene Sledge recounts his experiences in combat as a Marine during the 
invasion of Okinawa in 1945 (2007).  His Third Battalion, Fifth Marine Regiment 
comrades had already seen brutal fighting through the Pacific theater, and most recently 
on Peleliu, which Sledge describes from his own memory as one of the most “hellish” 
battles of the war (2007, p. 190).  Japanese soldiers had been performing inhumane and 
gruesome acts upon American corpses left exposed on the ground overnight throughout 
all of the island campaigns, and in the ensuing development of hatred of the enemy, 
combined with the miserable human conditions on the ground, including driving rain, 
mudslides, and the horror of having decayed corpses continually decimated and re-
distributed in pieces into the ranks of the living by artillery shelling from both sides, 
Sledge recalls the radical moral disintegration of one of the Marine officers in his unit 
(2007).   
Lieutenant “Mac” began acting erratically as the Battle for Okinawa expanded 
and the American casualties mounted.  On one occasion, after coming across a number 
of deceased Japanese soldiers decomposing on the side of a ridge, “Mac” insisted on 
turning each corpse over, pulling its trousers down over its knees, “trying very carefully 
to blast off the head of the corpse’s penis,” and then cheering over his aim when he 
succeeded (Sledge, 2007, p. 198).  His men were horrified, even given their own 
miserable experiences of war and their desensitization to many forms of inhumanity.  
Mac also had the habit of delaying urination until he was able to find a suitable 
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Japanese corpse, after which he would open its mouth and urinate into it, making 
cheerful comments about his aim and the sounds that his urine made (Sledge, 2007). 
Mac was surprised by his men’s horrified reactions to his behavior, which in 
turn further surprised and disoriented his men.  Sledge recalls Mac as “a decent, clean-
cut man, but one of those who apparently felt no restraints under the brutalizing 
influence of war…[he had] ghoulish, obscene tendencies that revolted even the most 
hardened and callous men I knew” (Sledge, 2007, p. 199).  Mac’s ability to present a 
clean, competent and professional image to his men except when he came into contact 
with enemy bodies suggests the combat-impairment of his moral intuition, leaving him 
incapable of discerning humane and socially acceptable actions in certain situations.  A 
Marine officer is expected to be a moral exemplar for his men, especially in time of 
combat, and yet Sledge believes that in combat Mac’s moral intuition suffered profound 
disorientation, leading to his ability to participate in shockingly inhumane behavior 
even as he was able to relate to his men and his environment appropriately in other 
circumstances (2007). 
In 2003, Specialist Richard T. Davis was murdered, burned, and dismembered 
by four of his comrades soon after they returned from combat operations in Iraq 
(McCain, 2009).  Richard and his comrades has been involved in intense action during 
their deployment, including a nearly six hour firefight that one reporter called “one of 
the most hellish and controversial engagements of the war,” in which as many as 100 
Iraqi soldiers were killed (Boal, 2004, p. 3).  One soldier involved in the battle said this, 
about its aftermath: “the street was shrouded in smoke, slick with blood and body parts.  
You saw legs, arms, and just meat…there was – I don’t know what it was.  It looked 
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like a big steak stuck to the side of our Bradley, and later we had to take it off…we took 
a picture” (Boal, 2004, p. 3).  At least five counts of potential war crimes were 
investigated after the battle, as reports of savage and sometimes sadistic treatment of the 
enemy surfaced, and as grotesque trophy-like displays of dismembered bodies were 
reportedly hung around the command compound (Boal, 2004). 
According to the prosecuting counsel of Richard’s murder trial, after engaging 
in an argument outside of an exotic dancing establishment a few nights after their 
homecoming from Iraq, one of Richard’s comrades, Specialist Alberto Martinez, beat 
Richard extensively and then stabbed him in the chest at least 33 times, twisting the 
knife as it repeatedly entered and exited Richard’s body (McCain, 2009).  Specialist 
Mario Navarrete, another of Richard’s comrades, then poured lighter fluid over 
Richard’s body and lit him on fire (McCain, 2009).  Martinez, who was also accused of 
rape during the combat tour, Jacob Burgoyne, another of the companions who had been 
on “suicide watch” for many weeks during the combat tour because of suicidal and 
homicidal ideations, and the two others present then left the scene of the crime, acting 
as if nothing had occured (Boal, 2004, p. 5). 
During the ensuing investigation, detectives struggled to discover a likely 
motive for murder.  Jacob Burgoyne displayed a cold distance while discussing the most 
gruesome parts of the murder with detectives, leading one investigator to claim that he 
“was so cold it unnerved me,” and to add that of all the murder suspects he had ever 
investigated, none had seemed so distant from any sense of human compassion 
(McCain, 2009, p. 52).  In the 2007 film adaptation of the story, entitled In the Valley of 
Elah, director Paul Haggis provided a chilling portrayal of the emotionally distant and 
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morally disoriented state of the murderers (Becsey, 2007, Motion picture).  Martinez 
describes his memory of the murder as “looking down at my hands and realizing that I 
was stabbing him,” and one of the other soldiers mentioned that, after Richard was 
dead, they had considered dicing the remains and burying the pieces, but they “were all 
so hungry,” and instead left to dine at a nearby chicken restaurant (Becsey, 2007, 
Motion picture). 
Martinez and Burgoyne displayed a disconcerting inability to discern the moral 
nature of their actions when reflecting on their murder of a friend and teammate, but 
even more unusual is their inability to place their actions into any coherent context of 
meaning, and to judge how any action could be understood as better or worse than 
another.  In this their condition bears a connection with Tick’s description of "moral 
inversion" on the part of his patient that had participated in the My Lai massacre (2005).  
What judges, reporters, community leaders, military leaders, and their own family 
members considered outrageous and bizarre criminal behavior, Martinez and Burgoyne 
seemed to consider normal and understandable given their circumstances.  Indeed, a 
number of observers noticed that the two soldiers seemed to be just as confused about 
the public responses of horror over their actions as the public seemed confused over the 
two soldiers' apparent lack of horror (Boal, 2004).  Formulated in this way, an inversion 
of moral intuition is clearly apparent, and consequently the two soldiers have developed 
a worldview that may be labeled, in Tick's words, “all-encompassingly absurd” (2005).     
Tick’s My Lai veteran, Lieutenant “Mac,” and Martinez and Burgoyne, all 
involved in war crimes that feature an unusual disregard for human life, have each 
demonstrated a significant loss in the capacity for moral discernment with which they 
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entered combat.  Simultaneously, and relatedly, they have each demonstrated a position 
of confused distance from their society’s expectations of humane behavior as a part of a 
larger coherent worldview, which worldview appears to them as irrelevant or absurd.  
Richard Howard’s description earlier in this chapter of experiencing elation when he 
was killing, but realizing his teammates thought him strange in those moments, evinces 
something similar.  Exposure to intense combat, the complex experience of holding 
power over human life in the act of killing, and mixed messages from leadership on 
what is and is not acceptable behavior in war all appear to be contributing factors to the 
dissolution of moral intuition and narrative coherence that these veterans have endured 
upon homecoming.   
 
Accounts of an Uncontrollable, Lustful Rage 
 
David Philipps writes about his encounters with a veteran named Marquez, 
whose fellow soldiers during Operation Iraqi Freedom described him as “the platoon’s 
pit bull” (2010, p. 72).  One of these fellow soldiers explained the description in the 
following terms: “we called ourselves ‘the Bad Boys,’ and we really were bad boys.  
We had to be, in a city like Ramadi.  We did a lot of bad things.  Beating.  Killing.  And 
for that, Marquez was really good.  He would do anything you wanted him to do, but 
you needed to keep him on a short leash, because he’d also do what you didn’t want 
him to do” (Phillips, 2010, p. 72).  From his own perspective, Marquez did not enter his 
service in Iraq being unable to control his actions or prone to rage.  Reflecting on the 
past, he noticed that he had gradually become more violent and unpredictable as his tour 
of duty progressed, and he particularly noticed a change in his mode of relating to 
others after an accident in which his friends became trapped in an armored vehicle that 
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had ignited into flame.  He had watched helplessly and listened to their screams as they 
burned to death, as no extraction had been possible (Philipps, 2010).   
In the aftermath of that accident, Marquez remembered feeling extreme 
exhaustion, and at times experienced impulses “to blow his head off,” but his suicidal 
ideation was not persistent (Philipps, 2010, p. 72).  Eventually, he began conducting his 
responsibilities in combat with what he now recalls as a lack of feeling, although from 
time to time he would become unpredictably angry and energetic, and act without 
restraint towards the enemy (Philipps, 2010).  From his recollection, he did not 
experience pleasure in killing, but he did experience exhilaration, and once he began 
acting violently, he was not able to stop on his own accord (Philipps, 2010). 
Jonathan Shay recounts his work with a Marine veteran from Vietnam, who 
recalled entering a state of wild rage in combat that had continued to profoundly effect 
him even decades after the war:  
“I was walking point.  I had seen this [North Vietnamese Army] NVA soldier at 
a distance.  We were approaching him and he spotted us.  We spread out to look 
for him.  I was coming around a stand of grass and heard a noise…I stuck my 
head in the bush and saw this NVA hiding there and told him to come out.  He 
started to move back and I saw he had one of those commando weapons…and 
he brought it up and I was looking straight down the bore.  I pulled the trigger 
on my M-16 and nothing happened.  He fired and I felt this burning on my 
cheek.  I don’t know what I did with the bolt of the 16, but I got it to fire, and I 
emptied everything I had into him.  Then I saw blood dripping on the back of 
my hand and I just went crazy.  I pulled him into the paddy and carved him up 
with my knife.  When I was done with him, he looked like a rag doll that a dog 
had been playing with.  Even then I wasn’t satisfied.  I was fighting with the 
medical corpsmen trying to take care of me.  I was trying to get at him for 
more…I lost all my mercy.  I felt a drastic change after that.  I just couldn’t get 
enough.  I built up so much hate, I just couldn’t do enough damage…got worse 
as time went by.  I really loved fucking killing, couldn’t get enough.  For every 
one I killed I felt better” (Shay, 1994, p. 78-79). 
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Shay notes that, in his experience, this tendency among warriors to enter into a state of 
energetic violence in combat with little ability for self-restraint and little contact with 
conscience is uncommon but not unprecedented, and further expresses the opinion that 
veterans who have entered into such a state are far more likely to experience the most 
complex forms of disorientation upon homecoming.  He uses the label “berserk state” to 
approach the phenomenon, and clearly voices his concern for its impact on returning 
warriors: “on the basis of my work with Vietnam veterans, I conclude that the berserk 
state is ruinous, leading to the soldier’s maiming or death in battle – which is the most 
frequent outcome – and to lifelong psychological and physiological injury if he 
survives.  I believe that once a person has entered the berserk state, he or she is changed 
forever” (Shay, 1994, p. 98).  
 Edward Tick also discusses this phenomenon in describing his work with 
combat veterans, and in the same terms (2004).  He notes that the onset of the berserk 
state often seems to begin with the development of a sense of helplessness in combat, 
especially after a warrior has seen a comrade or an innocent civilian killed or maimed 
by an enemy combatant – in which case the warrior may also experience the activation 
of an impulse towards revenge (2004).  Tick stresses the importance of the origin of the 
concept of the berserk state in Norse mythology and military history, where leaders of 
men would evoke the idea of putting on a ferocious “animal self,” and in fact would 
whip their warriors into a frenzy, urging them to become “as frantic as dogs or wolves, 
[biting] their shields, [slaying] men, and [believing that] neither fire nor iron could hurt 
them (2004, p. 37).   
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In agreement with Shay, Tick’s recognizes in his own work that once a warrior 
enters into a state of uncontrollable rage in combat, the warrior’s homecoming process 
will become far more complicated, and the warrior is likely to experience long-term 
disorientation which may  “shape character for life” (2004, p. 37).  One of Tick’s 
clients, who served in ground combat in Vietnam, admitted decades after the war that he 
volunteered for combat because he longed to kill and destroy Vietnamese people – 
nothing more, and nothing less.  He claims to have gone “because those bastards killed 
my cousin.  I only went for revenge.  I don’t give a damn that we lost…” (2004, p. 90).  
After the war, this combat veteran has experienced chronic and unpredictable entries 
into an energetic state of violent rage, during which he experiences strong impulse to 
kill people around him.  Another of Tick’s clients, a veteran named Lenny, details his 
experience of “post-berserk” life in society even decades after the war in this way: “[For 
thirty years I have] avoided Chinese restaurants and fled public spaces whenever [I see] 
a person of Asian descent because I can’t tell them apart and if I got near I’d lose it and 
kill them” (2004, p. 90). 
Sergeant Nathan Everly, during his last deployment to Afghanistan, found 
himself wanting to murder people – or, worse, to maim them and then watch them 
suffer – almost every time he faced a stressor in his environment, or entered an 
argument with someone.  This tendency abides after homecoming, and frightens him on 
occasion, because he does not feel able to control himself when he enters a rage, and he 
has not been able to gain insight into his rages in psychotherapeutic treatment (Everly, 
interview, 2010).  Sergeant Harold Miller entered into what he described as a state of 
ecstasy when in combat, and especially when he was in the act of killing, becoming full 
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of energy, exhilaration and joy, and feeling invincible (Miller, interview, 2014).   Since 
returning he has not been able to experience joy or ecstasy in another way, even though 
he has pursued these experiences in a high-risk manner, through recreational drug use 
and sexual promiscuity (Miller, interview, 2014).  He describes feeling numb unless he 
has entered into a violent rage, which occurs unpredictably (Miller, interview, 2014). 
Walter McDermott works with a combat veteran from the Iraq War who 
experiences similarly unexpected and violent episodes of rage, and who sometimes feels 
incapable of restraining himself from acting on destructive impulses (2012).  When the 
veteran first entered treatment for PTSD, he had been mandated by the courts for 
treatment because of an assault conviction for battering his elderly grandmother into 
critical condition (McDermott, 2012).  According to his own account, he “went berserk” 
when his grandmother was scolding him and attacked her with his fists.  Afterwards he 
claimed that he knew what he was doing was somehow wrong, but only in an abstract 
way, because his only feeling in the moment was rage and exhilaration (McDermott, 
2012, p. 143).   
D. C. Hoop describes what he considers to be a lasting consequence of having 
once entered into wild, unbridled rage in combat, after which he had become “like an 
animal” trying to return to society (2010, p. 54).  Like Shay’s veteran, he describes his 
episodes of rage upon homecoming not only as an unexpected experience of anger, but 
also as a sense of all-encompassing hatred, ready to be attached to anyone or anything 
(Hoop, 2010).  He describes this process as “hate taking over my world…turning my 
heart cold inside my chest” (Hoop, 2010, p. 54).  When the “hate takes over,” Hoop 
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explains that he finds himself “able to do unthinkable things, excited by the absurdity of 
it all” (2010, p. 54). 
Hoop’s self-description depicts movement between feeling like an animal and an 
immortal, before, during and after his episodes of rage.  Shay also describes this 
movement in self-identity among survivors of combat who have entered the berserk 
state, noting that “the berserker feels like a god” when he is engaged his violent action, 
but afterwards can feel less than human (1994, p. 97).   In states of rage upon 
homecoming, the warrior can experience his intense impulses toward violence as 
accompanied by strong feelings of power, victorious satisfaction, and even sexual 
stimulation.  Bob Steck, a Vietnam veteran interviewed by Nancy Sherman, talks about 
having haunting experiences of sexual power and discharge in combat that engender a 
powerful confusion in the moment and in the aftermath, upon homecoming (Sherman, 
2011, p. 78).   
David Phillips quotes a soldier named Mifflin who experienced something 
similar, in his exposure to combat: “it was the oddest feeling.  The only way to describe 
combat is that it is like being raped, but really enjoying it.  It scars you, it’s horrible, but 
at the same time, you start to like it” (Phillips, 2010, p. 76).  Stephen Muse, in his work 
with one soldier, speaks of the complicated psychological and spiritual injuries that can 
accompany sexual release in the act of killing, affect a soldier’s understanding of the 
meaning of his own sexuality, and the meaning of the act of killing in which he was 
engaged (Muse, interview, 2012).  In such cases, the convergence of powerful inner 
states that are not often experienced together, such as sexual release, horror, victorious 
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elation, disgust, and self-doubt, seem to profoundly disorient the post-berserk warrior, 
and to profoundly shape his post-combat position towards the world. 
Specialist Marquez, Sergeant Nathan Everly, Sergeant Harold Miller, D. C. 
Coop, and Mifflin are examples of warriors returning from combat that have 
experienced a complicated, abiding sense of lustful rage upon homecoming that appears 
clearly connected to moments in combat when they lost self-restraint and began acting 
wildly in violence towards their enemies, often entering into acts of inhumanity.  In 
their own descriptions, having once crossed into this state of unrestrained violence in 
combat, they were more likely to have entered the state again in combat, and - upon 
homecoming - to enter unpredictably into similar states even decades later. 
This tendency appears to be resistant to many common psychotherapeutic interventions, 
leading Shay, Tick, and others to believe that it may lead to an irreversible change in the 
character patterns of effected veterans (Shay, 1994). 
 
A Summary of Five Related Elements 
 This chapter has illuminated five distinct forms of disorientation found among 
the most distressed of returning veterans, apparently activated during participation in 
intense combat operations: (1) a self-horror connected to the sense of having absorbing 
something evil in combat, (2) a conscious experience of being disconnected from 
emotion and bodily sensation, (3) a persistent, socially debilitating mistrust, (4) a 
radical dissolution of moral intuition and narrative coherence, and (5) lustful, 
uncontrollable rage.  These elements appear to be interrelated, in that veterans who 
experience one of these elements appear likely to experience others.  This is 
 54 
demonstrated in the juxtaposition of the narratives of Richard Howard, Nathan Everly, 
and Harold Miller at the beginning of the chapter, each of which demonstrated three or 
more of the five, and which together illustrate all five.   
There are also aspects of the individual accounts of each of these three veterans 
that provide evidence of the direct relation of one or more of the elements highlighted, 
in the sense that one or more elements appear to have contributed to the development of 
another.  For instance, Richard’s description of a conscious disconnect from his 
emotions and from bodily sensation is clearly related to his entry into episodes of rage, 
because he claims that he is “only feeling anything when he is raging” – which is rare in 
any case (Howard, interview, 2014).  In Richard’s experience, then, the interplay 
between the two disorienting elements is one of activation and deactivation of one in 
response to the other – i.e. he claims to feel nothing, and then enters into a rage, during 
which he feels exhilaration, and upon exiting his episode of rage he once again feels 
nothing.  Similarly, Everly’s episodes of rage are related to both extreme social mistrust 
and also his sense of the presence of something evil within him.  He describes himself 
as especially dangerous when interacting with either supervisors at work or with people 
that he depends on some way, and feels unpredictable in his potential to harm them 
without warning, in the event that something might “trigger the blackout rage” (Everly, 
interview, 2010). He describes himself as both unable to trust anyone and quick to 
become murderous towards anyone who seems to belittle or betray him, demonstrating 
a clear relationship between rage, mistrust, and the sense of evil within him. 
 Miller’s sense of evil within appears related to his social mistrust and his loss of 
narrative coherence.  He describes himself as unable to entrust himself to others in any 
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context, but he also describes himself as untrustworthy to himself, as he believed that he 
cannot trust the evil part of himself not to hurt and terrorize others if they come into 
close proximity with him (Miller, interview, 2014).  His belief in a higher power as a 
young man has dissolved, but his sense of the evil he believes that he has encountered – 
and that he believes is now a part of him – supports a sense that he has now way of 
knowing whether or not there is any “good or bad in the world,” or how anyone can 
claim to know who has been through experiences similar to his (Miller, interview, 
2014).    
 D. C. Hoop’s sense of having absorbed evil in combat is connected with his 
episodes of rage and his sense of meaninglessness and incoherence.  He describes the 
strong sense that a “monster” entered into him after he was reduced to an “animal-like” 
state in combat, a sense that has not diminished since his homecoming (Hoop, 2010, p. 
54).  In the times when he describes his “hate taking over,” he finds his worldview 
dissolving into meaninglessness and “absurdity,” where actions and ideas that formerly 
would have seemed monstrous now seem to him to be “exciting” (Hoop, 2010, p. 54).  
In these self-descriptions, Hoop demonstrates a relationship between the sense of 
having absorbed evil, his episodes of uncontrollable rage, and the dissolution of his 
narrative coherence. 
 Although the connections between these elements are not fully clear, some 
relationships are evident, and the presence of one of these five elements in the 
experience of a returning warrior should alert observers to the possibility of the 
presence of more of them.  This is the very nature of a syndrome, in that these elements 
present a clustered picture of a complex form of disorientation in which the presence of 
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one element points to the potential presence of the others, although the nature of the 
connections is not fully understood (Martin, 2010).  That being noted, it will prove 
helpful to delay using the label syndrome until it is certain that a medical or psychiatric 
approach is an appropriate avenue of orientation, given that the term syndrome is often 
associated with the psychiatric paradigm.  
  
A Working Label for the Phenomenon 
It will be doubtless be useful to assign a theoretically neutral working label to 
the phenomenon and its five elements, in order to aid concise and organized discussion 
in further chapters.  The label Complex Combat Activated Disorientation or CCAD will 
prove sufficient. Papadopoulos warns caregivers about using terms like trauma or 
disorder when working with people who have survived an adversity and are in distress, 
because these concepts tend to prematurely bind both caregivers and distressed persons 
into categories that affect the way they make meaning of what has happened to them 
(2007).  Although the veterans mentioned in this chapter have each been diagnosed with 
PTSD, their experiences may not fit neatly into the psychiatric category of PTSD, and 
the psychiatric paradigm itself may not fully account for what they are experiencing.  It 
is also possible that what they are experiencing, while clearly very distressing, is not 
evidence of a clinical disorder, although it may bear psychological or psychiatric 
implications.  
The term complex disorientation captures the experience of these veterans in 
way that the terms such as disorder cannot.  Whether or not each of these veterans can 
be appropriately diagnosed as psychiatrically disordered, each experiences an 
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overwhelming sense of loss and distress that is mysterious to them because its exact 
source and nature is difficult to discern.  They do not feel as if they understand what has 
happened to them, and each of them has a profound sense of difficulty relating to 
themselves, their loved ones, and their communities.  Although they have each 
attempted to find help, the nature of their distress is not easy to classify with the use of 
existing paradigms. 
Papadopoulos uses the term adversity activated in place of the term traumatic in 
his work with refugees and other distressed persons for this very reason (2007).  
Because the use of the term trauma has the tendency to evoke psychiatric responses to 
phenomena, or to stigmatize or oversimplify the experiences of distressed persons, it 
should be avoided when initially attempting to approach a phenomenon from a neutral, 
holistic perspective.  When working with the specific phenomenon under consideration 
in this thesis, it is clear to see that each of these veterans been exposed a common 
adversity: combat action.  Although their experience of this adversity differs, and 
although each may respond to this adversity in different ways, their distress is activated 
during their exposure to combat. 
Accordingly, the label Complex Combat Activated Disorientation is fitting, 
since it has been established that the phenomenon contains complex elements, is 
activated during exposure to combat, and contains a significant amount of personal 
disorientation for affected veterans.  Such a label will allow this thesis to initially avoid 
terms like trauma, injury and disorder. 
 Having examined the elements of Complex Combat Activated Disorientation in 
detail, and having briefly noted the potential for the inter-connection of these elements, 
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it is now possible to consider an orientation of approach that adequately captures their 
complexity, uniqueness, and totality (Papadopoulos, 2014).  Because certain elements 
of CCAD have gained notoriety in the work of contemporary trauma researchers, and 
because this work has largely occurred in conjunction with medical and psychiatric 
treatment, under the category of PTSD, it is fitting to begin with the psychiatric 
approach, and to consider the ways in which the phenomenon may or may not be 
entirely fit for discussion and description within the contemporary psychiatric 
paradigm.  
In fact, the psychiatric paradigm is ever becoming more nuanced in its 
classification and categorization of trauma symptoms and dissociative symptoms.  With 
the release of the American Psychiatric Association’s new Diagnostics and Statistics 
Manual in 2013, and the impending release of the newest edition of the International 
Statistical Classification of Diseases, the psychiatric and psychological communities 
contain far more material for potential discussion and description of the features of 
CCAD than the category of PTSD alone. This thesis will now examine the psychiatric 
paradigm’s ability to account for all of the features of each element of CCAD, as 
described in this chapter, to see whether or not it can provide a fully adequate account 
of these features, and of CCAD as a whole. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PSYCHIATRY & CCAD 
 
According to the available literature, the psychiatric paradigm is the most 
common theoretical paradigm used to understand and account for the phenomenon 
under consideration in this thesis, which in the previous chapter was assigned the 
working label of Complex Combat Activated Disorientation or CCAD.  The psychiatric 
paradigm primarily approaches CCAD using the criteria for post-traumatic stress 
disorder, as listed in the most recent editions of the International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10) and the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostics and Statistics Manual (DSM-5).  Some 
psychiatric theorists also address elements of CCAD by making use of other diagnostic 
spectrums within in the DSM-5, including the criteria for dissociative disorders and 
delusional disorders (Herman, 1992; Jones, Griffiths, Humphris & Skirrow, 2001).  
In addition to making use of the approved categories of the DSM-5 and the ICD-
10, a number of clinicians and researchers use the label Complex PTSD to organize 
features that are hard to adequately classify using the psychiatric criteria for PTSD, and 
which require them to take considerable latitude in order to account for their clients’ 
most unusual or extreme experiences within the existing diagnostic spectra (Herman, 
1992; Van der Kolk, 2002; Chu, 2011).  Complex PTSD does not serve as an official 
diagnostic category, and originated in the field as an attempt to recognize extreme 
“personality change” occurring after severe or prolonged exposure to traumatic events, 
and most commonly childhood sexual abuse (Johnson, 2005, p. 26).  The term has 
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recently become more commonly used in conjunction with combat related trauma, and 
clinicians use it in order to stay close to psychiatric criteria while still acknowledging 
symptoms that are hard to classify and inadequately explained in the existing literature 
(Roth, Newman, Pelcovitz, Van Der Kolk & Mandel, 1997). 
In order to address what they are calling Complex PTSD, some common 
descriptive features of which do generally correspond with CCAD, as will be 
demonstrated in this chapter, the theorists and clinicians represented in the literature are 
adopting a variety of theoretical approaches.  However, there is a clear irony in the 
approaches that many theorists and clinicians are adopting: although they are using the 
label Complex PTSD because they find the approved psychiatric category of PTSD to 
be inadequate to account for the experiences of their clients, they are generally 
approaching Complex PTSD in the same way they have been trained to approach 
PTSD.  For instance, in approaching radical social mistrust after exposure to intense 
combat, Figley and Nash use the same Piagetian developmental and cognitive 
framework that they use to approach the cardinal symptoms of PTSD (2007).  Theorists 
involved in developing Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT), a rational-emotional 
approach to trauma, make use of the same constructs for understanding extreme 
narrative dissolution in cases of Complex PTSD that they use when approaching the 
more common PTSD symptom of distorted cognition about the causes of traumatic 
experiences (Stone & Friedman, 2010). 
Process-experiential and emotion-focused theorists and practitioners, such as the 
University of Pennsylvania’s Edna Foa and Elizabeth Hembree and their colleagues in 
the field of Prolonged Exposure (PE) therapy, use the same framework for 
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understanding persistent and extreme experiences of being “lost…numb, empty and 
detached” from loved ones and community that they use for any type of disturbed 
emotional processing associated with trauma (Foa, Hembree, & Rothbaum, 2007, p. 
51).  Paivo and Pascual-Leone’s Emotion-focused Therapy for Trauma (EFTT), 
although more focused in the field of child abuse than war-related trauma, nevertheless 
addresses Complex PTSD in general, and approach its features as emotional injuries 
capable of being understood along the same lines as other emotional injuries resulting 
from traumatic experiences (Paivo & Pascual-Leone, 2010).   
Sociologists and systemic psychotherapists approach both persistent, socially 
debilitating mistrust and conscious disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation as 
social conditions associated with avoidance and cognitive distortion surrounding the 
events of the trauma, just as they approach several common PTSD symptoms (Welsh & 
Rothbaum, 2010).  David Morgan, in the work of family therapy after trauma, 
approaches Complex PTSD from a Bowenian perspective, the same primary lens by 
which he might look at any kind of clinical difficulty, although he also makes use of 
some other theoretical lenses in his approach (Morgan, 2013).   
Existential psychotherapists such as Edward Tick approach Complex PTSD by 
making use of the same categories they use when addressing any number of issues in 
mental and spiritual health (2005).  Tick insists that a conscious disconnect from 
emotion and bodily sensation is a kind of “fleeing of the soul” which can best be 
described as a sort of “psycho-spiritual dissociation,” effecting a loss of one’s contact 
with one’s own deepest self and entry into an existential emptiness without self-identity 
(2005, p. 16).  Muse interprets this similarly, as a “severing or compartmentalization of 
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the soul from bodily and mental life,” which, when severe, can lead to “damage to the 
seamless connection between body and soul” (2009, p. 64).  Theorists such as Tick and 
Muse express the need for a greater understanding of the impact of Complex PTSD on 
all the aspects of the human experience of the affected veterans, and this is exactly what 
they are calling for the psychiatric community to consider in general when treating 
veterans with PTSD (Tick 2004; Muse, 2009).  
This clear tendency for theorists to approach the elements of Complex PTSD in 
a way that generally corresponds with their central theoretical presuppositions in 
approaching PTSD is something that has not gone unnoticed in trauma research.  Susan 
Johnson, a leading PTSD theorist in the field of systemic psychotherapy, has noted the 
effects of a wide variety of approaches to Complex PTSD in contemporary trauma care, 
and the tendency of each theoretical orientation to use its own metaphors and constructs 
for PTSD to make sense of Complex PTSD (2005).  However, in her view, most 
clinicians show more willingness to import ideas from other orientations when it comes 
to Complex PTSD then when working with clients in other kinds of distress, especially 
whenever clinicians find that their approaches seem ineffective (Johnson, 2005).  She 
applauds this practical sort of eclecticism, because in her mind it evidences a privileging 
of the client’s needs over a dogmatic insistence on a single theoretical foundation 
(Johnson, 2005).  It certainly also indicates that many contemporary clinicians find their 
theoretical approaches to PTSD unable to exhaustively account for every element of 
what they are seeing in the field, and that their common approaches to PTSD are not 
efficacious in approaching what they are calling Complex PTSD. 
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A Unifying Factor 
What is just as notable is that the majority of theorists and clinicians from the 
vast number of therapeutic orientations represented in the literature continue to describe 
the features of CCAD using the language of the psychiatric paradigm, even though (1) 
the category of PTSD does not seem to adequately account for their clients’ 
experiences, and (2) their common treatment approaches to PTSD does not seem fully 
appropriate or efficacious in treating clients with these unusual features.  The use of the 
pseudo-psychiatric label of Complex PTSD is ironic when one considers that the 
development of the label was made necessary because of the inability of the official 
psychiatric category of PTSD to account for client experiences, and yet PTSD remains a 
central idea in the new label.  Barry Schaller is one of many scholars who finds the 
universal appeal to psychiatric categories among clinicians and researchers to be both 
curious and dangerous when working with veterans, and who questions the ability of 
psychiatric categories to be capable of an exhaustive assessment of veterans whose 
situations are inadequately understood and unusually complex (2012).  His especially 
critiques its use in the case of traumatized veterans with extreme features, given its 
inability to fully account for these features, and therefore to account for essential pre-
existing moral, psychological, and social frameworks that might help to provide the 
nuance necessary for adequate diagnosis and treatment (Schaller, 2012). 
Therefore, a question emerges: why are so few clinicians and theorists willing to 
diverge from the psychiatric category of PTSD when working with veteran clients 
demonstrating some of the features of CCAD?  There is a logical answer.  In America, 
the shaped language of the Diagnostics and Statistics Manual has not only been 
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declared by the American Psychiatric Association to be authoritative and normative for 
all government-funded or state-licensed mental health practices, but its use has become 
required by insurance companies for any helping professional seeking to make a formal 
mental disorder diagnosis for billing purposes (APA, 2013).  As a result, theorists and 
clinicians may each approach the features of CCAD by making use of their own 
orientation and experience, but if they wish to treat clients with these features with the 
help of any government resources or insurance reimbursement, or if they wish to share 
their work by publication or collaboration with clinicians from other centers or fields, 
they are more or less obliged to speak about these features using the shared language 
and framework of the DSM-5.  One must note that, at least in America, the DSM-5 and 
the clinical perspective are synonymous when discussing any issues of human distress 
or disorientation. 
Accordingly, if in practical terms any clinical perspective on CCAD is 
professionally limited to the psychiatric language found in the ICD-10 and DSM-5, a 
key research question arises: does the psychiatric framework of the ICD-10 and DSM-5 
contain categories capable of even creatively approaching CCAD in a way that captures 
its complexity, uniqueness, and totality, as described by affected veterans?  The 
literature indicates from many different  perspectives that it does not, and this will now 
be demonstrated.  This thesis will describe the ways that various elements of CCAD are 
indeed at least partially described under the psychiatric category of dissociative 
depersonalization, under the category of delusional disorders, and in the new addition in 
the DSM-5 of common PTSD symptoms described as “negative alterations in 
cognition” and “alteration in arousal and reactivity” (Morrison, 2006, p. 270).  It will 
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also describe the ways that various elements of CCAD are left partially or completely 
without any account by the ICD-10 and DSM-5. 
 
 “Dissociative Depersonalization” 
The element of CCAD described in Chapter Two as a conscious disconnect from 
emotion and bodily sensation seems to be best accounted for in the psychiatric 
paradigm by the concept of dissociative depersonalization, which in the latest edition of 
the DSM serves as both a working diagnostic label for categorizing a severe 
accompanying tendency of PTSD and also the cardinal symptom of a stand-alone 
dissociative disorder (APA, 2013).  Depersonalization disorder is one of five types of 
dissociative disorders listed in the DSM-5, and is described as essentially a detachment 
or estrangement from oneself, coupled with an awareness of this detachment, and not 
attributable to substance abuse or the result of a general medical condition such as the 
aftermath of a seizure (APA, 2013).  Although it is classified as a freestanding disorder 
in its own right, it may, according to the DSM-5, occasionally be a feature of PTSD 
important enough to warrant classification as a subtype of PTSD (APA, 2013).  The 
DSM-5, published in 2013, was the first edition of the American psychiatric manual to 
attempt to make any direct clinical connection between depersonalization and PTSD. 
Neziroglu and Donnelly describe dissociative depersonalization as a feeling that 
one has been “encapsulated in a bubble,” unable to experience one’s environment, or 
“on autopilot” going through life (2010, p. 9).  They stress that this is a very rare but 
well-documented phenomenon, sometimes experienced after trauma, and that “reality 
testing must be intact” to differentiate the condition from hallucination or a symptom of 
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dissociative identity disorder (Neziroglu & Donnelly, 2010, p. 9).  In other words, the 
client must be fully aware of not feeling what he or she used to feel, or be aware of not 
feeling what he or she would normally feel under the same life circumstances 
(Neziroglu & Donnelly, 2010).  
Marlene Steinberg describes dissociative depersonalization as a condition that 
“manifests in a variety of ways in trauma survivors…[including] feeling detached from 
one’s own emotions, feeling that the self is strange or unreal, or feeling physically 
separated from one’s body, including out-of-body-experiences…or observing oneself 
from a distance” (2004, p. 130).  This certainly does bear similarity to the element of 
CCAD described in Chapter Two as a conscious disconnect from emotion and bodily 
sensation.  Steinberg includes a number of first-hand accounts with traumatized clients 
that resonate with the accounts recorded in the previous chapter, including clients 
diagnosed with PTSD who describe themselves as “feeling like a zombie,” and who 
describe a lack of contact with felt experience (2004, p. 134).  These accounts are 
specifically similar to the experiences of Richard, Jim, Art, John, Dan, Scott, and Tim, 
as related in Chapter Two.   
It is important to notice that dissociative depersonalization is not a popular 
diagnosis, and both its theoretical origins and its connection with other psychiatric 
disorders is not clear (Dorahy & Hart, 2007, p. 4).  In fact, the phenomenon of 
depersonalization seems to have a tentative connection with dissociation as a larger 
diagnostic category.  R. B. Ulman, who writes from a psychoanalytic perspective, 
makes the case that the contemporary concept of dissociative depersonalization is an 
essentially Freudian one, as Freud first noticed and labeled “depersonalization” as an 
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“unconscious ego mechanism of defense involved in ego splits” whose main feature 
consists of “the subject feel[ing] that either a piece of reality or a piece of his own self is 
strange to him” (1993, p. 173).  Although this pairing of dissociative splitting after 
trauma and the conscious sense of one’s lack of access to his or her own experience can 
be found as early as Freud’s work with women suffering from hysteria, as he described 
it, depersonalization has not been clearly linked with dissociation in the psychiatric 
trauma literature until very recently (Ulman, 1993, p. 173).   
According to Dorahy and Hart, “the original understanding of dissociation 
relates to divisions in the personality or consciousness,” evidencing a complete break 
between two or more “selves” which are not, in general, able to each be conscious of 
the other, and each of which contain their own psychobiological systems…collection of 
memories, affective experiences, behavioral repertoires, and sense of self” (2007, p. 4).   
They note that “the concept of dissociation has widened,” the term now being used to 
“denote [any kind] of alteration in conscious experience…a diffuse 
understanding…[which can now] account for many and various clinical and nonclinical 
psychological phenomenon (Dorahy & Hart, 2007, p. 4).  Indeed, the sense of being 
consciously outside of one’s own bodily experience is a phenomenon far more 
commonly addressed in spiritual paradigms than clinical ones. 
 For instance, such experiences are described in great detail in the Tibetan Book 
of the Dead, the Egyptian concept of “the Ka,” the Mexican concept of “second body,” 
and even, according to Immanuel Swedenborg and others, in the New Testament 
(Sorrell, 2012, p. 9).  Swedenborg, in fact, wrote at length of such experiences from a 
spiritual perspective, recounting his “travel to spiritual realms [while] remaining aware 
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of being present at the same time in his own body…he did not fall into a trance state 
and lose complete awareness of his body” (Tyson, 2007, p. 59).  This experience of a 
conscious disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation can be accounted for from a 
number of ancient perspectives, but is only tenuously accounted for from a clinical 
perspective, especially under the label of dissociation, since it describes something that 
is not easily compatible with the traditional definition of that term. 
 In addition to dissociation and depersonalization being tenuously linked in terms 
of their belonging to uncertainly associated categories with few connecting features, 
global behavioral health professionals have not been able to agree on how to categorize 
depersonalization in recent years, as the phenomenon has become more documented.  
Simeon and Abugel note that, unlike in the American Diagnostics and Statistics 
Manual, depersonalization is not listed as a type of dissociative disorder at all in the 
ICD-10, but is instead classified as a “not otherwise specified neurotic disorder” (2006, 
p. 13).  However, given that dissociation for the purpose of psychic numbing to avoid 
overwhelming emotional experiences is a cardinal feature of PTSD, and that 
depersonalization seems to some researchers to serve a similar purpose in emergency 
emotional regulation, the two have been linked by the psychiatric community in recent 
years, perhaps simply in order to find a place to account for this very unusual 
experience as it is increasingly documented in the field (Neziroglu & Donnelly, 2010). 
 Some clinicians have doubts as to whether or not this is the result of a hasty 
attempt by the psychiatric community to develop a working category for a 
phenomenological experience after trauma that has not been fully understood or 
explained.  Simeon and Abugel mention the significantly vague grasp that current 
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research has on depersonalization’s link with trauma, especially considering the 
increasing anecdotal attention the phenomenon is being given in the literature (2006, p. 
12).  They mention, for instance, that the essential element of depersonalization, which 
is the conscious sense of being out of touch with some part of oneself, tends to be 
combined in the literature with an “astonishing multitude” of other features as client 
accounts are progressively documented (Simeon & Abugel, 2006, p. 12).  In each 
documented case, the connections which a certain clinician draws between 
depersonalization and his or her client’s other presenting symptoms may seem to 
present a new understanding of the experience, but it has also resulted in the availability 
of such a multiplicity of perspectives on depersonalization that each case can begin to 
be seen as distinct from all of the others (Simeon & Abugel, 2006.  For instance, a 
major American military medical handbook on treating psychiatric disorders, published 
by the Department of Defense, links depersonalization with extreme “emotional 
exhaustion,” decreased interpersonal sensitivity evidenced by tendencies toward 
isolation, mistrust of coworkers, and a tendency towards strained narrative cohesion, 
where the importance or justice of one’s work comes into question (Wilcox, 2000, p. 
33).  Nowhere in this handbook are the actual connections made between these 
phenomenological features, nor is there any appeal to the key criteria of 
depersonalization in the current Diagnostics and Statistics Manual.  It seems to be a 
codification of anecdotal juxtaposition. 
It is necessary to be upfront about the tentative and unclear function of the 
concept of depersonalization after trauma and its difficulty in categorizing an existing 
experience in clinical terms.  In a psychiatric handbook published in 2003, Deihl and 
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Goldberg suggested that “the prevalence of depersonalization isn’t clearly 
known…[except that] the onset is sudden…[and] resolution occurs gradually (p. 296).  
Further, they note that “depersonalization…hasn’t been studied widely [enough] and its 
exact cause is still unknown…” (Diehl & Goldberg, 2003, p. 296).  
Neziroglu and Donnelly note that there is some international controversy 
surrounding not only dissociative depersonalization but also dissociative identity 
disorder and other dissociative disorders because their presence “is so much greater in 
the United States than the rest of the world” (2010, p. 18).  They offer as an opinion 
“the possible explanation…that different cultures have different overall ways of dealing 
with emotions,” or different ways of experiencing, making meaning of, and recovering 
from devastating events  (Neziroglu & Donnelly, 2010, p. 18).  They defend the 
condition nevertheless as something that must be taken seriously, because it is a 
phenomenon so well documented in trauma care in recent years. 
It may be that depersonalization provides the psychiatric paradigm with a wide 
category in which to include some other elements of CCAD which otherwise do not 
seem to be accounted for.  For instance, the tendency of some veterans to feel as if there 
is a monstrous evil present inside of them might seem to the psychiatric perspective to 
connect with the experience of feeling removed from control of one’s own body, 
especially if seems to the veteran that the monstrous presence activates an episode of an 
uncontrollable rage.  Also, depersonalization might possibly account for a radical 
dissolution of moral intuition and narrative coherence, especially if combined with a 
clinical condition related to depersonalization which has been labeled dissociative 
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derealization, in which the world seems artificial and imposed upon one’s 
consciousness, lacking any objective meaning (APA, 2013). 
Nevertheless, dissociative depersonalization, although it is a concept that seems 
to be able to stretch in any number of directions, does not seem to provide a clear and 
consistent category for any of the five elements of  CCAD except for conscious 
disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation.  Even with regard to that element, 
depersonalization does not as a psychiatric category seem to shed much light on the 
accounts of the traumatized veterans compiled in Chapter Two.  It is a tenuous 
psychiatric category, far from being fully understood from the medical and scientific 
perspectives, although some slow strides are being made to understand the phenomenon 
from neurochemical and neuroanatomical perspectives (Neziroglu & Donnelly, 2010).  
Some of the most successful contemporary treatments, in fact, often make use of 
psycho-spiritual interventions, such as those that combine cognitive techniques with 
Buddhist and other Eastern spiritual practices (Neziroglu & Donnelly, 2010).   
 
 “Negative Alteration in Cognition” 
 The American Psychiatric Association admits a number of significant changes in 
its classification and diagnostic approach to post-traumatic stress disorder in the last few 
years, owing to a surge in research and scholarship in the field, and evidenced in its 
most recent edition of the Diagnostics and Statistics Manual (2013).  Wilbur Scott notes 
that significant lobbying was required to see the diagnosis of PTSD included in the 
DSM-III in the first place, in 1980, as “war neurosis” had been “eliminated from the 
psychiatric nomenclature” in the decades preceding (1990, p. 294).  The DSM-III took 
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the American military’s input into account when developing its category for PTSD, 
which fell under the general umbrella of anxiety disorders and included three diagnostic 
criteria that would remain central to psychiatric diagnosis throughout four revisions of 
the DSM manual, and across 23 years: recurrent and intrusive memories of a traumatic 
event, persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with a traumatic event, and persistent 
symptoms of arousal (APA, 1980). 
 In the DSM-5, PTSD was moved out from the umbrella of anxiety disorders and 
placed into a new category entitled “trauma and stressor-related disorders,” showing 
both the emerging importance of PTSD in contemporary psychiatric care and also the 
difficulty in accounting for PTSD in connection with other disorders with similar 
symptoms, such as anxiety disorders and dissociative disorders (APA, 2013, p. 812).   
In addition to the new umbrella, the three classic symptom clusters of PTSD were 
expanded to four in the new manual, with “the avoidance / numbing cluster divided into 
two distinct clusters: patterned avoidance and persistent negative alterations in 
cognition / mood” (APA, 2013, p. 812).  It is in these two clusters made newly distinct 
in the DSM-5 where two more of the features of the phenomenon under examination in 
this thesis may find some connection to the psychiatric paradigm. 
 The DSM-5 acknowledges that in some cases persons diagnosed with PTSD 
exhibit “negative alterations in cognitions and mood associated with the traumatic 
event…[including] persistent and exaggerated negative beliefs or expectations about 
oneself, others, or the world, e.g. ‘no one can be trusted’” (APA, 2013, p. 272).  This is 
a leap forward from the DSM-IV, which accounted only for “feelings of detachment or 
estrangement from others” and “patterned avoidance of people that arouse recollections 
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of the trauma” (APA, 1994, p. 270).  Martyn Symons suggests that experiences of 
mistrust after suffering a devastating event are usually specific, and focus on people and 
institutions involved in the devastating event itself, on participating and/or responsible 
parties considered to be responsible in some way for the event, or on people whose care 
after the event was experienced as negative or re-traumatic (2009).  Symons also 
suggests that clinicians should not be overly hasty in assigning pathological status to 
mistrust, noting that there could very well be “valid reasons” for mistrust if the 
suffering person was betrayed or violated by someone they had once considered to be 
trustworthy (2009, p. 116).   
Walter McDermott, a clinical psychologist who has treated combat-related 
PTSD for 30 years and is a combat veteran himself, agrees with Symons’ assertion that 
mistrust as a feature of PTSD is often specifically focused on a certain person or 
organization, but adds that this initial focus can begin to systematically shift in a 
veteran’s experience (2012).  He quotes the condition of a warrior who “at first learned 
to mistrust Vietnamese civilians, because he could not distinguish them from the 
enemy,” but then experienced the “suspicious mistrust spreading like cancer, growing to 
include his leaders…other soldiers in his unit…most American politicians…and [upon 
his return] his wife, children, coworkers, and friends” (McDermott, 2012, p. 41).  
Indeed, this kind of chain reaction in the loss of ability to trust, beginning with one or 
two focused objects of betrayal but spreading outward, as the pain of the trauma and the 
fear of it somehow recurring continues, seems to connect with the experiences of 
Nathan Everly, John Needham, and others described in Chapter Two. 
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McDermott is not willing however to attribute a debilitating experience of 
mistrust to the result of negative alterations in cognition or mood alone.  Like Symons, 
he is clearly hesitant about identifying this extreme mistrust as necessarily 
“exaggerated,” as the DSM-5 requires for diagnosis (McDermott, 2012, p. 41).  He 
notes a strong social aspect to the symptom, and suggests that in the vast majority of 
cases, only a part of the mistrust can be seen as exaggerated or pathological, the other 
part being a normal reaction to devastation by seemingly trustworthy people, even if the 
reaction is extreme (McDermott, 2012).  The idea of exaggerated negative beliefs would 
still apply for McDermott in those cases in which mistrust moves from one fixed object 
to include another, and so on, multiplying the phenomenon until an eventual belief 
emerges that life has no coherent structure, and that there is no real way of knowing 
anything.   Shay’s soldier, mentioned in Chapter Two, who had gotten to the point that 
he could no longer decide whether objects around him could be experienced as 
permanent and assigned a meaning, offers an example of such extreme exaggeration 
leading to complete disorientation (Shay, 1994, p. 170).   
 It is clear therefore that the psychiatric paradigm does make some attempt to 
address the element of CCAD described as persistent, socially debilitating mistrust, but 
only in its latest edition, published in 2013.  The ICD-10, it should be noted, does not 
have any diagnostic criterion for post-traumatic stress disorder that accounts for 
debilitating mistrust such as has been described in accounts of the veterans in Chapter 
Two, with the possible exception of its references to “hyper-vigilance,” if the meaning 
of that term were to be expanded to include social vigilance (WHO, 1993, p. 121).  
However, the psychiatric concept of hyper-vigilance is much more likely to be 
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connected to the physiological function of the ANA system during intrusive thoughts 
from dissociative material (WHO, 1993, p. 121).   
The emergence of this theme in the documented experiences of many 
contemporary American veterans has demanded an account from the American 
psychiatric community, and has received one from an exclusively cognitive orientation 
under the label of “negative alteration in cognition” evidenced by “persistent and 
exaggerated negative beliefs” (APA, 2013, p. 272).  Questions remain as to whether 
warriors experience betrayal in war by leaders, teammates, and allies at a purely 
cognitive level, resulting in a purely cognitive response, or whether or not their 
experiences and responses are more complex, necessitating the search for an equally 
adequate or superior description from another angle of orientation. 
 
"Alteration in Arousal and Reactivity” 
 In the newly published PTSD symptom cluster labeled “marked alterations in 
arousal and reactivity associated with the traumatic event(s), beginning or worsening 
after the traumatic event(s) occurred,” the DSM-5 addresses the tendency of a number 
of veterans returning from combat to experience symptoms such as “irritable behavior 
and angry outbursts with little or no provocation, typically expressed as verbal or 
physical aggression toward people or objects,” and “reckless or self-destructive 
behavior” (APA, 2013, p. 272).  The American psychiatric community has long made a 
connection between increased arousal or hyper-arousal associated with PTSD and a 
tendency toward irritability with angry outbursts, and has long noted that such outbursts 
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can be extreme (APA, 1994).  It has been a part of the psychiatric diagnostic criteria for 
PTSD, in fact, since 1980.   
To a limited extent this psychiatric criterion for PTSD is connected with the 
element of CCAD described in Chapter Two as “an uncontrollable, lustful rage.”  
Steven Taylor helpfully describes the potential for the PTSD criterion of “irritability 
with angry outbursts” to be extreme and completely unpredictable in some cases, even 
developing into episodes of “dissociative rage” in which veterans can be so overcome 
by murderous impulses that “things [can seem] unreal” and that they can be “in a daze,” 
barely aware of their immediate environment (2006, p. 209).  This description is 
certainly similar to the accounts given about Marquez, Everly, Miller, and Hoop in 
Chapter Two, in which they described themselves as being unable to stop acting 
violently once their rage came to a peak, and no longer feeling fully human. 
Nevertheless, psychiatrists and clinicians in the field of traumatic stress have 
long questioned whether or not the radical nature of the rage found among certain 
combat veterans can be captured by psychiatric criteria, especially in all of its scope and 
consequences (Nash, Carper, & Mills, 2008; Drescher, Foy, Kelly, Leshner, Schultz & 
Litz, 2011).  Jonathan Shay is perhaps the most influential voice in the literature that 
has consistently challenged the efficacy of the DSM to meaningfully account for the 
experiences of traumatized warriors returning home from combat.  According to Shay, 
angry, inhuman rage, when fueling actions of violence that a veteran cannot fully 
control, can be so completely and unalterably destructive to a human being’s 
psychological character that it cannot fit into simplistic-sounding psychiatric 
descriptions of anger and irritability (1994).   
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In Shay’s opinion, elements of ancient Greek and Norse epic poetry, which use 
ontological paradigms from philosophical anthropology, come closer to accounting for 
the nature of rage in combat and its after-effects, because epic poetry speaks in a 
holistic language that addresses a larger understanding of human experience than 
medical and scientific categories allow (1994).  He helpfully notes that this kind of 
language differs strongly from the psychiatric criteria for PTSD contained within the 
DSM, which implicitly “claims ethical and culturally neutral knowledge” of what 
constitutes normal and abnormal reactions to traumatic stress, but fails to clearly 
classify abnormality in a way that fully connects with the actual experience of trauma 
survivors (Shay, 1994, p. 166). 
Shay also notes that the phenomenon of complex rage in combat veterans 
contains accompanying aspects other than anger that are not covered in the PTSD 
criteria, such as strong concurrent delusions of invincibility, sexual arousal, and the 
potential for complete loss of short-term memory (1994).  He notes that these aspects, 
when presented in psychiatric interviews, often lead to concurrent clinical diagnoses, 
and he cites a number of instances where his veteran clients were dual-diagnosed with 
PTSD and schizophrenia, or PTSD and a personality disorder, muddying the potential 
for a nuanced understanding of the warrior’s condition and indicating a failure of the 
psychiatric model to “capture the devastation” these veterans experience (Shay 1994, p. 
169). 
Tick also questions the ability of the psychiatric paradigm to account for the 
experience of violent rage in and after combat from which “there may be no return” 
after a war (Tick, 2005, p. 90).  In his experience, “conventional models of medical and 
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psychological functioning and therapeutics are not adequate to explain or treat such 
wounds,” and he expresses a disappointment in the psychiatric community for claiming 
an authoritative account of this phenomenon when “the veterans and their afflictions try 
to tell us” that something more than the psychiatric criteria are needed for a full 
understanding (Tick, 2005, p. 2).  He also notes that the actual accounts of warriors, 
when it comes to having experienced the berserk state, are so full of language about the 
supernatural world that we are compelled to accept that they are either having real 
religious experiences at the height of their trauma, or else do not have any other 
language to approximate their condition (Tick, 2005). 
It is certain that the psychiatric paradigm offers some accounting for angry 
outbursts and general irritability following exposure to significant adversity such as 
combat action.  Theorists and clinicians seeking to understand and treat veterans with 
extreme features under the label of Complex PTSD may perhaps find themselves able to 
stretch this single psychiatric criterion to account for their clients’ experiences.  
However, there are significant limitations inherent in doing so.  The psychiatric 
criterion for PTSD listed as alteration in arousal, while a vague enough term to allow 
for some creative application, is an impoverished approach to describing an experience 
which includes permanent changes in the personality of veterans who have experienced 
it.  This being clear, clinicians find themselves trying to account for their veteran 
clients’ lasting and complicated distress by finding additional diagnoses that may apply.  
Rather than describing the phenomenon completely and totally, as it presented, the 
psychiatric paradigm actually demands a dual or triple diagnosis in order to place all 
presented features into existing diagnostic spectra, clouding understanding and initiating 
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a complicated and layered treatment plan which may not at all be appropriate or 
efficacious. 
 
Seeking an Explanation for the Radical Dissolution of Moral Intuition & Narrative 
Coherence   
 
 Neither the DSM-5 nor the ICD-10 provides direct accounting for the kind of 
radical dissolution of moral intuition and narrative coherence experienced by Tick’s My 
Lai veteran, Eugene Sledge’s lieutenant, Jacob Burgoyne, Richard Howard, or Harold 
Miller, as documented in Chapter Two.  This is not to say however that the concept of 
making meaning of one’s adversity is not discussed in the psychiatric community in 
relation to trauma.  In fact, psychiatric research into the connection between meaning 
assigned to adversity and the severity of PTSD symptoms in the aftermath of adversity 
is quite extensive.  Livanou, Basoglu, and Mark, in a University of London research 
project conducted just after the commencement of the Global War on Terror, 
convincingly demonstrated the connection between traumatized persons experiencing 
meaninglessness and a higher severity of a number of baseline PTSD symptoms (2002, 
p. 157).  Raymond Bergner notes a strong connection in his research between 
meaninglessness and PTSD social symptoms such as avoidance of people that arouse 
distressing memories (2005, p. 347).  Froma Walsh demonstrates a qualitative 
connection between a traumatized person’s sense of helplessness and meaninglessness 
and the diagnostic criterion of the presence of negative alterations in cognition and 
mood associated with the traumatic event (2007, p. 207). 
Nevertheless, neither Bergner nor Livanou nor Walsh considers 
meaninglessness a PTSD symptom of its own.  Bergner speaks of meaninglessness as a 
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potentially complex condition wherein “instrumental, intrinsic, and spiritual value are 
missing,” but he is unable to speak about meaninglessness within the psychiatric 
paradigm because there is simply no place within the diagnostic categories for such 
discussion (2005, p. 347).  In fact, he quotes Victor Frankl’s work with trauma, which 
culminated in a therapeutic approach that extended elements of existential philosophy to 
the care of suffering persons (Bergner, 2005).  In doing so, Bergner indicates a 
movement away from sole use of the psychiatric paradigm in order to fully make sense 
of his clients’ experiences, and he uses philosophy as an added lens for viewing the 
phenomenon in a way that is not unlike Shay’s use of epic poetry. 
In the DSM-5, a radical dissolution of the ability to make meaning of life 
experiences such as the kind described in Chapter Two should not be included under the 
diagnostic criterion for psychotic disorders listed as “nihilistic delusion,” because it 
does not necessarily contain the persistent, irrational belief that a major catastrophe is 
imminent, rendering one helpless to survive (APA, 2013).  Meaninglessness as an 
element of CCAD should be rather described as a persistent sense that there is no point 
or order to life, or that no underlying cohesion to events and relationships exists, or that 
social norms and moral claims are absurd.  Meaninglessness of the kind described in 
CCAD should also fail to fit neatly into the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality 
Disorder, in which persons might fail to “conform to social norms with respect to lawful 
behaviors, as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest,” 
because the disorientation of a veteran after exposure to the adversity of combat action 
is not necessarily centered around “a pervasive pattern of violation of the rights of 
others,” as is required for diagnosis (APA, 2013, p. 659).   
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In fact, there is no place in the psychiatric paradigm to account for the kind of 
the radical dissolution of moral intuition and narrative coherence experienced by the 
combat veterans who suffer from CCAD.  This is partly related to the scientific and 
medical boundaries of the psychiatric paradigm, which keep it from accounting for 
certain human tendencies after adversity that are not easily understood in scientific or 
medical terms.  It is also partly related to the fact that the psychiatric community 
considers its PTSD criteria to adequately cover the presenting distress of veterans who 
demonstrate a pervasive sense of meaningless, attributing this also to “negative beliefs 
about the world” and “distorted cognitions about the cause of the traumatic event” 
(APA, 2013, p. 659).   
It is important to note the tendency in this approach towards pathologization of 
the veteran’s response to adversity in and after combat.  Here the psychiatric 
community assigns general categories of what beliefs should to be seen as negative and 
positive, related to their behavioral understanding of what should be considered 
cognitively adaptive or maladaptive in individual mental health.  This assignation of 
what is negative and positive does not account for common changes in thinking as a 
normal effect of exposure to adversity.  It also reduces a complex phenomenon 
experienced by a number of veterans to a simple matter of individual cognition, which 
cannot provide a serious account of the actual experiences of those suffering from 
CCAD.  In addition to these arguments, it is clear that although there are seven 
subcategories of PTSD criteria under the category of negative alterations in cognitions 
and mood associated with the event, meaninglessness as a phenomenon is neither 
mentioned nor implicitly connected with any of them (APA, 2013). 
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“Delusional Disorder” 
The element of CCAD described in Chapter Two as self-horror at a perceived 
absorption of evil is likewise unsatisfactorily accounted for in the psychiatric category 
of PTSD, and no explicit or implicit mention of such a presenting feature exists in either 
the DSM-5 or the ICD-10.  While the psychiatric paradigm does not, in general, allow 
for the presence of supernatural elements in its diagnostic criteria, the accounts of 
veterans like Segrest, Wolfe, Everly, Hoop, and Miller do demand consideration.  All 
five of these veterans, along with several others described in Chapter Two, have 
described encounters with monstrousness, badness or evil in relating their experiences.  
It is important to note that they are clearly doing more than labeling their specific 
adversities with such adjectives as “bad” or “evil.”  Rather, they each claim to have felt 
a personal connection with something distinct during their experiences in combat that 
they can only describe as evil.  Their contact with this distinct entity has frightened and 
horrified them, and they feel some level of helplessness or powerlessness in breaking 
contact with it. 
Such unusual descriptions during and after combat are part of the reason that 
Shay and other clinicians have received veteran clients by referral who have already 
received a dual-diagnosis of PTSD and paranoid schizophrenia, even though they seem 
to have almost no symptoms of schizophrenia (1994, p. 169).  The DSM-5 includes 
several diagnoses that account for persons claiming contact with evil entities, but all of 
these accounts are labeled as delusions or hallucinations in the Schizophrenia Spectrum 
(APA, 2013).  Specifically, the psychiatric paradigm might best try to account for the 
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experiences of Segrest, Everly, Miller, and others under the schizophrenia criteria of 
“bizarre persecutory delusion of thought insertion” (APA, 2013, p. 87).     
Delusions, according to the DSM-5, are “fixed beliefs that are not amenable to 
change in light of conflicting evidence,” and are “deemed bizarre if they are clearly 
implausible and not understandable to same-culture peers and do not derive from 
ordinary life experiences” (APA, 2013, p. 87).  One might note that “fixed belief not 
amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence,” here, does not included a 
description of what should be considered objective “evidence,” although it may be 
supposed that sociological and cultural consensus may be excluded as unreliable (APA, 
2013, p. 87).  Certainly a “fixed belief not amenable to change in light of conflicting 
evidence” might describe elements of faith in religious and folk traditions, if the term 
“evidence” only goes so far as to describe a rational construct based upon a single set of 
philosophical presuppositions (i.e. there is nothing about the universe or the human 
experience that is essentially mysterious, and only what can be demonstrated in a 
scientific lab or in a controlled social experiment is a valid context for “reality”).  These 
psychiatric presuppositions, of course, might seem absurd to most of the world’s 
population, and this calls into question the efficacy of the psychiatric paradigm in 
making sense of a number of human experiences, some of which may even be 
considered normal in other cultures, or from other points of view. 
One might also note that delusions are deemed bizarre if not “understandable by 
same-culture peers,” which have ostensibly been through similar circumstances and 
have had similar reactions (APA, 2013, p. 87).  Of course, a significant number of 
veterans have experienced this feature of CCAD, across cultures and without direct 
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contact with each other.  Whether or not, as the APA requires, this feature can be seen 
as “ordinary” is another question. 
The concept of “delusional thought insertion” in the psychiatric criteria, in 
which “alien thoughts have been put into one’s mind,” could be another opportunity for 
the psychiatric paradigm to account for the a veteran’s experience of returning from 
combat feeling like a personal evil had entered his life.  According to the DSM-5, if 
such a “delusion” persisted for more than one month, and could not be attributed to 
substance abuse or a general medical condition, a diagnosis of Delusional Disorder 
could be warranted – with no other criterion or qualification necessary (APA, 2013, p. 
87).  This shows another inherent difficulty in using the psychiatric paradigm to account 
for complicated human distress.  If a clinician using the DSM-5 were to interpret a 
client’s experience as persistently delusional, because the clinician’s worldview 
constrained him or her to describe it as such, the client could be immediately assigned a 
diagnosis of Delusional Disorder, and as a result involuntarily confined in a treatment 
facility, obliged to ingest neuroleptic medications, or even subjected to 
electroconvulsive therapy (Munro, 2004). 
This is an extreme example, but one that illustrates the point.  Veterans suffering 
from CCAD, if being referred to a licensed clinician, will most likely receive an initial 
diagnosis of PTSD because their distress is connected with exposure to combat.  
However, if they express contact with an evil presence, or any similar experience, there 
is a significant chance that the clinician will examine the psychiatric criteria to consider 
a dual-diagnosis, because the psychiatric paradigm specifically advocates for the 
addition of further diagnoses when one cannot account for all of the apparent symptoms 
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of a client (APA, 2013).  If the veteran is then diagnosed with Delusional Disorder, his 
clinician must develop a corresponding treatment plan or risk potential legal liability for 
malpractice.  
Accordingly, it is clear to see that the potential for difficulty in using the 
psychiatric paradigm to approach this element of CCAD rests in the psychiatric 
paradigm’s inability to account for anything not easily explained within its own 
categories.  This may not only lead to a lack of understanding, but a dual diagnosis that, 
due to a lack of understanding, leads to complications in a veteran’s care, and risks 
further exposure to adversity or traumatization. 
 
Is the Psychiatric Paradigm Sufficient? 
Taken as a whole, the psychiatric paradigm has significant difficulty in 
accounting for CCAD.  From the perspective of the DSM-5, one of the elements of 
CCAD is altogether unaccounted for, and the remaining four elements are only 
accounted for using criteria from three distinct psychiatric disorders: two have some 
significant connection to PTSD criteria, a third element is related to criteria listed under 
the Dissociative Spectrum of disorders, and a fourth has a tenuous connection with a 
disorder in the Schizophrenia Spectrum.  As a result, veterans experiencing CCAD and 
seeking care under the psychiatric modal might be diagnosed concurrently with PTSD, 
Dissociative Disorder, and Delusional Disorder.  Each of these three diagnoses will 
indicate its own treatment plan for specialized psychotherapy and 
psychopharmacological support, leading to some potentially very serious difficulties in 
cooperative case management.  Additionally, it must be noted that even with a perfectly 
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nuanced and layered diagnosis of this kind, and a perfectly coordinated care plan, these 
veterans would still have at least one of their most distressing features completely 
unaccounted for. 
Nevertheless, after a close examination, it may be suggested that the psychiatric 
paradigm’s main difficulty in addressing the complexity, uniqueness, and totality of 
CCAD does not lie in its inability to provide a single, integrated diagnosis.  This is 
indeed an issue, because it demonstrates a continuing inability in the psychiatric 
community to capture the experiences of returning veterans in a consistently coherent 
manner, and leads to inevitable complications in their care.  However, the psychiatric 
paradigm’s main difficulty in addressing CCAD seems to be a philosophical one, in that 
it does not – and perhaps cannot, by its very philosophical orientation – account for 
complex features that are not able to be coherently addressed by making use of the 
dominant scientific approach to healthcare. 
Jeffrey Bishop, a physician, philosopher, and tenured professor, notices a 
tendency in all medical care, including psychiatric care, to treat distressed persons in 
corporate, mechanical ways, seeing their problems as difficulties in engineering, and not 
accounting for any patient experiences that might be resistant to codified physiological 
or psychological explanations alone (2011).  He says this: “no practitioner of medicine 
[started out wanting] to turn a person into an object…a meaningless mechanism…yet 
the pragmatism of medicine focuses on ways to manipulate the physiological body [as 
just such a mechanism] rendering the practitioner forgetful of meaning and purpose” 
(Bishop, 2011, p. 119).  This insight is helpful in understanding psychiatric approaches 
to the CCAD.  The medical model is capable of very accurate diagnosis according to 
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physiological morbidity, as long as the distress of clients cleanly fits into its particular 
categories.  However, once a distressed person shows evidence of experiences that are 
inexplicable according to its particular categories, the psychiatric paradigm must either 
ignore these experiences or else reframe them according to the particular categories 
available – for instance labeling as delusional clients claiming to have absorbed some 
kind of evil present in the combat zone. 
There are a number of professional theorists and clinicians who, for the very 
reasons listed above, feel compelled to broaden their perspectives in understanding and 
helping veterans with extreme and unusual experiences, and are not willing to be 
limited to psychiatric categories (Drescher, Foy, Kelly, Leshner, Schulz & Litz, 2011).  
Other theorists and researchers broaden their perspectives because, although they may 
be compelled to use psychiatric categories for diagnosis, given the realities of funding, 
maintenance of professional licensure, and shared language in cooperative treatment, 
they are also concerned about the dangers of using psychiatric criteria to approach 
situations in which a psychiatric response could do more harm than good 
(Papadopoulos, 2007; Skolbekken, 2008; Maj, 2014).  Renos Papadopoulos suggests 
that it is increasingly essential in the fields of trauma care and crisis care to avoid 
pathologizing the somewhat “ordinary responses to human suffering” commonly found 
among people who have been exposed to adversity by insisting on the use of psychiatric 
assessment (2014, audio recording).  He notices, for instance, a growing problem in the 
overuse of the psychiatric diagnosis of PTSD, noting that “now we seem to have no 
difference between ‘being traumatized’ and having PTSD.  Everything is a psychiatric 
disorder because it must be in order to be covered…this has done a lot of 
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damage…[people] have been exposed to adversity, and they are in distress – sure, this is 
an ordinary part of human suffering – but can we say they are [all] suffering from a 
psychiatric disorder?” (Papadopoulos, 2014, audio recording).  
Among those who have become uncomfortable using the psychiatric paradigm 
alone, some have chosen to supplement psychiatric criteria with philosophical 
approaches to what their clients are experiencing.   Shay uses ancient epic war poetry as 
a way of expanding his understanding of human experiences during and after combat 
(1994).  Edward Tick chooses to use a combination of epic poetry, war fiction, 
neurological research, and existential philosophy to understand his clients (2005).  
Muse uses both clinical constructs from psychiatry and ancient philosophical and 
theological concepts from Eastern religions, and especially Eastern Christianity, to 
accomplish the same goal (2013, public lecture).  In expanding their conceptual base 
when approaching CCAD, these professionals are not dismissing the psychiatric 
paradigm altogether.  Nor should they.  Through the psychiatric paradigm’s reliance on 
scientific and medical anthropology, and through its access to extensive research in 
evidence-based behavioral treatment, it captures many of the physiological and 
psychological features of CCAD quite adequately, and offers undeniably helpful 
insights in the care of veterans suffering from CCAD.   
However, each of these professionals has found the psychiatric paradigm to be 
lacking in its ability to account for the totality, uniqueness, and complexity of CCAD as 
whole, and their response has been to expand their conceptual base not in terms of 
scientific research but in terms of philosophical assumptions about human experiences, 
and specifically human experiences of distress around war and killing.   Much has been 
 89 
written in recent years about the philosophical self-limitations of psychiatry, which 
often do not provide adequate foundations for a full understanding of either the 
presentation or underlying etiology of various types of human illness (Radden, 1994; 
Sadler, 2005; Patil & Giordano, 2010).  In terms of approaching such complex and 
distressing experiences developing after exposure to intense combat as have been 
observed in this thesis and collected under the working label of Complex Combat 
Activated Disorientation, no theorist has been more outspoken on the philosophical self-
limitations of psychiatry than American psychiatrist Jonathan Shay. 
Shay’s concept of moral injury as an alternate philosophical path to 
understanding some of the elements of CCAD has, in fact, successfully challenged the 
psychiatric paradigm’s ability to respond to those elements, in that his ideas have been 
accepted and used in the development of complementary care programs for veterans in 
the American Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) psychiatric hospitals and outpatient 
clinics (Nash, Carper, & Mills, 2008).  Since his alternate philosophical approach have 
been taken seriously by the psychiatric community, and since the psychiatric 
community has seen the concept of moral injury as capable of being used in an 
integrated manner with psychiatric diagnosis and treatment planning, it is an ideal place 
to begin the next stage of the search for a meaningful and fully adequate account of 
CCAD.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
MORAL INJURY & CCAD 
 
 
Moral injury as a concept is made possible by an intentional expansion of the 
philosophical presuppositions of trauma care to veterans, primarily because its primary 
theorist, Jonathan Shay, did not find those presuppositions to be adequate (1994).  Shay 
claims to have found the grounds for his critique incidentally.  In the late 1980’s, while 
providing psychiatric care for a group of American Vietnam war veterans, he came 
across some significant similarities between his client’s most complex features, some of 
which were not fully accounted for in the psychiatric paradigm, and Homer’s 
description of combat activated distress in ancient Greek warfare and homecoming 
(1994).  He carefully re-read Iliad and Odyssey, making notes on Homer’s 
anthropology, social observations, combat narratives, and homecoming narratives, and 
eventually published a book about their potential use in contemporary trauma care, as a 
needed contribution to better understanding complex conditions of rage, moral 
disorientation, and meaninglessness after combat (Shay, 1994).  Shay’s challenge to the 
psychiatric community was direct:  “[Homer captures] the bitter experiences that 
actually do arise in war…[and] has seen things that we in psychiatry and psychology 
have more or less missed” (Shay, 1994, p. xiii).  His thesis was that Homer had an 
ability to understand the first-hand, existential descriptions of the distress of returning 
warriors because he had a broader understanding of the human experience than can be 
found in modern medical approaches to illness. 
Shay’s challenge was reasonable, thorough, and full of vignettes and concrete 
applications for veteran care.  It was immediately received by scholars and practitioners 
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alike. Gary May, a leading scholar-practitioner in psychiatric care to veterans, described 
Achilles in Vietnam as a book that would permanently change the face of trauma care 
for combat veterans, as it compelled caregivers to rethink the underlying assumptions of 
their treatment methods and to take seriously existential descriptions of distress from 
their most severely troubled veterans (1995).  Vince Gotera, a leading academic in the 
social sciences, called for every student training for the helping professions in his 
university to read Shay’s book, because of its ability to step outside of the philosophical 
presuppositions of medicine to look for a broader perspective while remaining 
committed to what psychiatric care can accomplish (1994).  Indeed, in the more than 
twenty years since the first publication of Achilles in Vietnam, Shay’s category of moral 
injury as an application of the ancient Greek philosophical anthropology of Homer to 
the complex distress and disorientation of returning combat veterans has become an 
essential past of American trauma care (Nash, et. al., 2008).  It has gained such 
prominence that the National Center for PTSD considers it to be a major paradigm in 
PTSD care, regardless of its continued omission in the diagnostic manuals (Nash, et. al., 
2008). 
The landmark philosophical feature of Shay’s application of Homer’s epic 
poetry to the condition of contemporary distressed and disoriented combat veterans is 
the assertion that the violation of conscience in combat can affect veterans in ways that 
cannot be fully explained by modern scientific approaches to human anthropology 
(1994).  Shay found this to be a constant theme among his veterans, who used distinctly 
moral language in the description of their combat experiences and the difficulties of 
their homecomings.  He also found it as a constant in Homer’s writing, as the most 
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disoriented of Homer’s warriors were described as being injured at the place of thymos, 
or, in Greek philosophical anthropology, the seat of both human emotion and human 
moral instinct (Shay, 2002).  
Shay’s resulting description of injury to thymos, or moral injury, may be 
understood and critiqued under two broad categories: (1) moral injury after leadership 
betrayal and loss of meaning, and (2) moral injury through social isolation and the 
suspension of moral intuition upon entry into a “berserk state” (Shay, 1994, p. 97).  It 
will be helpful to examine the elements of CCAD alongside of these two broad 
categories, in order to see to what extent the elements of CCAD that are inadequately 
explained by the psychiatric paradigm can be accounted for in the paradigm of moral 
injury.  It will then become clear whether or not an integrated approach using both 
psychiatric and moral injury paradigms can facilitate a fuller understanding of CCAD in 
its uniqueness, complexity, and totality.   
 
Moral Injury after Leadership Betrayal 
For Shay, understanding the impact of leadership betrayal and its potential 
impact on a veteran’s ability to make meaning of his actions in combat “begins in the 
moral world of the soldier – what his culture understands to be right – and the betrayal 
of that moral order by a commander” (1994, p. 3).  The connection between a warrior 
and his leadership, bound together with one another through shared experiences in 
mortal danger and a life lived under a corporate code of honor, is difficult to compare to 
connections between leaders and dependents in other social groups or institutions.  Shay 
describes the combat warrior as a lethal child of sorts, conditioned for “dependence on 
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the organization for everything he needs to survive” (1994, p. 5).  Lieutenant Flournoy 
Phelps provides an American Marine leader’s take on this kind of dependence, showing 
well the vulnerability that develops between a warrior and his system: 
“A Marine’s rite of passage in initial training is full of the language of ‘rebirth.’  
He receives a new hair and grooming style, a new clothing line, new friends, and 
new skills that are designed to keep him alive in the most chaotic and violent of 
circumstances.  He is fed, and he is housed, and he lives where he is placed, 
regardless of his preferences.  He is given orders, which he is often expected to 
carry out with childlike faith and simplicity.  At the appointed time, he is 
whisked away from his homeland and dropped into chaotic conditions of 
combat, equipped with the most basic necessities for his survival and charged 
with the task of using deadly force for the sake of ‘good” (interview, 2014). 
 
The warrior can experience betrayal by his leadership in a number of ways, but 
for Homer, the essential betrayal for a warrior is when his leader compels him to 
employ lethal force in combat in a way that violates the code of honor they have shared 
(Shay, 1994).   Shay argues that the impact of such betrayal is more profound the closer 
a leader is to a warrior, but that it can also occur at the highest level of statesmanship, in 
which a politician, body of politicians, or body of high-ranking generals may thrust the 
warrior into combat while using the language of justice, but without deep interest in 
maintaining justice (1994).  Again, Phelps gives us an example of each of these two 
possibilities from a combat Marine’s point of view:  
“The first kind of betrayal could take place on the ground in a combat situation, 
in which a commanding officer might order his subordinate troops into an action 
that they either individually or corporately believe to be unjust or immoral.  In 
those situations, warriors would face a moral dilemma: do they carry out their 
orders, as they have been trained, and let the moral responsibility rest on the 
commander, or do they refuse, and face the consequences of refusing orders, and 
the potential loss of the respect and trust of their brother-in-arms, the only 
family they have at the moment?  The second might happen when a warrior 
senses that he has been ordered to war as a result of immoral or unjust decision-
making at the top level, leaving his own killing in combat to seem to him 
equivalent to murder.” (interview, 2014). 
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In Shay’s experience, a sense of this second type of leadership betrayal, from the 
position of the statesman, was almost universally present in his work with combat 
veterans suffering from features similar to the elements of CCAD after Vietnam (1994).  
He summarizes this situation with one veteran’s words: “The U.S. Army in Vietnam 
was like a mother who sold out her kids to be raped by their father to protect her own 
interests” (Shay, 1994, p. 5). 
This kind of rhetoric may seem shocking or confusing to some readers, but the 
warrior’s struggle to integrate leadership betrayal while still trying to serve in combat, 
and to try to continue to live under a code of honor that will guide them to right action 
in chaos is a very complex undertaking.  Muse, commenting on Shay’s work, notes that 
the warrior who has been betrayed by his leaders faces a complex situation: he 
experiences the disillusionment of being abused by the very people who trained him, he 
begins to question whether his lethal actions in combat were tantamount to murder 
rather than a response to a lawful order, and he may also begin to question whether 
there is an objective thing as goodness or badness at all (public lecture, May 12, 2013).  
A warrior’s response to such a complex situation may, in Shay’s paradigm, lead to an 
extreme form of mistrust, which he describes as a “persistent expectation of betrayal 
and trust” from all places of authority and from society at large (1994, p. 33).  And in 
addition to trust issues with figures of authority, he notes that veterans with a strong 
sense of leadership betrayal can feel distant from their own families, including their 
mothers and fathers, who might represent figures of primal authority, and their spouses, 
as those from whom betrayal might seem most devastating (Shay, 1994, p. 33).   
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In the beginning of Homer’s Iliad, Achilles, the great battle captain, suffers a 
public disrespect and personal betrayal by the statesman and chief war leader 
Agamemnon (Chapman, Ed., 2000).  Thus begins a series of changes in Achilles in 
which he becomes increasingly disillusioned, distrustful, unconstrained in battle, and 
brutal.  Shay considers Achilles’ change to eventually lead to a complete disintegration 
of his character, set into motion by Achilles’ sense of betrayal, and he further notices 
that in Homeric terms the essential change to Achilles is damage to his thymos, which in 
ancient Greek thought served as the anthropological locus of moral intuition (1994).  
There is certainly evidence to support this assertion.  Stephen Sullivan, a scholar in the 
field of Homeric poetry notes that thymos is a central component to Homer’s 
anthropology in both Iliad and Odyssey, and that thymos functions in Homer’s work as 
the place of conscience and motivation toward justice and goodness (1988).  Sullivan 
also notes that, in Homer’s work, thymos can be damaged or scattered, at which point a 
person can no longer reliably orient towards justice or goodness, and can feel lost in his 
or her ability to make sense of the events of life or to find meaning and purpose (1988). 
Shay argues that this sense of damage to the moral center of a person, brought 
on by betrayal or disorientation towards justice and goodness, can provide a 
philosophical explanation for complex features of mistrust and meaninglessness that are 
not easily explained under the psychiatric paradigm.  As he describes some of these 
complex features in his own work, there are clear connections to at least two elements 
of CCAD.  It will now be useful to examine these connections, and to draw some 
conclusions about the ability of the moral injury paradigm to address these elements in 
their totality. 
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Accounting for Debilitating Mistrust & Dissolution of Moral Intuition & Narrative 
Coherence  
The moral injury paradigm’s concept of damage to thymos after leadership 
betrayal does provide some insight into the features of CCAD described as persistent, 
socially debilitating mistrust and the radical dissolution of moral intuition and narrative 
coherence.  Many veterans suffering from debilitating mistrust, as demonstrated by the 
accounts from Everly, Miller, Needham and others in Chapter Two, begin to question 
everything they have been taught by their leaders once they feel they have been 
betrayed.  They begin to lose the ability to trust people in positions of power, and may 
begin to believe that life has no coherent, knowable structure, with dependable 
understandings of right and wrong.  This leads to a perspective of objects, ideas, and 
people as ultimately unstable or impermanent, and can easily lead to a total collapse of 
social trust.  Shay’s exposition of Homer and his connection of the phenomenon of 
leadership betrayal with damage to thymos, leading to the erosion of the human capacity 
to know and follow an established sense of right and wrong, is supported by the 
experiences of Everly, Miller, and Needham, who first lost trust in their leaders’ 
understanding of right and wrong and then lost trust in their own, with devastating 
consequences. 
Veterans suffering from the radical dissolution of moral intuition and narrative 
coherence, as demonstrated in the accounts from Miller, Mac, Martinez, Burgoyne, and 
others in Chapter Two, have not only lost the ability to discern right and wrong, but 
have lost the ability to find meaning in life itself, leading to an absurd approach to life 
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that renders them unable to survive and flourish in community.  Some of them are even 
involved in war crimes and civic crimes, and seem surprised to be prosecuted 
afterwards (Boal, 2004).  A number of the veterans mentioned in the discussion of this 
element of CCAD in Chapter Two were involved in situations that involved a sense of 
leadership betrayal.  Tick’s My Lai veteran has been ordered in previous circumstances 
to do inhumane things, and had afterwards come to understand some inhumane actions 
as necessary and even right in combat (2005).  Martinez and Burgoyne each entered a 
state of moral disorientation in their urban combat environments, and had been jokingly 
encouraged in their inhumanity by some of their leadership, who then seemed surprised 
at their decreasing inability to self-manage and restrain their actions on humanitarian 
grounds (Boal, 2004).  Through exposure to intense combat and mixed messages from 
leadership on what is and is not acceptable behavior in war, these men all not only 
experienced lapses in moral discernment, but in the aftermath of their crimes 
experienced an enduring sense of moral meaninglessness that evolved into 
meaninglessness in other areas of life, including the maintenance of a sense of purpose. 
The moral injury paradigm does, especially in its appeal to the Greek 
philosophical concept of thymos, provide an account for the elements of CCAD 
described as persistent, socially debilitating mistrust and the radical dissolution of moral 
intuition and narrative coherence in a way that the psychiatric paradigm could not.  An 
understanding of complex mistrust among veterans as beginning with a painful and 
fearful loss of one’s faith in trusted leaders during mortal combat, later to develop into a 
damage to one’s ability to trust anyone’s motives provides a helpful and more holistic 
line of approach to the phenomenon, including many aspects of the human experience.  
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This certainly transcends the psychiatric paradigm’s strictly cognitive approach to 
complex mistrust as a result of hyper-vigilance in the autonomic nervous system, 
exacerbated by “negative alterations in cognition” and “persistent and exaggerated 
negative beliefs” (APA, 2013, p. 272). 
Equally helpful is the moral injury paradigm’s understanding of 
meaninglessness as a further complication of complex mistrust, in which damage to a 
veteran’s ability to trust leaders evolves into a loss of trust in one’s own judgment and 
eventually a loss of trust in any permanence or meaning in the world.  This certainly 
proves to be a helpful addition to the psychiatric paradigm, which could not 
appropriately account for such radical dissolution of moral intuition and narrative 
coherence using its criteria for “nihilistic delusions,” or Antisocial Personality Disorder 
(APA, 2013, p. 659).  In providing this conceptual approach to both mistrust and 
meaninglessness, the moral paradigm also provides evidence of a strong connection 
between the two elements of CCAD. 
 
Moral Injury and the Berserk State 
The second broad theme of moral injury in Shay’s work is the potential for a 
warrior to enter into a wild, disconnected state of animal-like fury in combat, especially 
when he is cut off from social accountability or is motivated by revenge.  Shay calls this 
the berserk state (1994).  He describes the phenomenon in this way:  
“I believe the word berserk is the most precise term available to describe the 
behavior that I call to the reader’s mind…berserk comes from the Norse word 
for the frenzied warriors who went into battle naked, or without armor, in a 
godlike [but also] beastlike fury…[an] ambiguous borderline between heroism 
and a blood-crazed state in which abuse after abuse is committed” (1994, p. 77). 
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This condition may or may not be catalyzed by a leadership betrayal, but it often acts 
itself a catalyst for self-betrayal, in the sense that it opens the way for the warrior to 
commit acts that will later horrify him, having violated his previously held convictions 
of right and wrong (Shay, 1994).  The connections that Shay forges between his veteran 
clients and Homer’s characters highlight three main features of the consequences of 
entering into the berserk state: (1) the same motivation which leads a warrior to be 
roused to valorous actions instead begins to motivate the warrior to brutality and violent 
inhumanity, violating his own conscience (2) this brutality contains disorienting 
excitement and sensations of invulnerability in the midst of violent, aggressive action, 
and (3) in the aftermath of the berserk state, there is a long-term alteration of the 
warrior’s temperament and ability to self-restrain (1994, 2002).  It is important to 
briefly examine all three of these features. 
First, although Homer himself does not use a term equivalent to berserk, he does 
describe the entry of a warrior into an uncontrollable state of rage in which “epic, 
noteworthy valor,” a concept described by the Greek term aristeia, turns into 
unprincipled brutality in the midst of mortal combat (Shay, 1994, p. 78).  In Book 24 of 
the Iliad, Homer describes the valorous Achilles’ turn towards animal-like, unrestrained 
frenzy in battle this way:  
“[the now] ruthless Achilles…whose mind is nowise right, neither is the purpose 
in his breast one that may be bent; but his heart is ever set on cruelty, even as a 
lion that at the bidding of his great might and lordly spirit goeth forth against the 
flocks of men to win him a feast; even so hath Achilles lost all pity, neither is 
shame in his heart, [a loss] which harmeth men greatly…neither honor nor profit 
shall he have.  Let him beware…for lo, in fury he doth foul [himself] (Il. 24.40, 
Chapman, 2000, p. 381). 
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In Homer’s worldview, this internal state in which aristeia or principled valor is 
transformed into brutal inhumanity is another phenomenon connected with damage to 
the human capacity of thymos (Kobierzycki, 2010).  It is specifically made possible, 
according to Homer’s anthropological pre-suppositions, by a loss of function in the 
thymos that ordinarily regulates aggression and keeps it from dominating and 
overwhelming a person’s sense of justice, moderation, and moral restraint (Kobierzycki, 
2010).  Thaddeus Kobierzycki, a Homeric scholar, notices helpfully that incidences and 
discussions of violent, uncontrollable rage following a character’s sustainment of 
damage to thymos occurs no less than 16 times in Iliad and Odyssey, making it an 
important and repetitive concept (2010). 
Secondly, Shay notices in his own work that the onset of the berserk state is 
often triggered by a warrior’s sense that he has “nothing to lose,” and that actions 
performed in the berserk state, which are often marked not only by reckless frenzy but 
by astonishing acts of inspiring athleticism, may appear to be actions of extreme valor 
(1994, p. 86).  He notices that warriors in such a state may also experience a god-like 
sensation of invincibility and invulnerability, accompanied by an exhilarating sense of 
transcendence over normal human limitations or responsibilities (Shay, 1994).  In Iliad 
Achilles is described as godlike for his bravery, his athleticism in battle, and for his 
general outlook in battle, in which he carried an attitude of invulnerability (Chapman, 
Trans., 2000).  This is connected with his eventual fall, after he becomes more and more 
reckless, which seems to take him, his comrades, his leaders, and his enemies by 
surprise (Chapman, Trans., 2000). 
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A number of researchers and caregivers using Shay’s idea of moral injury and 
likewise using Homer’s character Achilles as a lens for understanding their veteran 
clients have noticed similar trends in their work.  Edward Tick describes the berserk 
state from his interviews with veterans as a “frantic” and almost joyful experience in 
killing, accented with freedom from moral concerns and the joy of feeling invincible 
(2002).  Brock and Lettini discuss the joyful exhilaration that can occur within the 
berserk state to be potentially orgasmic, and note that in this state the act of killing can 
begin to seem unreal, like acting in a play, which supports their ability to set aside 
moral constraints (2012).  Lawhorne and Philpott share their field notes on the berserk 
state as a condition of becoming “kill crazy,” in which affected warriors cannot rest if 
there is more killing available, chasing new conquests in combat like a drug and 
becoming socially disconnected from peer accountability in the process (2011).  
Papadopoulos, although he does not work specifically with the idea of moral injury, 
also notes the phenomenological development of a seemingly transcendent state in the 
act of killing, illustrated by his work with combat veterans and survivors of the conflict 
in Kosovo: “destructiveness can have a certain kind of chilling purity which is 
extremely seductive. This is difficult to convey, but it can be approximated once we 
connect it with the process…where one polarity, in its extreme form and devoid of 
personal content, dominates the individual” (1998, p. 464-5). 
Lastly, Shay considers the berserk state to be one of the most irreparably 
damaging conditions in which a warrior may find himself: 
“I conclude that the berserk state is ruinous, leading to the soldier’s maiming or 
death in battle – which is the most frequent outcome – and to lifelong 
psychological and physiological injury if he survives.  I believe that once a 
person has entered the berserk state, he or she is changed forever…episodic 
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recurrence of the berserk state in civilian war [is common, and] is not new” 
(1994, p. 98). 
 
Homer portrays Achilles’ movement towards death as a one of increasing predictability, 
as Achilles becomes more erratic, more isolated from social engagement, less able to 
restrain himself, and engages in riskier behavior (Chapman, Trans., 2000).  The reader 
begins to sense that Achilles is moving in a direction of socially-disconnected, personal 
disintegration from which there is no return.  Edward Tick also describes the berserk 
state as a place from which there “may be no return,” and recounts the experiences of a 
number of his clients fear that their blind, violent rage may forever be triggered without 
warning (2002, p. 90).  He also notices that they can begin to develop other related 
compulsions and tendencies, such as masochism and sadism (Tick, 2002).  Lawhorne 
and Philpott suggest that the disconnect from friends, comrades, and society that seems 
to be prevalent before a warrior enters into “kill crazy” rage will also tend to grow 
wider in its aftermath, as if the experience of once entering into the berserk state makes 
it difficult for the warrior to establish any kind of social stability moving forward, even 
to the extent that they may “never again [make a] friend” (2011, p. 224). 
Shay argues that these three features of the berserk state, when understood in the 
light of damage to thymos, in which the human capacity to guard against being 
overcome with violent aggression erodes and a person begins to experience episodes of 
uncontrollable rage, can provide a fuller account of the conditions of some of his 
veterans than the psychiatric paradigm alone (2002).  He also provides a connection 
between thymos and a warrior’s social relationships, noting that suggesting that entry 
into a berserk state is made more likely by social factors such as leadership betrayal, 
humiliation over self-perception of cowardice or accusations of cowardice by comrades, 
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a sudden dissolution of an important relationship, witnessing the death of a close friend, 
and finding or hearing about the mutilated body of a comrade (1994).  
In the moral injury paradigm’s description of the complex aftermath of the 
berserk state, there is at least one clear connection to an element of CCAD, which was 
described in Chapter Two as lustful, uncontrollable rage.  It will now be useful to 
examine this connection, and to draw some conclusions about the ability of the moral 
injury paradigm to address this element in its totality. 
 
Accounting for a Lustful, Uncontrollable Rage 
Marquez, Harold Miller, Nathan Everly and others described in Chapter Two 
seemed to experience a similar frenzied state in combat to Achilles, in which they 
became disconnected from moral restraint and entered an “animal-like” condition (N. 
Everly, personal communication, September 1, 2010; H. Miller, personal 
communication, July 22, 2014).  They each also feel that they are permanently changed 
in the aftermath.  In Everly’s case, raging violence was accompanied by a loss of 
awareness and a sense of being unattached to anyone and anything, which was 
exhilarating in the moment, but scared him afterwards and led him to profound regret 
for his loss of moral discernment and brutality (N. Everly, personal communication, 
September 1, 2010).  He also describes his entry into this state as involuntary and 
sudden, as “snapping” and “just losing it” (N. Everly, personal communication, 
September 1, 2010).  In Harold Miller’s case, he recalls being able in combat to fight 
with a ferocity, strength and stamina that surprised him and astonished and inspired his 
teammates (H. Miller, personal communication, July 22, 2014).  When he got into that 
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state of frenzy he experienced it as a “high” that was both exhilarating and addictive, 
and afterwards felt a “craving” for more opportunities to get into combat action (H. 
Miller, personal communication, July 22, 2014).   
Shay notes that veterans experiencing this phenomenological feature are 
“usually very clear about the incidents that brought on the change, in contrast to 
generally clouded memory of the berserk state itself” (1994, p. 77).   In the previous 
chapter, it was demonstrated that the psychiatric paradigm does offer some accounting 
for angry outbursts and general irritability following exposure to significant adversity 
such as combat action, but represented an impoverished approach to describing an 
experience that includes permanent changes in the personality of veterans who have 
experienced it.  It was also mentioned that, due to this difficulty in understanding such a 
phenomenon of complex rage using the psychiatric criteria, clinicians can find 
themselves trying to account for their veteran clients’ lasting and complicated distress 
by finding additional psychiatric diagnoses that may apply, increasing the risk of 
complications in treatment.   
The moral injury paradigm does, in its treatment of the berserk state, provide a 
further account of the element of CCAD described as uncontrollable, lustful rage, and 
once again its main insight is in the concept of damage to thymos.  Shay does not 
discard the psychiatric paradigm for Homer’s philosophical understanding of veterans, 
but rather expands upon it.  He mentions in Odysseus in America that “the berserk state 
leaves a permanent imprint on the physiology of a person who has been in it – a 
permanent hyperarousal of the autonomic nervous system and adrenaline secretion” 
(2002, p. 24).  However, he also gives great importance to understanding the berserk 
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state in terms of thymos, and the erosion of its capacity for moral restraint and curtailing 
instincts of aggression.  This certainly accounts for this element of CCAD more fully 
than categorizing it as persistent irritability, and takes seriously the need for a holistic 
understanding, incorporating physiological, psychological, social, and existential 
concerns. 
 
The Post-Berserk State and Disconnect with Felt Experience 
 A third aspect of the moral injury paradigm which may be relevant in examining 
CCAD is not a broad theme in Shay’s work, but it is connected to the berserk state, and 
is discussed on several occasions in both of his books.  Shay mentions a distinct 
phenomenological feature that often appears in the aftermath of the berserk state: a loss 
of inner vitality or of the “sense of life” (1994, p. 52).  He notices that post-berserk 
warriors often experience an inability to experience any emotion, bringing in a 
“prolonged state of numbness…[and an] inability to feel love or happiness” (Shay, 
1994, p. 52).  Learning to follow conscience again in terms of feeling compassion or 
mercy towards others can be elusive, because of the damage done upon entry into the 
berserk state (Shay, 1994).  He also observes a common sense among his veterans of 
“already being dead” or of having been dead in some way since a certain moment in 
combat, the result of which is surreal, ghost-like experience of moving through the 
world (Shay, 1994, p. 51).  He notes that “‘I died in Vietnam’ is a common utterance of 
our patients…[just as] Homer shows Achilles as ‘already dead’ before his actual death 
in a series of fine poetic stratagems,” including the use of the Greek word keimai when 
Achilles falls down in grief and exhaustion (Shay, 1994, p. 52). 
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 Tick accounts for this feature of feeling dead and lifeless as the result of a break 
between body and soul that occurs during the berserk state, and relates the stories of a 
number of veterans who claim to feel like they left the war zone “without a soul” (2005, 
p. 287).  He recounts the experience of one such veteran, who had committed an 
atrocity as a result of lost moral discernment in the midst of combat, as saying the 
following: “my soul…is gone.  I’ve been without a soul since the war.  I killed innocent 
people.  I killed a boy.  I can’t feel a thing” (Tick, 2005, p. 287).  Brock and Lettini 
describe the post-berserk state of affected veterans as one of feeling and being lost, or 
sensing that “they lost their souls in combat and are no longer who they were” (2009, p. 
iv.).  They note that, in their experience, such veterans can feel cut off from their own 
feeling as if they are “trapped inside of a wall” (Brock & Lettini, 2009, p. iv.).  They 
quote one veteran as describing his experience after the berserk state this way: “hell 
ain’t got no coordinates.  You can’t find it on the charts, because there ain’t no charts.  
Hell is no place at all, so when you’re there, you’re nowhere – you’re lost.  There are 
guys [around here] who come home from war and live fifty years without [any feeling], 
fifty years lost (Brock & Lettini, 2009, p. 65). 
 Tick, Brock, and Lettini observe in these two accounts a certain pattern that also 
follows the patterned experience of Harold, Jim, Art, and Tim as related in Chapter 
Two.  After having entered into the berserk state in combat, they find themselves cut off 
from felt experience whenever they are outside of combat.  Harold kept trying to 
volunteer to go out into the most dangerous places in combat just to “feel again,” and 
claims that when he returned from the war he could only “feel” when he was driving his 
motorcycle recklessly and running from the police (H. Miller, personal communication, 
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July 22, 2014).  He claims to still have trouble experiencing any emotions at all (H. 
Miller, personal communication, July 22, 2014).  Jim first noticed his difficulty with 
feeling when he began trying to date after the Vietnam War (Egendorf, 1985).  He 
claims to have not been able to even fully feel orgasms during sexual activity 
(Egendorf, 1985).  Art claims to have virtually no sensation, and claims to be able to 
watch himself sometimes from a distance, as if he is outside of his own body (Tick, 
2005). 
This certainly does seem to address the element of CCAD described as a 
conscious disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation, and once again, the strongest 
foundation for the moral injury paradigm’s perspective on this element of CCAD is 
related to the philosophical concept of thymos.  Shay argues that some of the aspects of 
the post-berserk state, in which veterans lose the ability to experience emotional 
connection with themselves and others, seem to be an aggravated result of damage to 
thymos, which can continue to erode indefinitely after initial entry in the berserk state 
(2002, p. 160).  In his view, once damage is done to thymos, emotional disconnect and 
feelings of being dead naturally follow, because thymos is the seat of the human 
capacity for energy, feelings, and loving connection (Shay, 2002).   
This secondary understanding of thymos, in which it contains not only the 
aggressive instinct or moral intuition of the human person but also the ability to 
experience inner vitality or to sustain an emotional connection with one’s environment, 
is indeed supported by Homeric scholars.  Sullivan notes that Homer uses the word 
thymos as the locus of emotional reactions such as fear, worry, and anxiety as well 
anger (1988).  Kobierzycki argues that in Homer’s worldview, thymos served as the 
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“instrument of the affects,” in the sense that it was seen as the place from which 
affective emotions and feelings were generated, and also mentions that Homer’s 
writings suggest that thymos can “depart,” resulting in a sensation of deadness and loss 
of passion in life (2010, p. 3).  Snell also notices Homer’s description of the “departure” 
or even destruction of thymos, after which there is experience of death or detachment 
from oneself (Snell, 2012, p. 9). 
Moral injury and its concept of thymos provide a far better account for this 
element of CCAD than does the psychiatric paradigm alone, under the diagnostic 
category of dissociative depersonalization.  Although dissociative depersonalization 
provides some account for specific psychic and physiological features of conscious 
disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation, it lacks a strong connection with other 
phenomena associated with combat related adversity, and it does not aid researchers or 
clinicians in developing a cohesive, holistic approach to veteran clients suffering from 
the other complex elements of CCAD.  The moral injury paradigm has been able to 
address both of these inadequacies.   
First, it has provided a reasonable conceptual connection between the unique 
features of conscious disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation and combat-related 
adversity, in that thymos, which from an ancient philosophical perspective is an 
essential but vulnerable human capacity during war-fighting, is the seat of aggression, 
moral intuition, and felt experience.  When damaged in combat, through leadership 
betrayal and / or an entry into the berserk state, all of these aspects of thymos may be 
affected, leading to an eroded ability to regulation internal motivation, a moral 
disorientation, and a loss of felt experience.  Secondly, this self-evidently provides 
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significant conceptual connections between conscious disconnect from emotion and 
bodily sensation, uncontrollable and lustful rage, the radical dissolution of moral 
intuition and narrative coherence, and persistent, socially debilitating mistrust.  
  
An Adequate Account of CCAD? 
 In summary, the paradigm of moral injury has proven capable of providing a 
meaningful account for four of the five features of CCAD, and it has done so by making 
use of the philosophical concept of thymos, and particularly the earliest recorded use of 
thymos in the epic poetry of Homer.  Shay traces the potential for thymos to be damaged 
after leadership betrayal in combat, and describes the steady disintegration of a 
veteran’s ability to trust anyone in leadership, and eventually anyone in a position to 
betray him at all, including close friends, relatives, or romantic interests.  This certainly 
addresses the element of CCAD described as persistent, socially debilitating mistrust.   
 Next, he describes an extreme sense of meaninglessness that may occur in 
tandem with complex mistrust, as a further result of damaged thymos after leadership 
betrayal in combat.  In this phenomenon a veteran’s inability to trust his leaders can 
evolve into a skepticism about in the veteran’s own judgment or sense of right and 
wrong, especially if it has been shaped by that leader’s guidance, and this can lead to an 
eventual skepticism any permanence or meaning in the world.  This certainly addresses 
the element of CCAD described as the radical dissolution of moral intuition and 
narrative coherence. 
Third, the moral injury paradigm describes a state in which a warrior, in the 
midst of combat, can be overcome by exhilarating aggression, and damage can thus be 
 110 
done to thymos in a different way, eroding his ability to regulate his passion in battle 
and remain able to exercise moral restraint.  Once this happens, Shay argues that the 
warrior may experience long-term difficulty regulating his aggressive instincts, and 
once he enters into an aggressive episode, may be incapable of avoiding brutality.  This 
does seem to provide an account for the element of CCAD described as uncontrollable, 
lustful rage. 
Fourth, the moral injury paradigm has provided a connection between the post-
berserk state and a feeling of lifelessness, devoid of vitality.  Shay notices that, when 
thymos is damaged during entry into the berserk state, a loss of felt experience may 
follow, since thymos carries not only aggressive capacities but also emotional 
capacities, and is no longer able to function optimally.  This does provide an account for 
the element of CCAD described as conscious disconnect from emotion and bodily 
sensation. 
All four of these elements are connected, according to the moral injury 
paradigm, and all have a coherent origin in common, in terms of the philosophical locus 
of damage to the human person: thymos.  Notably, Shay does not provide an account for 
the fifth and perhaps most unusual feature of the phenomenon under consideration, 
which has been described as self-horror at the perceived absorption of evil, and 
illustrated in the experiences of Tim, John, Lois, Harold, and others in Chapter Two.  
Each of these warriors have claimed to experience some kind of contact in the combat 
zone with an entity they call evil or monstrous, and have also claimed to have somehow 
absorbed or connected with it.   
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Shay does describe warriors in the berserk state as becoming like “monsters,” 
from a certain point of view (1994, p. 49).  He once even quotes a warrior who 
expressed the feeling that a monster had taken up residence in him to some extent, 
acting suddenly and without his consent at times in “coming out with a fury” around 
people he met (Shay, 1994, p. 95).  He quotes a second warrior as describing the time 
when “evil entered into him” (Shay, 1994, p. 33).  Another warrior he quotes says 
speaks about “evil” as an entity that came into his life and that made him “turn into 
something” he wasn’t before (Shay, 1994, p. 95). 
 Shay does not treat any of these accounts directly, as a unique report of actual 
client experience.  As a medical doctor and clinically trained psychiatrist working and 
writing in contemporary times, this should perhaps not be surprising.  Thermos notes in 
his own psychiatric profession the wholesale philosophical “shift from ontological 
priority to psychological prevalence [in the last century of human care], which is 
nowadays universal, and has almost completely deprived [physicians and 
psychotherapists] of the ‘receptors’ necessary to recognize” any phenomena which 
seem difficult to reconcile with scientific paradigms (2004, p. 70).  Timothy Keller, a 
modern philosopher and social scientist, adds that professional mistrust of mysterious or 
seemingly supernatural experiences have long paralyzed the modern sciences from fully 
understanding the human experience, beginning with “the Enlightenment belief that 
[such things] cannot be reconciled to a rational view of the world” (2008, p. 101).  
 Nevertheless, given that he has been clearly open to exploring philosophical and 
poetic ideas outside of the psychiatric paradigm in order to better account for the 
extreme and unusual features his was seeing in his veterans, it is strange that Shay does 
 112 
not seem to consider taking seriously their common description of contact with a 
personal sort of evil in the most intense combat situations.  This highlights an 
occasional tension in Shay’s work.  His thesis is built on the idea that the psychiatric 
paradigm cannot account for some of the most complex phenomena common among 
combat veterans, necessitating the broadening of philosophical presuppositions in 
understanding and treating their distress.  On the other hand, there are occasions in 
which he does not seem to take the experiences of his clients seriously, electing instead 
to interpret them metaphorically so that they can better fit into a more scientific set of 
presuppositions about the human experience.   
 Although it is possible to say that the moral injury paradigm does not directly 
account for the element of CCAD described as self-horror at the perceived absorption of 
evil, it does not necessarily follow that the ancient philosophical concept of thymos 
includes no potential lines of accounting for this phenomenon.  Shay, indeed, saw 
evidence of this element of CCAD in his own work, and never attempted to search for 
an understanding of its features from the Homer’s philosophical worldview, as he did 
the other four elements of CCAD.  This introduces some obvious questions: how did 
Shay approach thymos, in general, considering the methodological difficulties of 
applying an ancient philosophical concept to a modern phenomenon in veteran care?  
What were his epistemological considerations?  In answering these questions, it will be 
possible to understand why he did not attempt to address the fifth element of CCAD, 
and it will then be possible to consider whether the fifth element of CCAD can be 
addressed using the concept of thymos, from a different perspective or with different 
epistemological commitments. 
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Shay and Homer: a Tale of Two Thymi 
Shay’s epistemology in understanding thymos is made evident by his attempts to 
directly define the term, especially in his work Odysseus in America.  It is quite clear to 
see the gap between Shay’s worldview and Homer’s, and to see the consequences of 
these differences.  In a number of places Shay defines thymos in generally Homeric 
ways, calling it the “noble fighting heart of a warrior,” and the generator of “heroism, 
boldness, and courage” (2002, p. 12).  Kobierzycki notes that Homer uses thymos in this 
way more than 35 times in his epic poems (2008).  Shay also discusses thymos as the 
seat of emotions, and as “that which causes affection” and enables the self to love 
another (2002, p. 158).  Similarly, Homer uses thymos to describe emotional states such 
as fear, hatred, joy, sadness, love, and bitterness 167 times in Iliad and Odyssey 
(Kobierzycki, 2008). 
However, beyond these broad similarities, there are distinct differences in 
Homer’s use of thymos and Shay’s usage, and these differences have an impact on 
Shay’s ability to meaningfully appropriate Homer’s ideas.  Shay discusses thymos as 
that which rouses a warrior to fight for principles of honor that are culturally 
constructed and constantly changing, and emphasizes this concept of the ultimately 
movable cultural construction of a warrior’s morality at least 12 times in Odysseus in 
America (2002).  Kobierzycki offers the opinion that although Homer uses thymos to 
describe the aggressive instinct that rouses a warrior to battle 36 times in Iliad and 
Odyssey, it is never clear that he is connecting the instinct itself to a socially constructed 
morality (Kobierzycki, 2008).  Bruno Snell also notes Homer’s regular use of the term 
to describe both an instinct that rouses a man to action and a man’s moral sense, and 
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further notices Homer’s descriptions of the way that social expectations may influence a 
man’s actions during combat (2012).  However, he does not find any place where 
Homer insinuates the cultural construction of a man’s moral intuition (Snell, 2012).   
Although Homer does clearly associate thymos with both aggression and moral 
intuition, Shirley Sullivan reminds contemporary readers that Homer’s understanding of 
moral intuition was parallel to Plato’s idea of conscience, as a universal absolute that 
can be discerned through either reason or a felt sense of right and wrong, rather than the 
product of social construction (1988).  Shay’s use of thymic morality as a social 
construction certainly reflects his philosophical presuppositions about how a human 
being develops and sustains a moral sense, but when these presuppositions are divergent 
from Homer’s, the efficacy of Shay’s use of thymos to discuss moral disorientation can 
be called into question. 
As another example, Shay reflects Homer’s use of thymos as the seat of moral 
intuition, but explains that in contemporary terms this can be understood as the function 
of an “interior psychic mirror” which reflects the self’s moral state relative to societal 
mores (2002, p. 156).  Again it is clear that, for Shay, the moral intuition of a person is 
essentially informed by historically and socio-culturally constructed content embodied 
in ideals, ambitions, and attachments,” making the human person particularly 
vulnerable to social and cultural changes in the understanding of right and wrong (2002, 
p. 157).  In fact, Shay’s writings suggest that, in his opinion, this is the exclusive way 
that moral intuition is formed, because at no point in either Achilles in Vietnam or 
Odysseus in America does he offer an alternative idea.  Shay’s presentation of thymic 
morality certainly reflects certain cultural assumptions that were foreign to Homer’s 
 115 
philosophical worldview. Sullivan argues that, for Homer, thymos functions as a moral 
intuition that is not necessarily connected with moral reasoning, but which can be “open 
to divine influence,” and can aid a warrior in doing what is right outside of what he has 
been ordered or educated to do (1988). 
Another way that Shay allows his philosophical presuppositions to overshadow 
Homer’s presuppositions occurs around the concept of the self, the “I,” or the ego in its 
relation to thymos (2002, p. 284).  Shay describes thymos as essentially an ancient 
philosophical understanding of “narcissism,” in that it involves a deep desire for 
recognition from society (2002, p. 156).  He argues that in a “fixed inflated state” it can 
produce megalomania, but in a regulated state it produces a healthy, differentiated 
position in relationships and social standing (2002, p. 161).  At one point Shay even 
suggests that thymos can be summarized as “the human universal trait of commitment to 
people, groups, ideals, and ambitions, and of emotional upheaval when these are 
threatened” (2002, p. 247).  Accordingly, for Shay and the moral injury paradigm, when 
leadership betrayal occurs, it is essentially the warrior’s ability to maintain a stable 
commitment to people and ideals that is damaged, and therefore complex mistrust and 
meaninglessness ensue.  And further, when a warrior enters the berserk state, it is his 
narcissistic stability that is compromised, resulting in an entry into a state of extreme 
megalomania in which his connection to society is damaged through the violation of 
cultural mores about humane behavior. 
Unfortunately, these philosophical constructions are not present in Homer’s 
worldview, because the oldest of them dates back only to the advent of the 
Enlightenment, which occurred more than 2,400 years after Homer died.  According to 
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Kobierzycki, Homer does use thymos in describing “mental unsettlement” 29 times, but 
these uses are connected to ancient philosophical understandings of human distress and 
disorientation rather than contemporary psychiatric or psychological ones (2008, p. 8).  
Far from an individual trait of commitment to others, Sullivan argues that Homer’s 
original understanding of thymos reflected the opposite reality: that thymos is an 
essential inner vitality shared between persons, and is most threatened when one 
individual breaks from the whole (1988). 
 
Epistemological Considerations 
It is clear that Shay developed the ancient idea of thymos in the way he did not 
to better understand Homer’s worldview but to better support his own work with 
veterans, including the use of contemporary concepts such as narcissistic stability, 
megalomania, and positive individualism.  In fact, he is open about this in Odysseus in 
America: “…in this book I have asked readers to adopt [my] modern definition of 
the…word thymos (Shay, 2002, p. 247).  He describes why he has decided to depart 
from the context of the ancient and original context for the term, despite warnings from 
his colleagues that it would be a dangerously “ahistorical and universalizing approach to 
Homer’s content” (Shay, 2002, p. 247).  His defense takes this form: “the content of 
thymos is historically and culturally constructed…I use Homer’s words in this effort not 
because I believe that the ancient Greeks [had ultimate knowledge] but because…[they] 
were profoundly interested in thymos and we can learn from what they said about it” 
(Shay, 2002, p. 247).   
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And here, in essence, is the heart of Shay’s epistemology, when approaching 
Homeric thymos.  Shay chooses to remain distant from the historical and philosophical 
contexts of Homer’s presuppositions even while appealing to him for use of the term 
thymos, and his logic in justifying this seems to be that any term or idea from any time 
or place can be decontextualized and re-contextualized with impunity, because culture 
is always changing, and therefore no specific culture has the right to define its own 
terms indefinitely.  That may be reasonable, from a certain point of view, and it is 
certainly connected to his understanding of morality, which he believes to be a 
constantly changing social contract that represents the fluid dynamics of convention, 
order, and mutual expectations in a society (Shay, 1994).   
However, there are inherent dangers to be navigated when using this logic.  
Primarily, there is the danger of one’s own presuppositions becoming the only objective 
reality in one’s research, to the point of subjectivizing all conflicting presuppositions.  
Ronald Powell, an educator in the field of research design, argues that one of the most 
overlooked factors in research that can compromise reliable results is when a researcher 
carries philosophical assumptions into the work which conflict with the assumptions of 
the persons or institutions under examination, and does not account for this conflict in 
his or her methodology (1997).  It does not appear clear that Shay has done this 
important work, and the results are evident. 
Here is a clear presentation of the difficulty of Shay’s position.  He very clearly 
and convincingly links several of the most complex phenomena associated with 
exposure to extreme combat action to two kinds of radically disorienting events: 
leadership betrayal, and entry into a berserk state.  His work in drawing parallels 
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between Homer’s description of the consequences of such events in the lives of ancient 
warriors and contemporary descriptions of the same consequences in the lives of 
modern warriors is both thorough and unique in its contribution to the field.  His 
connection of these complex features is also thorough, from a causal standpoint of 
interpretation.  However, in his attempts to describe the actual nature of the impact such 
events have on the human person, and the damage done to the human person in all of its 
complexity and totality, he is unwilling to fully represent Homer’s philosophical 
presuppositions, even when those presuppositions did seem capable of such an 
understanding, in an ancient time.   
Instead, Shay decides to import his own understandings of the human 
experience, using constructs that not only are foreign to Homer’s worldview, but which 
actively contradict Homer’s worldview.  Shay decides to call the phenomena he is 
seeing moral injury, claiming Homer and the concept of thymos as its philosophical 
source, while describing morality in a way that Homer did not, ascribing moral ideas to 
thymos in a way that Homer did not, and developing his idea of the destruction of 
socially-constructed morality as the source of the complex phenomena he sees in his 
own veteran clients in a way that has almost no connection to what scholars know of 
Homer’s ideas about morality or anthropology. 
One is left to question whether or not a fuller understanding of Homer’s original 
context for thymos and its damage in combat could provide an account for the fifth 
element of CCAD which is not addressed in the moral injury paradigm.  One is also left 
to question whether some underlying realities of CCAD might be discovered in 
Homer’s worldview, since, as Shay highlights, that worldview has produced a collection 
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of accounts of disorientation during combat that seem quite parallel to the conditions of 
contemporary warriors, and offers ideas towards a cohesive view of at least four of the 
five elements of CCAD in a way that the psychiatric paradigm could not accomplish 
alone. 
 
In Summary 
Shay’s contribution to the field cannot be overstated.  As has been demonstrated 
in this chapter, his brilliance is in recognizing and connecting patterns of complex 
disorientation with two events that deeply impact the human person of the warrior, and 
finding parallels in Homer’s nearly 3,000-year-old work.  In so doing, he provides a far 
more adequate account of the complexity and uniqueness of four of the five elements of 
CCAD, and also makes sense of their inter-connection in a way the psychiatric 
paradigm alone could not. 
However, Shay’s work appears limited in the sense that although he thoroughly 
addresses existential parallels between Homer’s understanding of warriors and the 
experiences of contemporary veterans, and uses Homer’s concept of thymos in 
explaining some of what he sees in his work with veterans, he does not take seriously 
Homer’s philosophical context or presuppositions in writing.  Shay’s work evidences a 
significant departure from Homeric ideas about morality and injury to thymos, and 
essentially rests on Shay’s own philosophical presuppositions about morality and its 
potential damage in social construction and deconstruction.  In addition, Shay does not 
seem to work with the fifth element of CCAD, which he does see present in his own 
work, but does not address.  It is certainly possible that this unwillingness is related to 
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the privileging of his own philosophical presuppositions over the presuppositions of his 
clients, just as he privileges his own philosophical presuppositions over Homer’s in 
constructing the paradigm of moral injury. 
 In moving forward with this thesis, it is clear that Homer believed that warriors 
could be damaged in a way that cannot be adequately described by physiological 
criteria, cognitive tendencies, or the personal status of socially constructed morality.  In 
order to continue to pursue an understanding of CCAD that accounts for its uniqueness, 
complexity, and totality, there is an opportunity to attempt something that Shay was 
unwilling to attempt, which has also incidentally not been attempted before in the field.  
This thesis will now examine Homeric thymos in its original philosophical context, and 
attempt to understand the nature and consequences of damage to thymos, from his 
worldview.  Along the way, it will become clear whether Homer’s worldview was able 
to account for the element of CCAD described at self-horror at the perceived absorption 
of evil. 
Once Homeric thymos is examined exhaustively, and Homer’s understanding of 
each of the five elements of CCAD is established, it will not be the best course to 
attempt to directly apply his ancient philosophical understanding to a contemporary 
issue such as veteran care.  It will be more helpful instead to trace the development of 
thymos through later Greek philosophers, even unto the present, and to develop a 
philosophical corpus of its understanding and use into the contemporary era, after 
which some conclusions may be drawn about the potential efficacy of its use as a 
complementary philosophical approach to the phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
A CONTEXTUAL VIEW OF HOMERIC THYMOS 
 
 
Although it is likely that the concept of thymos was used in ancient Greece 
before the time of Homer, it earliest place in surviving manuscripts can be found in 
Homer’s Iliad (Koziak, 1999).  Barbara Koziak argues that not only for its early place 
but also for its grand significance in Homer’s portrait of humanity at war, any study of 
the history of the term thymos should begin with Iliad and Odyssey (1999).  This thesis 
has already established that Homer’s use of thymos in Iliad and Odyssey can prove quite 
useful in examining at least four of the features of Complex Combat Activated 
Disorientation.  This thesis has also established that the paradigm of moral injury, while 
using Homeric thymos as a central thematic lens by which to view those four features of 
CCAD, does not attempt to understand or make use of the term in its original 
philosophical context – something which might be valuable to understanding CCAD 
even further, or in accounting for the fifth element of CCAD. 
In order to adequately discuss Homer’s use of thymos in context, this thesis will 
now examine the term in two broad categories: (1) its place and function in Homer’s 
general anthropology and (2) the nature and implications of its potential loss of function 
or disintegration in human persons.  After this has been achieved, it will be important to 
engage in two further considerations.  First, it must be considered whether or not a 
contextual understanding of Homer’s use of thymos provides an account for the fifth 
element of CCAD, which is not otherwise accounted for in either the psychiatric or 
moral injury paradigms: self-horror at the perceived absorption of evil.  Secondly, it 
must be considered whether or not there is a way to examine the historical development 
 122 
of thymos through the work of Greek philosophers and other scholars following Homer, 
if possible, and to see their appropriation and expansion of his ideas throughout the 
centuries.  This could eventually aid in the development of a philosophical corpus of 
understanding thymos from the ancient world into contemporary times, after which 
some more conclusions may be drawn about the potential efficacy of its use as a 
modern complementary philosophical approach to CCAD. 
 
Homeric Thymos: Essential Function 
 In Homeric usage, thymos is an essential human capacity that is necessary for 
relationships between human beings, between humans and animals, and between 
humans and the divine (Kobierzycki, 2010).  Thymos has a number of specific functions 
in Iliad and Odyssey, and for the purposes of this thesis, they will be discussed under 
three main headings: (1) thymos as the seat of emotion, (2) thymos as the source of 
instinctive action, and (3) thymos as the locus of moral intuition.  It will be 
demonstrated here that these three categories of function share two similarities in 
Homer’s work.   
First, each of these categories of thymic functioning can be understood 
individually, in some way.  An individual can experience an emotion that is not 
necessarily shared, or can be moved to action individually, or can personally sense in 
one moment what he or she knows to be right or wrong in a given situation.  Secondly, 
there is in each of Homer’s three demonstrated categories of thymic functioning a 
collective aspect, or some element that transcends individual experience.  A person’s 
emotional experience is related to his or her ability to share community life.  Some 
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patterns of instinctual action seem shared within a community or a culture.  Many 
aspects of morality in a given culture are shaped by the community, or at least enforced 
by the community. 
By examining each of these three categories of thymic function in the writing of 
Homer, and by understanding their individual and collective elements, a general sense 
of the place of thymos in Homer’s philosophical anthropology will become clear.  This 
will make possible a further investigation of the potential consequences of thymic loss 
or damage in persons facing combat-related adversity, and will in turn allow for a more 
informed contextual consideration of the potential connections between damaged 
thymos and CCAD. 
 
Thymos and Emotion 
First, and most prominently, Homer uses thymos as the philosophical seat of 
human emotions.  Snell notes that, in Homer’s worldview, it is from this place of 
thymos that human beings are able to experience their vast array of moods, 
temperaments, and both pleasant and painful emotional reactions (Snell, 2012).  He also 
notes that it is with thymos that humans make and maintain emotional connections with 
their social and physical environments.  From this perspective, thymos plays a key part 
in individual and social experience in times of either great celebration or great distress.  
Kobierzycki considers this function of thymos to be general comparable to the 
functioning of “the heart” in other philosophical anthropologies, as it represents the 
place where suffering is experienced, and also the place where “liking, friendship, 
sensual love” and “feelings of hope” are stored, along with “pity, astonishment” and 
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“courage” (2010, p. 9).  Accordingly, thymos is also the locus from which humans can 
be driven to destroy relationships or alienate themselves from community during 
extreme emotional experiences of bitterness and rage.  Snell notes that while Homer’s 
use of thymos is sometimes “the abode of …love [and] sympathy,” it is at other times 
the abode of powerful experiences of hatred that lead to murderous impulses or self-
imposed exile (2012, p. 13).   
In all cases, Homeric thymos functions in a distinctly different way from reason 
or logic, as the human being engages with his or her social environment and responds to 
life’s events.  Thymos ideally functions in synchronicity with reason, in Homer’s 
context, but while reason exists within cognitive structures and makes use of rational 
constructs, thymos exists within emotional and instinctive structures and makes use of 
intuition and felt experience of one’s environment.  In Book 2 of Iliad, Homer’s 
character Menelaus is said to have thymic understanding of Agamemnon’s motives in 
preparing for war, and to be moved by this to prepare to fight alongside of him 
(Chapman, Trans., 2000).  This vignette demonstrates Homer’s understanding of how 
an emotional connection can take place between persons in which one shares the 
emotional state of another and becomes willing to act in response to that sharing.  This 
is an important demonstration of Homer’s understanding of the emotional capacity of 
thymos, as it contains aspects of both individual and interpersonal or social functioning. 
Homer also writes about the potential for the actual development of communal 
thymos, comprising the emotional connection of an entire team or community, and 
usually aimed at a specific task essential to the well being of all. For instance, in Book 
13 of Iliad, a warrior named Idomeneus is about to face Aeneas in battle, and calls out 
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to a number of his comrades to stand with him and fight (Chapman, Trans., 2000).  
They respond to his call, and Homer describes them taking a stand together with one 
thymos in their chests.  This sharing of thymos seems to account for the sense of 
community solidarity experienced when a number of persons share both an emotional 
state and a corporately understood urgency for action.  There is also the possibility that 
once gained, shared thymos may be lost, as persons in community suffer disillusionment 
or defeat, or face some other adversity that leaves them isolated and alienated.   
  
Thymos and Instinctive Motivation 
 Secondly, Homer uses thymos to represent instinctive motivation to action in the 
human experience.  Once a human being fixes on a physical objective, or an objective 
which requires physical activity, thymos can summon the motivation to act, and can also 
provide extra-rational instinctive direction to the human being in motion.  This function 
is not purely disconnected from emotional functioning, since in the Homeric corpus 
emotion is usually present in any activity, but Homer certainly writes as if human 
emotion and instinctive motivation to action reside distinctly in thymos, each having a 
different purpose.  Stephen Muse, a scholar and philosopher very familiar with the 
ancient Greek corpus, writes about this type of instinctive and aggressive function of 
thymos under the label of “proprioception,” in which the inner sensations of the body 
connect with past physical experience in response to external stimuli without any 
analytical element, and move the body into appropriate action (2011, p. 120). 
Both Snell and Kobierzycki comment at length on the association between 
thymos and instinctive motivation to action in Iliad and Odyssey.  Snell calls thymos 
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Homer’s “generator of motion,” and “that which rouses a man to action” in his combat 
narratives (2012, p. 9, 13).  He also notes Homer’s use of thymos as an animal capacity 
on some occasions, as if Homer considered the aggressive instincts of thymos in the 
heat of battle to be a “force of energy” shared by humans and animals (Snell, 2012, p. 
11).  This does provide some insight into the kind of beast-like aggression and 
unrestrained violence that develops in the character of Achilles, which Shay discusses 
in his concept of the berserk state (1994). 
Kobierzycki describes the instinctual, aggressive aspect of thymos as being for 
Homer both “the seat of wrath” in the human person, capable of beast-like rage, and 
also the “repository of courage” that can aid a person in using principled restraint when 
using force for the sake of what he believes is right and just  (2012, p. 6, 7).  In Homer’s 
usage, this martial or aggressive function can be either principled or unprincipled.  That 
is, it can be restrained by a person’s sense of what is right and good, leading to 
courageous action, or unrestrained by a person’s sense of right and good, leading to 
beast-like violence capable of great inhumanity.  Sullivan argues that, for Homer, the 
difference between the two potentialities is in the connection forged between thymos 
and reason (1988).  She writes that Homer understands thymos and reason to ideally 
work together in decision-making as the relationship between intuition and logic, or the 
relationship between felt experience and linear analysis; in the case of broken harmony 
between the two, thymos can be either “bridled” by reason or overrun by it in any given 
situation (Sullivan, 1988, p. 85).   
It may be helpful here to provide two illustrations of Sullivan’s point, which is 
quite important in understanding the function of thymos in Homer’s work.  First, in 
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Book 5 of Iliad, Homer’s character Odysseus experiences a dilemma in the midst of 
combat, consulting both thymos and reason to decide on a course of action (Chapman, 
Trans., 2000).  This is not essentially a moral dilemma, but rather a tactical one, and 
Odysseus is using both his knowledge of warfare and his thymic intuition toward 
aggressive action to help him.  Once his reason and thymos agree on an action, his 
thymos moves him into combat.  This is an example of harmony between reason and 
thymos, leading to a good outcome.   
In contrast, in Book 22 of Odyssey, Homer describes a character named Phemius 
who believes his life to be in danger and who experiences a division between thymos 
and reason in examining his options for survival (Chapman, Trans., 2000).  Specifically, 
Phemius struggles to decide whether to offer a sacrifice to the gods, which seems the 
conventional thing to do, or to trust an intuitive urge to rush to Odysseus to beg for his 
mercy, even though in doing so he will very likely be killed.  Phemius decides to trust 
his intuition, and his life is spared (Chapman, Trans., 2000).  This is an example in 
Homer’s writing of a break between the harmony between reason and thymos. In this 
particular example, thymic intuition triumphs over rational analysis after an internal 
conflict, and there is a positive outcome.  In other places in Homer’s writing, thymic 
intuition triumphs over rational analysis with disastrous consequences, and in other 
places still, reason challenges thymos and restrains thymic intuition.  This interplay 
between reason and thymos is an essential part of Homer’s anthropological 
understanding of the human experience in general, and understanding of this interplay 
will be developed further as this chapter continues. 
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Thymos and Moral Intuition 
 The third aspect of Homer’s anthropological use of thymos is as an extra-rational 
capacity for intuiting what is good and right, and in Homer’s writing it is often coupled 
with the thymic functioning of instinctive motivation.  More specifically, in almost 
every place where a person is thymically intuiting right action, he or she is also 
motivated to follow what he or she intuits to be right.  Understood together, and when 
functioning optimally, this aspect of thymos can be summarized as the ability of a 
human person to intuit what is good and then to immediately summon energy to act on 
behalf of the good.   
Sullivan again notices an ideal harmony between reason and thymos in this 
aspect of thymic functioning.  Specifically she implies that, in Homer’s usage, thymos 
can (1) ally with reason to pursue the good, (2) struggle against reason to pursue the 
good, when reason has been compromised, or, tragically, (3) struggle against reason to 
pursue something other than good, when thymos has been compromised (Sullivan, 
1988).  In this sense, thymos can be considered as the human conscience in Homer’s 
work.  Conscience is a difficult concept to summarize, and can hold different meanings 
for different persons, but the Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines conscience as 
simply “a person’s moral sense of right and wrong” (Soanes and Stevenson, Eds., 2006, 
p. 112).  Prominent moral philosopher and professor James Day notes that conscience is 
commonly understood “across all cultures” as a judging, evaluating moral entity of the 
personality, whose function is “not only [to] judge what we have done, but [to] prod us 
into action in order to act on behalf of [the] good, and to repair what we feel we may 
have transgressed…” (2010, p. 49).  This certainly describes Homer’s understanding of 
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the moral aspect of thymic functioning, which includes both intuition and impulse to 
action on behalf of what has been intuited. 
 In Book 1, paragraph 225 of Odyssey, the goddess Athena speaks to Telemachus 
at a wedding feast at his house, questioning the occurrence there of what she considers 
to be wanton and shameless behavior (Chapman, Trans., 2000).  She also questions the 
state of Telemachus’ thymos in being able to let these things occur around him without 
seeing their depravity and putting a stop to them.  Her challenge seems to be on both 
fronts: can Telemachus not, by thymos, intuit the wrong in these events, and having 
intuited the wrongs, could he not by thymos be roused to demand a change?  
Telemachus responds with an excuse, arguing that the unjust and unfortunate things that 
have happened to the people of his house – including the politically forced wedding 
occurring at the moment of her challenge – have left him in a position of moral lassitude 
(Chapman, Trans. 2000).  In this example, it seems that Homer’s character Telemachus 
has allowed a kind of philosophical fatalism to overcome his thymic intuition and 
thymic call to action against injustice.  This also captures the practical interplay between 
reason and thymos in Homer’s worldview, and the way in which either capacity, when 
not operating in harmony with the other, can subjugate the other – to either positive or 
negative consequences. 
Bruno Snell, noting Homer’s understanding of the moral dimension of thymos, 
describes it as a kind of moral will, and also mentions that a general pattern of the 
interplay between reason and thymos in a particular individual could be considered that 
individual’s particular “character” (2012, p. 14).  Shay speaks at length of the “undoing 
of character” after injury to thymos in combat, and uses the character of Achilles to 
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suggest many consequences to this condition, but does not choose to use Homer’s own 
philosophical presuppositions to describe the process of such a thing (1994, p. 29).  
Understanding the philosophical relationship between human reason and thymos in 
moral functioning, and considering the potential damage done to a person’s morality 
when this relationship is distressed, may very well offer fresh insight into how Homer 
saw injury to thymos affecting human persons in general.   
 
A Summary of Essential Human Function 
 Summarizing the areas of function discussed above, Homeric thymos is a human 
capacity which contains the emotions, and which ensures emotional connection between 
a human being and his or her social environment and allows a human being to respond 
to the perceived needs of others.  Thymos also functions in instinctive motivation to 
action or aggression, motivating the person to appropriate physical action in response to 
stimuli in his or her environment.  When aligned with moral intuition, this motivation 
can include courageous action, and when misaligned with moral intuition, this 
motivation can include inhumane brutality.  Notably, Homeric thymos also serves as the 
center of human moral intuition, containing the ability to discern what is good, and 
oriented to this sense of goodness both through social connection and possibly, for 
Homer, through a connection with divine understandings of right and wrong.   
 It may be mentioned here that the healthy maintenance of each of these 
functions is vital to the life of the warrior.  Although warriors stereotypically make use 
of a stoic approach to war, showing little outward appearance of emotion, maintaining 
emotional health is crucial for survival and war and homecoming.  Lieutenant Flournoy 
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Phelps says this: “Marines are not robots.  We want to lead men into war who are tough 
and prepared for the combat environment, but who can also respond with compassion to 
innocent civilians, and who can care for each other as brothers during the inevitable 
times when operational realities becomes overwhelming” (interview, 2014).  Likewise, 
warriors in both ancient and contemporary times need to maintain a healthy experience 
of instinctive motivation to action or aggression.  A human capacity for instinctive 
motivation to act that is not subject to reason can lead to wild, ineffective, and 
potentially dangerous consequences in battle.  On the other hand, a human capacity for 
instinctive aggression that is not ever trusted can paralyze a warrior, and keep him from 
responding to emergent situations that may place him in mortal danger. 
 Moral intuition is also crucially important in warfare.  Phelps notes this: 
“moral restraint in combat is difficult to condition through normal 
means…much as we try to develop this instinct using simulations of war during 
training.  Character comes from within, and it also comes from shared moral 
commitments with the team around you.  Staying close as a team and staying in 
touch with your own sense of humanity is key…” (Phelps, interview, 2014). 
 
 Having explored thymic functioning in Homer’s work, and considered the 
importance of healthy thymic functioning in the experiences of both ancient and 
contemporary warriors, it is now possible to consider the impact of the loss of thymic 
functioning.  There are a number of examples of the loss of thymic functioning in Iliad 
and Odyssey.  In fact, Thaddeus Kobierzycki notes up to 110 such occurrences in 
Homer’s work (2010).   In examining loss of thymic function, it will be possible to 
examine direct similarities with the experiences of contemporary veterans suffering 
from Complex Combat-Activated Disorientation. 
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The Impact of Lost Function in Homeric Usage 
 If the function of thymos in the Homeric corpus can be discussed in three 
categories, as was demonstrated above, then the loss of thymic function in the Homeric 
corpus can also be discussed in three categories.  Similarly, just as each of the three 
categories of thymic function were understood by Homer to exist communally, and just 
as in each category thymos stood in some relation to the human capacity for reason, so 
the loss of thymic functioning in Homer’s corpus features both social disintegration and 
a marked disharmony between thymos and reason.  In fact, it will become clear that 
each of the five elements of CCAD can be understood in terms of social disintegration 
and disharmony between thymos and reason.  To attain clarity on this assertion, it will 
now be beneficial to view the loss of thymic functioning in each of the three categories 
introduced in the last section. 
 
Emotional Disorientation 
 Homer’s understanding of damage to the emotional function of thymos centers 
on the potential for a person in extreme adversity to become both socially isolated and 
emotionally overwhelmed.  This potential becomes far more likely if a person’s social 
isolation has been forced.  Homer writes as if a person in such circumstances may suffer 
a thymic injury that culminates in both the dissolution of his or her ability to maintain 
long-term relationships and chronic difficulty with regulating emotion in the future.  
Snell notes that, in Iliad and Odyssey, thymos can be “eaten away or torn asunder by 
pain” in “intense, sharp or heavy” fashion (2012, p. 18).  The pain that Snell mentions is 
profound emotional pain, brought on by extreme distress after such adversity as the loss 
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of a beloved comrade or betrayal by a close friend or leader.  In Book 6 of Iliad, Hector 
confronts Alexander for storing up bitterness and rage in his thymos, after being the 
cause of war for his countrymen (Chapman, Trans., 2000).  The object of Hector’s 
rebuke is not that Alexander has simply felt bitterness or wrath, but that he is holding on 
to it, or allowing it to overtake him, and that it is causing him to abandon his 
subordinate warriors in their time of need.  In response to Hector, Alexander reveals the 
complexity of his thymic disorientation, explaining that it has not been bitterness but 
despair that he has been nursing in his thymos, and that this is what paralyzed him in the 
midst of battle (Chapman, Trans., 2000). 
 Sullivan writes that in Homer’s epics, thymos is a capacity for emotion that can 
be “scattered in some way, causing a person to faint” (1988, p. 7).  This is essentially 
what happened in Alexander’s case in the vignette above.  As Alexander realizes that 
the battle does not go well for him and for his countrymen, and knowing that he is the 
cause of the battle in some way, he is overwhelmed emotionally, isolates himself from 
his fellow warriors, and begins to fall into despair.  Shay also notes that, in Homer’s 
corpus, when love and friendship is broken it can produce damage to thymos that 
features “withdrawal of emotional energy and commitment” (2002, p. 158). 
 It is clear that damage to the emotional function of thymos has social elements.  
For instance, Alexander loses heart when he considers the impact of his actions on his 
comrades, and isolating himself from them, begins to despair.  However, it is also 
implicit in the vignette of Alexander and Hector that damage to the emotional function 
of thymos includes a disharmony with reason.  When Hector challenges Alexander, he 
uses a reasoned argument to do so, urging Alexander to rouse himself and to consider 
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the people dying around the city (Chapman, Trans., 2000).  Responding to the 
challenge, Alexander is moved to action, suggesting that his capacity for reason has 
become aligned with his thymos. 
 This vignette illustrates the potential for damage to thymos in human persons in 
the Homeric corpus, especially in situations associated with armed combat.  In Iliad and 
Odyssey, when warriors experience a powerful emotional loss in combat, Homer 
describes a kind of emotional injury that follows in the place of thymos, in which social 
isolation, fear, paralysis of action, hunger for revenge, and loss of commitment to other 
people related to mistrust of oneself and others become the common features.  This is 
also evident in warriors today who are returning from intense combat and have 
experienced the loss of or betrayal from comrades and leaders.  Eugene Sledge explains 
the loss of a beloved war leader who had previously protected and inspired his men in 
countless situations in combat and its impact on his warriors: 
“Our company commander represented stability and direction in a world of 
violence, death, and destruction.  Now his life had been snuffed out.  We felt 
forlorn and lost.  It was the worst grief I endured during the entire war.  The 
intervening years have not lessened it any…[his loss] was like losing a parent 
we depended upon for security – not our physical security, because we knew 
that was a commodity beyond our reach in combat, but our mental security” 
(2007, p. 138). 
 
It must be noted that Sledge and his comrades had endured some of the most brutal 
close-quarters warfare in modern history, which included great acts of inhumanity and 
barbarism on all sides (Sledge, 2007).  They had been fighting an aggressive, competent 
enemy for years under extremely adverse conditions, and yet the loss of this leader was 
“the worst grief” Sledge he ever endured during the war.  As he describes his comrades’ 
response in the aftermath of his company commander’s death, Sledge describes 
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temptation to violent action, words of despair and longing for revenge, and a sense that 
the “world had fallen apart” and that there was no one to follow or trust (Sledge, 2007).  
This condition is very similar to Homer’s understanding of damage to the emotional 
function of thymos during combat loss. 
 Major George Hill is an American Special Forces soldier and combat leader who 
has led paratroopers and commandos over the course of five major combat tours.  He 
also describes the impact the loss of a comrade can have on the rest of a team of 
warriors: 
“Troops that can otherwise be almost impervious to pain or desperate 
circumstances can be deeply affected by the loss of a teammate.  Rather than 
drawing together, which they have been trained to do, one or more of them can 
begin to isolate, and pull away from the others, struggling to keep close and 
maintain those bonds of trust and commitment that make them otherwise 
invincible in combat.  It’s a phenomenon we have to watch for.  These guys go 
through more than people know together, and sometimes it gets to be too much 
as they lose a comrade” (G. Hill, personal communication, December 13, 2014). 
 
 This concept of damage to the emotional function of thymos, as found in the 
Homeric corpus and as corroborated by the more modern experiences of Sledge and 
Hill, does account for some aspects of Complex Combat Activated Disorientation.  In 
Chapter Two, accounts recorded from the experiences of Sergeant Nathan Everly, John 
Needham, and three others described an persistent, socially debilitating mistrust during 
and after painful emotional experiences of loss and betrayal in combat, leaving warriors 
unable to enter into and maintain meaningful relationships afterwards.  The veterans 
whose experiences are recorded in that section of Chapter Two sometimes felt so 
betrayed and disoriented by those they had trusted in combat that they found it difficult 
to assign stability or permanency to almost any object, or anyone else in their lives.  
They also found themselves unable to maintain belief in any absolute, permanent good 
 136 
in the universe, and experience a painful vacuum that they consider to represent an 
absence of safety and order in the world. 
 This element of CCAD, which has been described as persistent, socially 
debilitating mistrust, seems directly related to something Homer saw in his own time 
and described as the emotional scattering of thymos, because the connections between 
his narratives and the narratives of the contemporary warriors collected in Chapter Two 
of this thesis are clear.  Homer used a philosophical understanding of the human person 
and the potential for emotional thymic disorientation as a way of describing a part of 
human functioning that could be damaged by war, and in doing so he had a line of 
approach to persistent, socially debilitating mistrust that was able to account for all of 
the potential features of warriors returning in such a disoriented condition.  Specifically, 
the emotional function of Homeric thymos contains the capacity for social connection 
and emotional stamina, and when these things are damaged as a warrior finds himself in 
an adverse situation in which he cannot bear the social connection he has lost because 
its emotional content is too powerful, he may find himself in a situation in which (1) his 
general ability to be connected to anyone or anything is compromised, and (2) his 
ability to experience powerful emotions in other situations is radically compromised. 
  
Instinctive Disorientation 
 Homer also understands the potential for damage to the instinctive, action-
oriented functioning of thymos.  In such cases, the aggressive instincts of the human 
person become disoriented, and are either (1) over-regulated, leaving the person with a 
feeling of “deadness” or extreme lethargy, or else (2) under-regulated, leaving the 
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person with wild, uncontrollable impulses to action.  Both Kobierzycki and Snell notice 
these particular difficulties in thymic instinctual-impulse regulation following extreme 
adversity.  Kobierzycki notes that in Iliad and Odyssey, a person’s ability to move into 
action can be lost upon what Homer describes as the departure of thymos, after which 
follows a sensation of deadness and loss of passion or vitality (2010).  To illustrate this, 
in Book 22 of Iliad, Homer includes a petition from Hector’s elderly father to his son in 
which the old man speaks of thymos as the life force in his limbs, which can be stolen 
away (Chapman, 2000, Trans.).  For Homer, after thymos departs, a sense of vitality 
departs with it, and a person can experience the sense that there is no life left in them, or 
a kind of living death. 
 Snell notices the other potential outcome when the instinctive, action-oriented 
aspects of thymos become disoriented during extreme adversity, noticing that this can 
cause a person to become unbridled by reason, and unable to control himself or herself 
(2012).  He notes that, “when running wild” like this, an under-regulated thymos can 
lead a person to “beast-like” functioning, demonstrating brutal and compassionless 
behavior (Snell, 2012, p. 13).  The final state of Achilles leading up to his death in Iliad 
seems to illustrate Snell’s observations, as Achilles has essentially become a brute, 
dishonoring his enemies and engaging in shocking and dishonorable conduct in battle 
(Chapman, 2000, Trans.). 
 Jan Bremmer, a career scholar in the field of ancient Greek philosophy, notes 
that in one particular place in Iliad, in which Andromache has fainted at the sight of 
Hector’s body being dragged around the city, she has to – in Homer’s words – re-
concentrate or re-center her thymos into her chest (1983).   Commenting on this 
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particular passage, Bremmer surmises that, in Homer’s philosophical worldview, it is 
possible during extreme adversity for “the thymos [to] leave its original seat,” becoming 
metaphorically dislocated, and no longer functioning in its proper place (1983, p. 56).  
During this dislocation of her thymos, Andromache demonstrates a subsequent 
difficulty in feeling alive and present in her circumstances.  Although Homer does not 
specifically use this idea of thymic dislocation in his narratives of warriors experiencing 
under-regulation of impulses to action, the metaphor is helpful in those narratives also, 
in that it seems as if those warriors do not have the ability to thymically interact with 
reason in order to restrain them from inhumanity.  It is as if metaphorically, in those 
cases, their thymos is no longer located in the correct place. 
 When considering Homer’s idea of the potential disorientation of the action-
oriented, instinctive functioning of thymos, two distinct elements of CCAD seem 
directly related to Homer’s understanding of extreme adversity survivors in ancient 
times.  First, the description of those combat veterans and other adversity survivors in 
Iliad and Odyssey who, after exposure to adversity, seem to have lost or possibly over-
regulated their aggressive instinct, leaving them feeling lifeless, seem related to the 
veterans described in Chapter Two of this thesis who experienced a conscious 
disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation.  The narratives of Jim, Art, Scott, and 
Tim in that chapter described men who not only feel empty, but who feel like zombies, 
with bodies that are intact but without the ability to feel anything emotionally or to 
experience any internal motivation in life.  In turn, this has left them unable to connect 
with other people in meaningful ways and unable to experience a former inner vitality 
that used to make life seem to them to be interesting, beautiful, and worth living.   
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Secondly, the description of those combat veterans and other adversity survivors 
in Iliad and Odyssey who, after exposure to adversity, seem to have lost the ability to 
regulate their aggressive instinct, or to thymically interact with reason in order to 
exercise restraint in chaotic situations, seem related to the veterans described in Chapter 
Two of this thesis who experienced an uncontrollable, lustful rage.  Specialist Marquez, 
Sergeant Nathan Everly, Sergeant Harold Miller, D. C. Coop, and many other warriors 
described in Chapter Two have returned home from combat having experienced a 
complicated, abiding sense of lustful rage that seems connected to moments in combat 
when they lost self-restraint and began acting wildly in violence toward their enemies – 
some of them even performing acts of inhumanity.  It is as if the part of their previous 
human functioning that allowed them to interact with reason to bridle their most 
powerful instinctual impulses to action has now broken down. 
Homer’s philosophical concept of thymos and the potential impact of its loss of 
function with regard to the use and regulation of instinctual aggression in the human 
person does seem to conceptually account for both a conscious disconnect from emotion 
and bodily sensation and the onset of a chronic, lustful rage.  Under extreme adversity, 
the damage to or the disorientation of this aspect of thymic functioning can have lasting 
consequences, as demonstrated by both Homer’s characters and the narratives of 
contemporary warriors collected in this thesis. 
One unusual example of Homer’s use of thymos as the seat of instinctive 
motivation is universal one.  Sullivan notes that on rare occasions Homer uses thymos to 
describe a kind universal vitality common among all human beings that goes beyond 
instinct or motivation to action, and represents a kind of life force common to all people 
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(1988).  She notes that this life force is extinguished after death, but can also be in some 
way lost while a person still lives (Sullivan, 1988).  A brief vignette from Book 23 of 
Iliad provides a helpful illustration of Homer’s use of thymos in this way.  Odysseus has 
returned from the war and is speaking with his elderly mother, and he describes the 
process of death as one in which a disease may take thymos from the body of an ailing 
person (Chapman, Trans., 2000).  In the following sentence he describes how through 
longing for his mother and her compassion during his time away in combat he had also 
lost thymos, and with it a sense of the goodness of life (Chapman, Trans., 2000).  There 
are at least three notable aspects of this short passage.   
First, there is the use of thymos as a kind of life force common to all human 
persons that is extinguished at the time of death.  Homer uses thymos this way on a 
number of occasions, especially during death narratives, such as those found in Books 
10 and 19 of Odyssey.  Secondly, there is the use of thymos as a person’s experience of 
inner vitality when living in a community, which may be lost while a person is still 
alive – especially if they have been alienated from their community.  As Odysseus is 
describing his experiences to his mother, he is expressing to her his sense that, although 
he is still alive physically, he feels that there is a part of him that has died while he was 
away from home in combat.  In Homer’s writing, then, death is not the only experience 
that can rob a person of thymos; experiences in war are also capable of taking away 
thymos, through a disconnect with homeland and family.  Third, there is a sense of the 
goodness of life that is missing upon Odysseus’ return.  Chapman translates Odysseus 
saying to his mother in this passage in Book 23 of Iliad that he lost the “honey-
sweetness of life” while away at war (2000, paragraph 23:880).  
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These three aspects or potentialities for the loss of thymos as representative of an 
inner vitality among humans may apply to an individual warrior, but the individual 
warrior clearly experiences them in relationship to their families, their comrades, and 
their fellow human beings in the Homeric corpus.  In the section on thymic functioning 
in which all three of these aspects were discussed, the potential for disorientation was 
also made clear.  The collective vitality enabled by thymos can be disrupted at the point 
of death, and can also be disrupted in the aftermath of an extreme adversity that leaves a 
person isolated and alienated from his or her home and community.  Snell notes that, in 
Homer’s writing, thymos can be destroyed in a living person, bringing on an experience 
of living death, or a sense of detachment from one’s own psyche (2012).  This 
interpretation allows for some connection with the element of CCAD described as 
conscious disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation, in the sense that people in 
such circumstances can feel self-detached, self-alienated, and as if their vitality and the 
goodness of life are missing. 
 
Moral Disorientation 
In certain cases, Homer’s characters experience a moral disorientation of 
thymos. Kobierzycki notes that, in such cases, those characters have experienced a 
disconnect between moral reasoning and the moral intuition of thymos in the midst of 
extreme adversity, and are no longer able to harmoniously understand or intuit what is 
good or right, leading to a breakdown in moral functioning (2010).  Snell also 
demonstrates an understanding of this phenomenon, as informed by various vengeance 
narratives in Iliad and Odyssey (2001).   According to Snell, in Homer’s vengeance 
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narratives a warrior, having lost a comrade or loved one, can be thymically driven to 
seek revenge as a type of justice, even when reason tells him that such an act is not or 
cannot be justified (2012).  If the warrior silences his moral reasoning and follows his 
thymic drive for justice anyway, he may commit an atrocity in the name of vengeance, 
in which his aggression is unbridled and he is unable to intuit the need for humane 
restraint in the passion of violent action. 
Jonathan Shay gives an example of such a vengeance narrative in Iliad that 
includes Homer’s character Achilles (1994).  He quotes a scene from Book 9 of Iliad in 
which Achilles demands that other Greek officers help him cause pain to Agamemnon 
for reasons of pure vengeance.  In this scene, Shay notes that Achilles, who sustained 
damage to the moral functioning of thymos after being betrayed by his trusted leader, is 
attempting to rally fellow leaders to break their own oaths of honor to help him pursue 
vengeance (1994).  It is, in Shay’s view, the beginning of the dissolution of Achilles’ 
ability to know and do what is right: 
“Before the [moral] injuries recorded in the Iliad, Achilles’ habit was to respect 
enemy dead rather than defile them, and to ransom enemy prisoners rather than 
kill them.  Achilles loses his humanity in two stages: he ceases to care about his 
fellow Greeks after betrayal by his commander, and then he loses all 
compassion for any human being after the death of Patroklos.  The Iliad is the 
story of the undoing of Achilles’ [morality]” (Shay, 1994, p. 25). 
 
This understanding of Achilles’ moral disorientation as a warrior is an important one.  
Through a thymic drive for vengeance, both in response to betrayal and in response to 
the loss of a comrade, Achilles is intuitively moved into action to combat injustice, but 
without the restraint of his moral reasoning.  As a result, he loses his ability to use 
intuition and reason to harmoniously discern what is right, and also loses the ability to 
restrain himself in violent action. 
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Earlier in this chapter, Sullivan was credited with noticing that in Homer’s 
usage, the moral aspect of thymos can (1) ally with reason to pursue the good, (2) 
struggle against reason to pursue the good, when reason has been compromised, or, 
tragically, (3) struggle against reason to pursue something other than good, when thymic 
morality has been compromised (1988).  The situation with Achilles, as mentioned 
above, is Homer’s most detailed example of the third of Sullivan’s potentialities.  In the 
aftermath of an aggressive, unprincipled thymic pursuit of something other than good, 
Achilles find himself more and more morally disoriented, and by the time of his death, 
his moral economy has become completely inverted from the moral economy of his 
fellow warriors and his society in general (Chapman, Trans., 2000).  Specifically, he no 
longer has any meaningful relationship with the ideals of honor, courage, humanity, 
compassion, brotherhood, or love. 
This kind of disorientation of the morally intuitive function of thymos does 
provide some conceptual account of the element of CCAD described as the radical 
dissolution of moral intuition and narrative coherence.  In Chapter Two of this thesis, 
Lieutenant “Mac” Mackenzie, Alberto Martinez, Mario Navarrete, Jacob Burgoyne, and 
others were described as being alienated from any organized internal or external code of 
morality.  Each of them experienced some extreme adversity in combat that included a 
source of moral disorientation.  Mac constantly saw his Marines being inhumanely 
treated by Japanese combatants, while having to uphold among his Marines a strict code 
of humane treatment of those same enemy combatants (Sledge, 2007).  From a Homeric 
point of view, at some point in his combat tour he seems to have experienced a 
disconnect between his capacity for reason, which knew the principle of restraint in 
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warfare, and his thymic capacity for moral intuition, which was drive to revenge in 
response to the desecration of the corpses of his men.  Martinez, Navarrette, and 
Burgoyne all experienced deep confusion in their understandings of power, killing, and 
socially acceptable behavior in combat during their tour in Iraq (Boal, 2004).  
Specifically, they seemed to received mixed messages from their leadership on what is 
and is not humane behavior in war, as some of their leaders encouraged acts of brutality 
such as the public display of severed body parts from enemy combatants after heavy 
fighting (Boal, 2004).   
After continually engaging in the act of killing human beings, and faced with 
disorienting and varied feedback on their actions, they no longer had any sense of when 
killing might be considered morally wrong.  During the rest of their tour in Iraq, and 
during its aftermath, these three soldiers demonstrated the kind of moral chaos that may 
culminate from contradictory moral messages from leadership in combat: they not only 
began to consider all morality completely arbitrary, but they developed an enduring 
sense of meaninglessness about what is true or trustworthy.  From a Homeric point of 
view, these men experienced a loss of trust in the moral reasoning they had been taught, 
since their leaders acted as if that teaching was arbitrary or unbinding, and then fell into 
thymic disorientation, being compelled to act aggressively without a trustworthy 
framework of right and wrong once they were engaged in combat. 
Mac, Martinez, Navarrette, and Burgoyne each experienced a kind of radical 
disconnect between intuitive action and moral reasoning in combat that proved very 
difficult to reverse.  Any kind of moral system or organized principles of justice and 
goodness seem absurd to them, in the aftermath of combat, and alien to their 
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experience.  As a result, they have difficulty living in society, which is governed by the 
enforcement of moral norms.  They also have a difficulty, from the viewpoint of 
Homeric thymos, in finding or reestablishing a connection between moral reasoning and 
thymic moral intuition, which, in the philosophical presuppositions of Homer’s time, 
was the most essential human connection for proper moral functioning. 
There is one further sense of extreme moral disorientation that has not yet been 
mentioned in this chapter.  Shirley Sullivan suggests that there may be spiritual 
overtones to Homer’s idea of shared thymos, in its moral functioning (1988).  She notes 
that in ancient Greek metaphysical philosophy, thymos seems capable of being “open to 
divine influence,” in the sense of a person’s inner moral intuition being guided by 
divine values, and that this capability might function both individually and communally 
(Sullivan, 1988, p. 117).  This sense of thymic morality as a divinely informed function 
in human beings is certainly present in the work of Plato, writing centuries after Homer, 
and many Greek thinkers following Plato (Jowett, 2008).  It is not as evident in the 
writing of Homer, who makes use of divine entities as mostly minor, anthropomorphic 
characters in Iliad and Odyssey.  Nevertheless, one unusual passage in Odyssey may be 
worth mentioning, on this topic, because it offers a potential connection with the 
element of CCAD described as self-horror at the perceived absorption of evil. 
In Book 21 of Odyssey, Odysseus engages in some verbal sparring with 
Antinous (Chapman, Trans., 2000).  At one point in the dialogue, Antinous references 
the mythological story of Eurytion and Peirithous, and noted how Eurytion made his 
thymos senseless and insane after drinking too much wine, and proceeded to become a 
worker of evil in Peirithous’ house – specifically by sexually assaulting Peirithous’ 
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daughter (Chapman, Trans., 2000).  It is the only time in the Odyssey in which the term 
thymos is directly connected with a Greek term whose plain sense in common 
translation can be rendered equivalent to the English word “evil.”  Even in this case, 
Homer’s understanding of Eurytion’s inner condition in the mythological text is one 
that evidences a relatively indirect connection between thymos and evil.  Homer writes 
as if in certain circumstances, such as drunkenness, thymic morality can lose its 
essential connection with reason, and therefore become more likely to give in to 
impulses that are – in Homer’s worldview – intrinsically aligned with a universally 
understood evil, such as nonconsensual sex with a minor, in the case of Eurytion.  
Homer does not go on to discuss Eurytion’s inner state after this series of events, so 
further insight into his understanding of the consequences of this engagement with evil 
cannot be deduced. 
In Chapter Two of this thesis, narrative experiences were presented from Tim 
Segrest, John Wolfe, D.C. Hoop, Nathan Everly, and three other veterans who, after 
facing extreme adversity in combat, and having been exposed to an entity they feel to be 
evil, have had unusual experiences upon homecoming that cannot be explained under 
either the psychiatric or moral injury paradigms.  They each, after exposure to this evil, 
have become in their own view connected with it, causing them to mistrust, fear, and 
loathe themselves.  The effect of the horror of their experiences and their self-horror at 
the sense of how their experiences have impacted or changed them is overwhelming, 
and each of them has tried something to keep themselves from having to face their 
horror continuously.  They have also each tried to keep the people they know and love 
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at a distance from them, for fear of passing on the evil they sense in or around 
themselves. 
Although there is not a direct connection with Homer’s narratives in Iliad and 
Odyssey to show the same kind of sense among warriors that they had absorbed evil, 
Homer does write about a situation in which a person can become disoriented and begin 
to work evil, acting out in ways that conflict with deeply held understandings of right 
and wrong, and he portrays this as a tragedy and a warning given between characters in 
his work.  If it is possible, in Homer’s mind, for a human person to enter into a state of 
moral disorientation and to begin to pursue evil, what would be the impact when a 
person came out of extreme disorientation and realized what they had done?  If their 
sense of good and evil is divinely aligned, or if they believe it represents a kind of 
universal good and evil, what would be the impact on their meaning-making of what 
they had done while in their state of disorientation?  It seems likely that they would 
enter a secondary state of disorientation in which they might call into question their 
previous understandings of themselves, of the meaning of good and evil, and in their 
connection with the divine.  Many of Homer’s successors in the Greek schools of 
philosophy would speak more specifically about this possibility in the centuries 
following Iliad and Odyssey (Jowett, 2008). 
 
A Summary of Thymic Disorientation in Homer’s Work 
A summary of thymic disorientation in Homer’s work clearly addresses four of 
the five elements of CCAD, and provides a potential if undeveloped line of accounting 
for the fifth.  In addressing potential damage to the emotional function of thymos, 
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Homer demonstrated a philosophical understanding of how a warrior may sustain 
radical damage to his ability to remain socially connected with his community and to 
retain emotional stamina in relationships following exposure to extreme combat-related 
adversity.  Warriors may experience the element of CCAD described as persistent, 
socially debilitating mistrust after an unbearable emotional experience in combat such 
as the loss of a close comrade or leadership betrayal, having sustained a type of loss to 
emotional thymic functioning that is not easily regained.  
In addressing potential damage to the thymic function of instinctive motivation 
to action, Homer demonstrated a philosophical understanding of how warriors may 
experience a deregulation of their aggressive instincts, in extreme cases leaving them 
feeling either uncontrollable in their passion or else entirely without felt vitality.  Such 
warriors may experience the element of CCAD described as uncontrollable, lustful rage, 
in which they are seemingly overwhelmed by aggressive impulses and unable to 
challenge these impulses with reason.  In such cases they are prone to inhumane 
behavior, especially when engaged in passionate activities such as violent action.  Other 
warriors experiencing damage to the thymic functioning of instinctive motivation may 
experience the element of CCAD described as self-conscious disconnect from emotion 
and bodily sensation, in which they feel lifeless, without any motivation, and unable to 
experience passion. 
In addressing potential damage to the thymic function of moral intuition, Homer 
demonstrated a philosophical understanding of how warriors may experience a 
disconnect between moral reasoning and moral intuition, leaving them unable to 
harmoniously understand or intuit what is good or right, and leading to a breakdown in 
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moral functioning.  Such warriors may experience the element of CCAD described as 
the radical dissolution of moral intuition and narrative coherence, in which they are 
alienated from any organized internal or external code of morality they have known in 
the past, and are as a result unable to meaningfully understand what is right in a given 
situation.  They may be equally unable to relate to socially constructed codes of 
morality, keeping them from being able to integrate into a community upon 
homecoming from combat.  Secondly, Homer also implies that it is possible, if in an 
altered state of consciousness, to work evil from the thymos instead of good, although 
he does not discuss the consequences.  Warriors described in Chapter Two of this thesis 
who claimed to have done such a thing claim afterwards to have absorbed evil inside of 
themselves in some way, and to be feel as if this evil is now inextricably linked with 
their person in a mysterious way.  These warriors experience the element of CCAD 
described as self-horror at the perceived absorption of evil. 
 
Methodological Issues in Moving Forward 
 Examining Homer’s usage of thymos in context has provided a far more nuanced 
philosophical approach to CCAD than the moral injury paradigm, for one crucial 
reason: his usage of thymos exists in a complete epistemological system, which has an 
anthropological locus that features the specific functions and specific consequences to 
the loss of each function of thymos.  The ability of this system in its original context to 
account for the most unusual aspects of CCAD evidences both a sophisticated 
observation of warriors in the ancient world and a clear connection between the combat-
related disorientation of ancient and contemporary warriors.  The moral injury 
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paradigm, in contrast, consistently treats Homer’s work from a para-psychiatric frame 
of reference, making contemporary psychiatric interpretations of his ancient 
philosophical understandings, and in so doing rendering its use of Homer as one of 
disconnected metaphor rather than as a unique platform of accounting for human 
function and loss of function. 
 If the primary failure of the moral injury paradigm in its use of Homer’s work 
lies in its inadequate approach to transferring ancient philosophical ideas into a 
contemporary approach to caregiving, as was argued at length in Chapter Four of this 
thesis, this failure highlights a general methodological issue that must be addressed by 
any researcher seeking to use ancient philosophical principles in a contemporary issue 
in social care.  In the conclusion to Chapter Four, it was argued that using a modern 
scientific foundation to view and to eventually appropriate ancient philosophical ideas 
is an untenable methodology.  It may be helpful here to further support that argument, 
and to offer an alternate methodology that may prove more efficacious. 
 Modern scholars of a variety of academic and professional disciplines have 
noted the difficulty in using ancient lines of thought to solve problems or address 
complex issues in contemporary times.  Annette Imhausen, who is both a professional 
mathematician and an ancient Near East scholar specializing in pre-dynastic Egyptian 
thought, notes that if pieces of ancient scholarship are to be used with relevance in 
contemporary scholarship, “their formal features need to be taken seriously” (2010, p. 
341).  She elaborates on this possibility by arguing that the formal features of ancient 
thought include ancient cultural contexts, ancient values, and ancient philosophical 
presuppositions (Imhausen, 2010).  In her opinion, the very worst kind of contemporary 
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scholarship has as its goal “to simply phrase bits of the ancient text in a modern way,” 
and this tendency must give way to better scholarship, in which ancient ideas are put 
“into the larger context of procedural texts” as they have developed over time 
(Imhausen, 2010, p. 343).  The most effective way of accomplishing this, which is not 
always available, given the nature of historical documentation and the gaps generated 
by both poor records keeping and organic discontinuation of certain lines of thought, is 
to acquire and study the general evolution of a particular line of ancient scholarship 
from its original ancient context into contemporary times. 
 Michael Fried, a professor of ancient cultures, notices that some modern 
scholars are synchronic, using their own cultural context and viewpoint as the only 
necessary one and viewing all scholarship from any other period through their own 
context (2008).  In response to this tendency, he insists on the importance of 
maintaining a diachronic emphasis when approaching ancient human phenomena, 
arguing the need for scholars to remember that their own cultural context is far removed 
from the ancient cultural contexts in which ancient scholarship was produced, and to 
remain vigilant for living links or thematic bridges between   
ancient and contemporary contexts that can support conclusions about the reliability of 
suggested comparisons and contrasts (Fried, 2008).   John Steele, a historian and 
professor of the sciences in early antiquity, echoes Fried’s position, noting that in 
working with ancient texts in contemporary times, methodological problems abound, 
from uncertainty about language patterns and the meaning of specific terms to widely 
different philosophical aims in study to a difference in understanding the efficacy of 
scientific precision in general (2011).  In his opinion, the most efficacious research 
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methods in offsetting these problems are text comparisons, beginning with ancient inter-
textual comparisons, and ideally moving into evolutionary text comparisons as each 
successive generation of scholars developed the ideas of the generation before them 
(Steele, 2011). 
  The efficacy of using a diachronic view when attempting to apply ancient 
thought to contemporary approaches to social care is apparent in many disciplines.  In 
2011 Robert Hayward published a book that traced 3,000-year-old Native American 
ritual medicinal practices to contemporary ritual practices, making use of the testimony 
of tribal elders who preserved the memory of the progressive changes of these rituals by 
oral tradition throughout the millennia, and applied some of the contemporary ritual 
practices to treatment of addictions in modern America (Hayward, 2011).  In 2013 
Rodney Lingham Durgadas published a book on the use of Ayurveda, a 5,000-year-old 
ancient medical science from the subcontinent of India, and its use in contemporary 
nutritional science.  In doing so he used not only ancient ideas, but also used their 
progressive transmission throughout the millennia and their living, unbroken practice 
today in many places in the contemporary world (Durgadas, 2013).  In 2012, Zindel 
Segal, a professional mental health clinician, published his second edition of 
Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy for Depression, which connected a 6,000-year-
old philosophical practice from the far east to contemporary treatment of clinical 
disorders, addressing living traditions of the practice rather than simply applying the 
ancient practice to contemporary people (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2012).  Greg 
Johanson had published a similar work in 1991 with the nearly 5,000-year-old Tao-te 
Ching from ancient China and its living transmission to contemporary times, for 
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modern use in teaching beginning psychotherapists to establish strong therapeutic 
alliances with clients (Johanson & Kurtz, 1991). 
 Each of these scholars has successfully connected ancient ideas with 
contemporary issues in social care, and has done so by avoiding synchronic tendencies 
in scholarship.  By using a diachronic approach, they have each traced the ancient ideas 
of their subjects to a living tradition or application of those ideas in the modern era, and 
then built a thematic bridge from contemporary tradition to contemporary issues in care, 
eliminating myriad methodological pitfalls in their work. 
 Considering the promising connections between the ancient Greek concept of 
thymos, and the ancient teaching about the potential consequences of its disorientation 
during and after the endurance of severe adversity, this thesis will attempt to continue 
moving toward an adequate bridge between ancient Greek philosophy and social care to 
veterans experiencing CCAD.  In order to accomplish this movement, a diachronic 
approach to understanding thymos and thymic disorientation will be used, which will 
trace Homer’s work through his successors in Greek philosophical thought.  It will be 
demonstrated, as the thesis continues, that the concept of thymic disorientation has been 
passed down in Greek philosophical thought from ancient times to a contemporary 
living tradition that is quite accessible today, and which will allow the construction of a 
thematic bridge from contemporary tradition to a contemporary issue in care, just as 
was recently accomplished by Hayward, Durgadas, Segal, and Johanson. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A DIACHRONIC VIEW OF THYMIC DISORIENTATION 
 Alphonse de Lamartine, writing as a historian and scholar of the classics, rightly 
surmised that Homer is not only the greatest poet of classical Greece, but also an 
underappreciated philosopher who prepared the way for the great thinkers of the Golden 
Age of Greece, beginning with Socrates (1872).  In the few centuries between Homer 
and Socrates, many great thinkers arose in Athens, but according to de Lamartine, it is 
doubtful that any philosopher influenced Socrates more in terms of the foundational 
inner state of human beings (1872).  Laurence Lampert, a professor of political 
philosophy, notes the irony of how Plato uses Socrates to put Homer on trial in Republic 
for Homer’s supposedly impoverished understanding of human virtue (2010).  It is 
undeniable that Plato – and Socrates before him – had very few thinkers to whom they 
could more easily appeal in furthering their own ideas of the difficulties of achieving 
human virtue than Homer, especially given his depiction of the inner struggles of 
human beings undergoing great adversity.  In Book 4 of Republic, in fact, Plato quotes 
Homer directly as a source of understanding the human capacity of thymos and how it 
relates to both emotion and virtue (Grube & Reeve, Trans., 1997).   
 In order to continue the development of a diachronic view of thymic 
disorientation, so that its meaning can be adequately understood as it developed over 
time and evolved into a living contemporary tradition, examining Plato’s use of the term 
is necessary, because he is indeed the next great philosopher writing after Homer who 
used it at length.  Aristotle, Plato’s student at the academy in Athens, also notably and 
widely used the concept of thymos in his teachings.  Accounting for the use of thymos in 
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Plato and Aristotle will progress the understanding of the living tradition of thymos five 
to six centuries from its earliest appearances in Homer’s work, placing the diachronic 
understanding of the term as presented in this thesis within a couple of centuries of the 
advent of the common era.  By examining their use of thymos in terms of both general 
human functioning and the understanding of the potential for thymic disorientation, 
comparisons can be made between Plato’s work, Aristotle’s work and Homer’s work, 
and a certain trajectory of meaning development associated with the term can be 
examined.  This in turn may offer new insights into connections between the ancient 
Greek concept of thymic disorientation and the contemporary phenomenon of CCAD. 
Thymic Disorientation in Plato and Aristotle 
Both Plato and Aristotle were mainly interested in attaining the highest and 
purest knowledge available to human beings, and for them this task was also connected 
with virtuous living.  J. J. Chambliss, a Plato scholar, suggests that all of Plato’s 
writings were aimed at “…taking possession of, and being possessed by the noblest 
object of knowledge,” and that this aim serves as a backdrop for both his interest in and 
his use of the concept of thymos (1974, p. 6).  Unlike Homer, who was very interested 
in the emotional state of his characters, and on the interplay between emotion, action, 
and practical virtue in times of great upheaval, Plato was a more abstract thinker who in 
many cases considered emotion to be a great danger to virtue and to philosophy in 
general, as the pursuit of highest knowledge.  As a result, Plato tended to view thymic 
emotion in a relatively negative light.  Power and Dalgleish argue that Plato on occasion 
even wrote as if emotion should be completely silenced by reason in all circumstances 
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(2008).  On the other hand, the roles of thymos in moral functioning and in inner 
aggression were of great interest to Plato, because of their impact on human virtue. 
Aristotle also focused on thymic morality and thymic intuition far more than 
thymic emotion, but he did see thymos as being essential to the social experience of 
human beings, which incudes elements of emotion and emotional connection.  More so 
than Plato, Aristotle in fact saw all aspects of thymic function as essentially communal, 
and built on Homer’s usage in portraying thymos as something that can be shared 
between humans and even through entire societies.  Giulia Sissa, a professor of classics 
who specializes in Aristotelian logic, suggests that it is a social experience of thymic 
inspiration to which Aristotle attributes the phenomenon of bravery and principled 
solidarity (2009, P. A.). 
Both Plato’s and Aristotle’s use of thymos can be, for the purposes of this thesis, 
addressed in the same general categories as was Homer’s use, as described in Chapter 
Five: (1) thymos as the philosophical seat of human emotions, (2) thymos as the seat of 
instinctual motivation to action, and (3) thymos as the seat of moral intuition.  Each of 
these categories will be addressed in turn, both in their ideal functioning in Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s understanding and also in their potential for damage or lost function.  
Following this, lost function in each category can be examined in terms of relevance to 
the elements of CCAD. 
 
Thymic Emotion in Plato and Aristotle 
Although Plato discussed the emotional aspects of thymos to a lesser extent than 
did Homer, given his different philosophical orientation and aims, on the occasions that 
 157 
he did give consideration to thymic emotion he spoke of it as dangerous and worthy of 
suspicion.  In fact, this was to have some impact on the trajectory of philosophical 
teaching about thymic emotion for many centuries.  For instance, more than two 
centuries after Plato, Galen wrote about thymos in his medical anthropology.  William 
Harris, a professor of classical antiquity, describes Galen’s mention of thymos as a 
problematic and dangerous capacity in humans, containing the emotion and impulses of 
explosive anger, among other things (2004).  Galen actually attributes this concept of 
the explosive, angry nature of thymos to Plato (Boylan, 2007). 
Plato’s wider understanding of thymic emotion was that it is the human capacity 
for ardor in both relationships and action (Ludwig, 2009).  Paul Ludwig, a professor of 
classics specializing in early Greek philosophy, notes that Plato probably saw thymos as 
the source of love and emotional connection between human beings, but almost always 
used the term to describe the source of human violence, bitterness and vindictiveness 
(Ludwig, 2002).  According to Ludwig, Plato would not have considered these to be 
disconnected ideas, because love and attachment often precede bitterness and 
vengeance, and are activated when one loses what he or she has loved (Ludwig, 2002).   
Aristotle gave less attention to the emotional functioning of thymos than did 
Plato, but he did represent the forward trajectory of Homer’s philosophical 
anthropology, which presented thymos as the seat of human emotion.  Rachana 
Kamtekar, a professor of ancient philosophy, notes that Aristotle understood thymos as 
“the capacity for emotion in general,” although he did not treat this capacity with much 
nuance in his teachings (2001, p. 826).  Like his teacher, Plato, he did write as if thymos 
was the place where bonds of love are formed.  Giulia Sissa notes that Aristotle uses 
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thymos as the place in humans where affection between two or more people is forged 
and maintained (2009, P. A.).  Hilary Case, a moral philosopher specializing in ancient 
Greek thought, argues that this is in fact a central idea in Plato’s understanding of 
thymos, offering her opinion that Plato most considered thymos to be the part of every 
human being which could guide him or her to calm, peace, and harmony with his or her 
environment (2006).  She argues that Plato saw this as an ideal, however, and one that 
he believed was almost never realized in humans, being used instead by people to make 
war against themselves and each other (Case, 2006). 
In addition to serving as the source of bitterness and vengeance, Plato also used 
the term thymos to describe the source of a particular kind of anger, which Peter 
Sloterdijk says can best be translated in English as wrath or “infuriation” (2010, p. 23).  
For instance, in Book 4 of Republic, Plato uses thymos to describe the place of anger 
that is aroused, and which “boils” and prepares for a bitter fight (Grube & Reeve, 
Trans., 1997, p. 1072).  Book 4 of Republic is the place in all of Plato’s work where he 
most clearly addresses thymic emotion, and he speaks of it in almost exclusively 
negative and cautionary terms.  The one exception to this is that, in one place in Book 4, 
he describes thymos as the place where some healthy anger is possible, from his 
viewpoint.  In this place he mentions that, when someone realizes they have done 
something wrong, and hurt someone in their family or society, thymos can become the 
place of self-confrontation or repentance of the act, potentially leading to change and an 
inspiration to make amends (Grube & Reeve, Trans., 1997, p. 1072).   
Plato’s mention of thymic emotion, then, is mostly a mention of its dysfunction, 
but in one case a mention of its potential to reverse dysfunction, or to begin to renew 
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functioning.  Although thymos is meant to be kept in peace, and can guide human 
persons to peaceful living, it can be easily turned, according to Plato, and in that case 
will inevitably begin to “boil with vicious anger” against oneself and others (Case, 
2006, p. 160).  Also, although it can be the place of repentance and healthy self-
confrontation, it can also – especially when one is isolated from others, such as is 
common after wrongdoing in society – become an internally aggressive force, urging 
the wrongdoer to injure himself or herself as a self-imposed punishment.  In Book 4 of 
Republic Plato writes as if a person can become wild when he or she loses self-respect 
after wrong-doing.  Sloterdijk comments at length on this section of Book 4, noting that, 
in Plato’s mind, thymos aggressively promotes “turning against oneself when a person 
does not live up to the expectations that would have to be satisfied in order for that 
person not to lose self-respect” (Sloterdijk, 2010, p. 22).  He also notes that, especially 
when encountering moral failure in oneself, Plato notices that a deep shame can ensue, 
in the form of an “all-encompassing mood that completely fills the subject” and 
experienced as a “rage-drenched self-reproach” (Sloterdijk, 2010, p. 22).  This personal 
attack upon oneself after violation of conscience or committing a wrong in society is a 
distinctly Platonic introduction to the history of thymos in literary and philosophical 
thought. 
In summary, Plato’s understanding of thymic emotion is generally connected 
with Homer’s understanding of thymic emotion.  Aristotle does not give this function of 
thymos much mention, but he clearly follows the Homer-Plato diachronic trajectory of 
understanding the term.  For Plato, the thymos is ideally the place where loving and 
peaceful connections with oneself, others, and one’s environment can be made, but it is 
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also the place where, once a person has become thymically disoriented, bitter and 
vengeful anger can develop, turned towards oneself, others, and one’s environment.  
Plato’s mention of thymic emotion continues to provide a consistent philosophical 
account for some of the phenomenological features of the element of CCAD described 
as persistent, socially debilitating mistrust after an unbearable emotional experience.  
For Homer this unbearable emotional experience tended to be leadership betrayal or the 
loss of a comrade, after which the combat veteran became unable to trust others or build 
interpersonal bonds with them.  For Plato it is slightly different, with the unbearable 
experience tending to be self-focused, as when a person betrays his or her own sense of 
right and wrong and then turns on oneself, unable to trust oneself and facing growing 
impulses to harm oneself or get distance from oneself. 
 This innovative Platonic addition to the potential for thymic emotion to become 
disoriented in a self-focused way also has some connection to the element of CCAD 
described as self-horror at the perceived absorption of evil.  Tim Segrest, after killing a 
large number of people with his sniper rifle in combat in the Middle East, experienced a 
deep self-loathing to accompany his self-horror at what he had done, as was recounted 
in Chapter Two of this thesis (2008).  He came to see himself as joined with the evil he 
felt he had done in combat, and refers to himself now as a “sadistic fucker” and “a son 
of a bitch” who he hopes “rots in hell” for his actions (Segrest, 2008, p. 198).  Just as 
Plato described more than 2,250 years ago, Tim’s anger boils over at himself, and he 
wildly turns against himself with moods of self-violence and self-condemnation.  This 
war on oneself from the place of thymos is the opposite of Plato’s ideal, that men and 
women would live at peace with themselves from the place of thymos, and from there 
 161 
live at peace with their environments.  Rather, in this disoriented state, brought on by 
self-betrayal during time of adversity, Plato depicts a situation in which a person makes 
war on himself or herself from thymos, and experiences a change after acting against 
what is good.  After this point, the person is unable to trust himself or herself any 
longer, and then extends this lack of trust to the rest of the world around him or her.  
This addition to understanding thymic emotion therefore provides a connection between 
the elements of CCAD labeled persistent, socially debilitating mistrust and self-horror 
at the perceived absorption of evil, while providing some theoretical philosophical 
account for both. 
 Plato also provides the first recorded therapy for disoriented thymos.  In his 
discussion of thymos as the place in which a person can become aware that they have 
done something wrong, and hurt someone in their family or society, he notices that 
repentance can be an ideal thymic function.  In this act a person can confront himself or 
herself, making use of both reason and thymos, and then move to change and to make 
amends (Grube & Reeve, Trans., 1997).   
 
Thymic Aggression in Plato and Aristotle 
Plato’s use of thymos as the human capacity to move oneself into action 
instinctively is nearly identical to Homer’s usage.  Christopher Green, a professor of 
psychology specializing in ancient origins of psychological thought, notices that 
although Plato understands this function of thymos to be natural and useful, he also 
writes as if it can easily malfunction or become maladaptive, resulting in the need for 
constant guidance from reason (2003).  Hilary Case notes that Plato, always interested 
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in human orientations toward the highest truth, sees instinctive thymic functioning as 
determined by a person’s strongest desires (2006).  In other words, she reads Plato’s use 
of thymos in motivation as the capacity in every person to attach to and defend objects 
of desire.  If a person desires to become a better person, it is thymos that will give the 
person “the energy and spirit necessary for growth” in development (Case, 2006, p. 17).  
Similarly, if a person desires to know the truth above else, it will give the person the 
energy and determination necessary for this pursuit (Case, 2006). 
Both Green and Case read Plato’s use of instinctive thymos to function similarly 
to Homer’s, and the points they each make when describing Plato’s understanding of its 
essential function in human motivation demonstrate obvious potential for dysfunction.  
From Green’s perspective, Plato notices the need for human beings to have motivation 
towards their goals, but also notes that this motivation can be deregulated in two 
unhealthy directions.  First, Plato writes as if thymic motivation can become overactive, 
dominating the self and producing an unruly, war-like tendency (Green, 2003).  
Secondly, Plato writes as if the thymic capacity to move oneself to action can be 
disabled during adversity, leaving a person lacking the ability to be roused to action 
when necessary (Green, 2003).  This is very similar to Homer’s usage, as demonstrated 
in Chapter Five of this thesis by comparing the work of Kobierzycki and Snell to 
sample texts from Iliad.   In that demonstration Homer was seen to clearly use the 
concept of thymos to describe both over-regulation of aggressive, instinctual action, 
leaving a person with a feeling of “deadness” or extreme lethargy, and also under-
regulation, leaving the person with wild, uncontrollable impulses to action.  
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From Case’s perspective, Plato’s concept of orientation by desire provides some 
clear potential for lost function.  If Plato believed that a person possesses thymic 
motivation in order to grow in goodness, which is made possible when growing in 
goodness is a person’s highest desire, the question must be asked how thymic 
motivation affects a person when he or she desires something other than goodness.  
Case notes that in Book 9 of Republic, Plato sees thymos degenerating from principled 
energy into irrational rage when the person begins to desire base or evil things, 
especially when this desire is blocked in some way (2006). She also notices that this can 
be understood in connection with reason, arguing that for Plato, when thymos and 
reason are working in an adaptively collaborative way, a person will be motivated to do 
what he or she feels is right, but when thymos and reason are not in harmony, thymos 
will continue to move in whatever direction its most powerful desires dictate in the 
moment, and it will respond in rage to anything in its way (Case, 2006). 
In paragraph 589 of Book 9 of Republic, Plato argues that thymos is ideally 
subject to reason, and even more favorably, to the “divine.” (Grube & Reeve, Trans., 
1997, p. 1197).  This subjugation is protective, in Plato’s view, and its removal or 
breakdown will leave a human being vulnerable to all kinds of further disorientation, 
and unable to either summon or else control his or her instincts.  Specifically, Case 
notes that Plato understood this disorientation as an inability to avoid desires he or she 
normally considers to be evil, or to be roused to defend against what is evil (2006). 
Aristotle again represents a Homeric-Platonic trajectory in his teaching on 
thymos.  Anna Cremaldi, a classical philosopher and professor who wrote her doctoral 
dissertation on Aristotelian ethics, notes that, while Aristotle expressed the point in 
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more communal terms than did Plato, he understood thymos to have an essential 
function of instinctual impulse and impetus to action in humans, just as did Plato 
(2010).  Aristotle also saw the same potential for damage or disorientation to this 
function of thymos as did Plato.  Giulia Sissa notices that Aristotle understood thymos 
as an essential fighting instinct in humans, which could adaptively aid them in 
developing a hard protection against evil impulses, and also help them to build and 
maintain a “stony disposition” in the face of threats meant to coerce them into wrong 
action (2009, G. P., 112).  Christopher Green notices that he also clearly understood the 
potential for disorientation of this instinct, which can result in thymic domination of the 
entire self, producing a war-like tendency in the personality (2003).  For Aristotle, the 
actual process of disorientation mirrors what was taught in Homer and Plato: thymos 
falls out of harmony with reason, and begins acting out without restraint.  Rachana 
Kamtekar argues that this link between reason and thymic instinctual motivation is clear 
in Aristotle’s work: for Aristotle, thymos is only able to function in a principled, 
restrained way when it is “responding to reason” by motivating the person to 
appropriate action (2001, p. 826).  Although Aristotle did not discuss this as thoroughly 
as Plato, including movement towards potential deregulation of thymic instinctual 
motivation in the direction of either extreme lethargy or extreme and unbridled anger, 
he did at least mention the latter as a tendency. 
In Chapter Five of this thesis it was demonstrated that, in addressing potential 
damage to the thymic function of instinctive motivation to action, Homer evidenced a 
philosophical understanding of how warriors may experience a deregulation of their 
aggressive instincts, in extreme cases leaving them feeling either uncontrollable in their 
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passion or else entirely without felt vitality.  Some warriors in the Homeric texts 
seemed to experience the element of CCAD described as uncontrollable, lustful rage, in 
which they were seemingly overwhelmed by aggressive impulses and unable to 
challenge those impulses with reason.  Others seemed to experience the element of 
CCAD described as self-conscious disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation, in 
which they feel lifeless, without any motivation, and unable to experience passion.  
Plato’s addition to these observations includes a potential therapeutic approach, or at 
least a prophylactic one: the constant pursuit of the highest ideal of virtue.  For Plato, 
when a person desires to attain to his or her highest understanding of what is good, it 
can protect him or her from being hijacked by an intense instinct towards something 
base or evil, and it can also rouse him or her from a position of lethargy and the 
experience of feeling instinctively deadened. 
Plato’s understanding of thymic instinctive motivation also connects with the 
element of CCAD described as self-horror with the perceived absorption of evil.  Freely 
using the concept of the “divine,” Plato writes as if a person can remain oriented to the 
good as long as he or she maintains a chief desire for his or her highest ideal of the 
divine.  Once that is compromised, he or she may pursue lesser things, and even 
experience a drive for things that are antithetical to the divine, which may be considered 
evil.  Once this happens, a person can begin to practice evil.  Although he does not 
continue a discussion of how evil can be “absorbed” into a person’s sense of self, or 
what response one may have when confronted with that evil, it would be entirely in 
keeping with Plato’s worldview to say that a person could become self-horrified by the 
evil he or she had done at some point, and to feel deeply tainted by his or her actions. 
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Thymic Morality in Plato and Aristotle 
Benjamin Jowett, in an introduction to his own translation of Phaedrus, argues 
that Plato mainly uses thymos to describe “the moral and spiritual center of a person,” 
from which spiritual connections and moral intuition are made possible (Jowett, 2008, 
p. 5).  Plato’s use of thymos does always include a moral element, even when it is 
directly describing an issue of emotion or instinctive motivation.  Paul Ludwig 
understands Plato’s teaching about human thymos as one in which moral intuition and 
instinctive motivation work in synchronicity, helping people take determined action on 
behalf of justice or against injustice (2009).  In his 2009 work Eros and polis: desire 
and community in Greek political theory, Ludwig appeals to Book 9 of Republic to 
highlight Plato’s apparent three-part teaching on the moral aspect of thymos, all of 
which also necessitate the presence of a healthy instinctive motivation: (1) maintenance 
of honor, (2) defense against injustice, and (3) guardianship of the good. 
Peter Sloterdijk makes an interesting and helpful addition to Ludwig’s teaching, 
noticing that in Plato thymos becomes nearly equivalent to conscience (2010).  Notably, 
Aristotle used the moral function of thymos in exactly the same way.  Anna Cremaldi 
notices that Aristotle used thymos as a capacity for understanding right and wrong that 
is sub-rational or extra-rational, and is designed to function in synchronicity with reason 
in the human person for understanding and doing what is right (2010).  In Sloterdijk’s 
view, Plato’s use of thymos takes on the form of an “inner appeal to oneself,” or the 
form of one’s reason issuing a challenge to one’s base instincts or the base instincts of 
others (2010, p. 22).  However, it is clear that thymic morality is, for both Plato and 
 167 
Aristotle, a human capacity that is vulnerable to disorientation, especially when turned 
away from one’s highest understanding of virtue.   
Sloterdijk notices that throughout Republic there are indications of what Plato 
believes may happen to a person who has been thymically disoriented and has lost the 
ability to know and act upon what is morally right (2010).  First, he notes that Plato sees 
the fruit of this moral discernment as moral failure, or evil, which will have a profound 
impact on a person in its aftermath (Sloterdijk, 2010).  In Plato’s teaching, the aftermath 
of having done evil is one of the most complicated and painful circumstances a person 
can face.  This pain is marked, according to Sloterdijk’s reading, by an “intense self-
disrespect” marked by shame and including moments of self-hatred (Sloterdijk, 2010, p. 
22).  Plato includes both social and emotional consequences of this self-hatred, 
including self-isolation from community and a patterned change in temperament, which 
Sloterdijk calls an “all-encompassing mood that completely fills the subject,” 
experienced as a type of “rage-drenched self-reproach” (2010, p. 22). 
This kind of moral disorientation, which contains severe social, emotional, and 
psychological consequences of moral failure, does seem connected with the element of 
CCAD described as the radical dissolution of moral intuition and narrative coherence, 
in which warriors are alienated from any organized internal or external code of morality 
they have known in the past after having acted against their conscience in combat.  The 
condition of such warriors, especially upon homecoming, can be marked by an inability 
to relate to socially constructed codes of morality, keeping them from being able to bear 
shame in their communities toward reconciliation, according to communal patterns of 
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reconciliation.  This seems to connect clearly with the aftermath of damaged thymic 
morality in Plato’s teaching. 
Plato’s teaching on the potential damage of thymic morality also provides the 
clearest account yet of the condition of self-horror after the perceived absorption of evil, 
into which those who have violated conscience and have committed acts of evil may 
enter.  Plato’s insight into such extreme self-hatred and rage-filled self-condemnation 
contains images of self-alienation that seems similar to the accounts of Tim Segrest, 
John Wolfe, D.C. Hoop, Nathan Everly, and others suffering from in Chapter Two, who 
in some cases internally sentenced themselves to death for their actions.  Aristotle’s 
teaching on the potential disorientation of the moral function of thymos also provides an 
account of this element of CCAD.  Anna Cremaldi notes that, for Aristotle, a person in 
crisis has to employ thymos to effect intuitive “spur-of-the-moment” decision-making 
on moral grounds (2010, p. 173).  This is a difficult and vulnerable state, and one in 
which, in the heat of distress, a person may act in a way that violates his or her own 
conscience.  When this occurs, a person may become morally disoriented, and no longer 
feel like they are able to make moral decisions – or in extreme cases, may feel as if they 
have been morally hijacked.  Kevin Corrigan notes that, in Aristotle’s view, once a 
person has committed a great evil, or has become enslaved by a certain vice, thymos 
may become dislocated from its proper place, and may be in position to “command” the 
self to do wrong without any possibility of being restrained (2009, p. 91). 
This very particular concept of thymic hijacking is similar to what Segrest, 
Hoop, Everly, and Miller expressed in the section on self-horror at the perceived 
absorption of evil in Chapter Two of this thesis.  In those narratives, each man 
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described a sense of being no longer in control of his own ability to make moral 
decisions, being rather compelled to do the wrong thing.  It is certainly the most 
meaningful explanation yet found to account for this facet of their experiences, and it is 
to be found in Aristotle’s Topics, written 23 centuries ago. 
 
Summarizing the Contributions of the “Golden Era” Philosophers 
 The primary contribution of the “Golden Era” Philosophers to a diachronic 
understanding of thymic disorientation is a clear continuation of the concept of thymos 
in a way that specifically invokes mention of Homer’s work and builds directly on his 
anthropology.  This demonstrates that a diachronic view is viable, methodologically, as 
Homer’s anthropology was popular enough and accepted enough to be passed down for 
at least for several centuries following the completion of Odyssey.  However, they also 
made unique contributions to contemporary understanding of the ancient concept of 
thymos, and two examples of this have emerged after a thorough examination of their 
uses of the term.   
First, Plato and Aristotle both taught that thymic health depends on consistent 
orientation of the self to the highest possible ideal of each person.  In this state, a human 
being will maintain a harmony between his or her capacity for reason and his or her 
capacity of thymos, and will always be both discerning what is good and being moved 
to act on behalf of the good.  On the other hand, if a person loses this orientation to the 
highest ideal, he or she may become disoriented, and experience a disharmony between 
thymos and reason, allowing thymos to chase desires that are not in line with what he or 
she feels to be right.  This clear identification of the origins of thymic disorientation is 
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in no way at odds with Homeric writings, but does provide a clearer account of the 
phenomenon. 
Second, Plato and Aristotle taught that there is an extreme kind of violent self-
focus that is common after a person realizes they have failed to live up to their ideas, 
and have committed an act of evil or have been in the wrong.  Its consequence, 
according to their teaching, includes self-condemnation, self-harm, impulses to escape 
one’s own body, social isolation, and the complete abandonment of previously help 
meaning structures and moral systems.  In short, this provides some account for the 
elements of CCAD described as self-horror at the perceived absorption of evil, 
conscious disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation, the radical dissolution of 
moral intuition and narrative coherence, and persistent, socially debilitating mistrust. 
 
Thymos in the Moral and Spiritual Philosophers of Late Antiquity 
 
 A teaching on thymos with the gravity of the works of Plato and Aristotle was 
not to be found again until the mid-fourth century of the Common Era in Byzantium, 
during the period often labeled “late antiquity” by historians.  Hilary Case rightly makes 
the case that the philosophical anthropology of ancient Greece was advanced more 
profoundly in the work of the Byzantine moral and spiritual philosophers of late 
antiquity than in any time since the Golden Age of Greek philosophy (2006).  These 
philosophers rose with the legalization of Christianity in the late Roman Empire, 
attempting to illuminate many aspects of the human experience with a revisited and 
revitalized Greek anthropology.  Among them were such teachers as Basil of Caesarea, 
Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus, sometimes called the “Cappadocian 
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Luminaries” after the region of their birth, and John of Constantinople, who came to be 
called “John of the Golden Tongue.”  Anthony Meredith, a scholar in the field of moral 
philosophy specializing in the time of late antiquity, notes that the work of the 
Cappadocians to continue a living tradition of ancient Greek anthropology as passed 
down through the Platonic corpus was evident especially in their writings on practical 
living (2014).  These particular writings offer much in the way of commentary on 
thymos and its impact on human health and community, and will prove an important 
place to continue the development of a diachronic understanding of thymos. 
 The teaching of Gregory of Nyssa on thymos essentially represented the 
Homeric and Platonic tradition by including elements of emotion, instinctual 
motivation, and morality, although like Homer and Plato, he never systematically 
explained thymos as tripartite.  Corrigan, in her research on Gregory of Nyssa, notes 
that he most commonly used thymos as a term to represent inner vitality and ardor, and 
was very concerned about the conditions in which thymos could be restrained, 
especially in emotionally charged situations (2009).  He also spoke of thymos, 
according to Corrigan, to describe a human capacity to know and cling to the good, 
even when everyone else in a person’s community is choosing evil (2009).  For Gregory 
of Nyssa, these aspects of emotion, inner ardor, and moral sense all work together, and 
he taught that when a person is watchful or focused on remaining restrained, he or she 
can carefully keep thymos in harmony with reason, and become a person of strong 
moral character.  Corrigan notices that he called this the state of the “preservation of 
wisdom” (2009, p. 142). 
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 Gregory of Nazianzus taught that thymos is an essential function of the human 
person, designed so that people have the energy and motivation they need to fight 
injustice and stay away from evil.  Jean-Claude Larchet, an independent scholar and 
researcher in the field of Greek moral philosophy, notes that Gregory of Nazianzus saw 
thymos as the ability of every person to withstand temptation to evil and vice, and to 
pursue good, as long as a person can nurture thymos with patience (2005).  John of 
Constantinople also focused in his Homilies on Statutes on thymos as the seat of a 
“tangible good” contained in the human person, which, when ignored or rejected, could 
withdraw or be lost (Larchet, 2005, p. 93). 
 Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus, and John of Constantinople each 
discussed the potential for disorientation or disintegration of thymos in their teaching.  
Both John of Constantinople in his Instructions and Gregory of Nyssa in his On 
Virginity taught that thymos can damaged when a person is exposed to great acts of evil 
or to death, or is exposed to his or her own mortality in an unexpected way (Larchet, 
2005).  John also noted in his Consolation to Stagirius that thymos can withdraw under 
certain adverse circumstances, leaving a person with a painful inability to experience 
emotional joy (Larchet, 2005).  He also described a particular type of thymic disorder 
that closely resembled Plato’s observation in people who have acted against their 
conscience and have realized what they have done.  John of Constantinople labeled this 
phenomenon with the Greek term lupe, and described it as a deep and abiding sense of 
regret or self-excoriation that follows an initial outburst of anger against oneself 
(Larchet, 2005).  John wrote as if, under some conditions, that initial outburst could 
rage, giving a person the sense that “[his or her] anger was excessive or 
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disproportionate to what had stimulated it” (Larchet, 2005, p. 95).  For John of 
Constantinople, during this phenomenon an unbridled thymos can gain control of the 
psyche, much like Plato and Aristotle warned, “weakening and depressing the mind 
itself…having destroyed all steadfastness of heart [and] crazing [the person], stupefying 
the intellect, [and] breaking and overwhelming it with punishing despair” (Larchet, 
2005, p. 95). 
This extreme state of thymic disorientation, representing the most complex 
description to date of thymic distress in ancient records, has some significant features in 
common with CCAD.  There are clear connections with the element of CCAD 
described as lustful, uncontrollable rage, and also some potential connections with 
conscious disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation and self-horror at the 
perceived absorption of evil.   
The work of the moral and spiritual philosophers of late antiquity had a 
profound effect on many psychosocial caregivers of their time, who by contemporary 
categories could be considered ancient philosophical healers.  Some of the most 
renowned of these healers often quoted John of Constantinople and the Cappadocian 
Luminaries throughout their teaching, and served as practitioners of philosophy who 
appropriated the living anthropological tradition of the ancient Greek world into their 
care.  Specifically, a group of hermits who took up an abode in Near Eastern Deserts in 
the 4th Century began practicing a psycho-spiritual lifestyle called hesychasm, and 
received pilgrims with all manner of distresses and disorientation.  They came to be 
known as the Desert Fathers, and the diachronic passage of thymos passes through them 
into medieval and modern times. 
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The Desert Fathers are considered by a number of scholars to be the founders of 
the world’s first psychotherapeutic centers.  Todd Hall, a scholar in the field of 
psychology, suggests that the techniques of the Desert Fathers in caring for distressed 
persons had an insight into the unconscious that can be compared with Sigmund Freud’s 
techniques (2010).  Lynette Harborne, a teaching psychotherapist, writes that the 
beginning of a history of psychotherapy begins in the desert tradition, and also notes 
that the Desert Fathers and Mothers provide the world with its first systematic 
psychotherapeutic handbook, collected from the words of Evagrius, John Cassian, and 
others (2012).  Hall and Harborne both stress the differences in orientation between 
modern psychotherapeutic schools and the therapeutic work of the Desert Fathers and 
Mothers.  Harborne notes that the therapeutic orientation of the desert did not follow a 
medical model, and focused on philosophical healing that was informed by ancient 
spiritual metaphysics and philosophical anthropology (2012).  Hall stresses that the 
work of the Desert Fathers and Mothers, unlike the work of many contemporary 
psychotherapists, was done in the context of a loving, committed community (2010).  
 Both Hall and Halborne have captured something in seeing the similarities and 
differences of the therapeutic practice of the Desert Fathers and contemporary 
psychotherapy.  The Desert Fathers and Mothers were informed by a philosophical 
understanding of the human person that was not primarily biological, but rather deeply 
holistic, containing physical, mental, and emotional processes, and also containing a 
spiritual element that was addressed philosophically.  This spiritual element and their 
philosophical approach to it was profoundly informed by the concept of thymos, passed 
down through the Greek philosophers and used as a lens for understanding for human 
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well-being and distress.  Two of the most important recorded voices of the era of the 
Desert Fathers and Mothers in terms of understanding thymos and its potential for 
disorientation through adversity were that of Evagrius of Pontus and Maximos of 
Constantinople.    
 
Thymic Disorientation in Evagrius of Pontus  
 
Evagrius of Pontus was an anthropological scholar and a practitioner of the 
desert way of therapy, which centers on radical humility and self-donative love in a 
committed community and under the guidance of one or more devoted caregivers.  
According to Larchet, Evagrian anthropology became standard in Greek philosophy 
from the time of the full circulation of his writings, which was accomplished by the 
beginning of the 5th Century (2005).  Like Homer, Plato, and the Capaddocians, 
Evagrius saw thymos as containing elements of emotion, instinctual motivation to 
action, and moral intuition.  Corrigan notes that Evagrius understood disorientation of 
the thymos in general to sometimes take place in its emotional capacity, especially when 
a person becomes attached to an object or idea that is destructive or vicious (2009).  In 
such cases, Corrigan notices, Evagrius describes a powerful chain reaction in thymos.  
First, a person’s emotional attachment, when misplaced, can become distressingly 
strong, and can activate the capacity of thymos for instinctual motivation.  Once these 
two aspects of thymos are acting together, they become a powerful force in the person 
which can “easily move or displace” reason and even fight against reason to gain the 
object of desire (Corrigan, 2009, p. 67).  Lastly, becoming “cut off from its natural 
alliance with reason,” thymos can become morally disoriented, engaging in rage-filled 
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combat against anyone threatening its path towards the misplaced desire (Corrigan, 
2009, p. 91).  Kevin Corrigan’s work clearly shows Evagrius’ nuanced, sophisticated 
and systemic understanding of thymic disorientation in this example. 
 Harmless and Fitzgerald give a further account of Evagrius’ teaching on the 
consequences of disoriented thymos, noting that Evagrius considered disoriented thymos 
to be a uniquely devastating human disorder, in which a person’s inner life becomes 
painfully disharmonious and conflicted (2001).  They note that in the Evagrian corpus, 
the thymos, “when disordered, emerges as intertwining streams of violence, fear and 
frustration that lurk in the depth of the human heart,” and can alienate a person from 
himself or herself, as he or she experiences himself or herself as a stranger (Harmless & 
Fitzgerald, 2001, p. 506).  Larchet notes that, in On Various Evil Chapters 11 and 12, 
Evagrius describes disordered thymos as a source of uncontrolled passion which leaves 
a person out of control, impairing the human faculty of discernment and depriving the 
person of dynamism and vitality (2005).       
It is clear that Evagrius saw thymos as a natural component of the human person, 
but it is clear that he also saw it as an explosive component.  In Chapter Five of On 
Discrimination of Thoughts, Evagrius suggests that thymos often functions within the 
context of emotional and instinctive arousal, and the more intense the arousal, the more 
dangerous it is and difficult to control (Trans. 1979).1  On the one hand, it can be 
aroused to fix on what is good, and in that case can increase a person’s ability to be 
patient, to bear difficulty, to forgive those who have injured him or her, to have 
                                                
1 Although the Palmer, Sherrard, and Ware English translation of the Philokalia is cited 
eighteen times in this chapter, it was used with refular reference to a Greek text of the same 
source document: Philokalia ton Hieron Nyptikon Syneranistheisa, First Edition, Panagiotis 
Tzelathe, Ed., Athens: 1893. 
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compassion on all creatures, and to “rise above a love of self-esteem” that could 
otherwise disorient him or her (Trans. 1979, p. 39).  This shows healthy functioning in 
emotional, instinctive, and moral capacities of thymos.  On the other hand, Evagrius saw 
the clear potential for uncontrollable arousal, sweeping a person away into violence and 
confusion, and in Chapter 15 of On the Discrimination of Thoughts noted that this could 
happen after being witness to the evil treatment of loved ones, which is quite relevant to 
the consideration of thymos and CCAD (Trans. 1979).  
 
Thymic Disorientation in Evagrian Contemporaries  
 
A number of Evagrius’ contemporaries shared a similar concept of the potential 
for thymic disorder or disorientation by a chain reaction beginning in the emotional 
capacity of thymic functioning.  John Cassian, a Desert Father of Roman descent, taught 
in his On the Eight Vices that thymos becomes disordered when the naturally occurring 
human potential for anger against evil and injustice becomes turned against its nature to 
focus on other people (Trans. 1979).  Cassian thought this disorder was most likely to 
occur when someone began passionately pursuing something that was not wholesome, 
and let his aggression overpower his moral intuition and moral related to his goals 
(Latchford, 2011).  In his treatise On Anger, John Cassian added that once this reoccurs 
enough to form a pattern, a person can lose the ability to maintain control over thymos, 
becoming “beast-like to [his] fellow men,” to the point that even when a person is 
initially moved against injustice, his thymic anger and passion can quickly be moved in 
any direction, with impulse to violence that is difficult to constrain (Trans. 1979, p. 86). 
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Cassian’s ideas follow the Homeric – Platonic – Cappadocian – formula, in that 
they pinpoint the beginning of thymic disorientation as a moment in the human 
experience when a person experiences a disconnect between reason and thymos, at 
which point the various capacities of thymos can begin to further fragment.  In 
Cassian’s specific example, a person might begin to aggressively pursue something in a 
way that outpaces his moral reasoning, and at some point his moral intuition loses 
function, his aggressive instinct begins to rage out of control, and his emotional anger 
becomes beast-like.         
Relatedly, John of Damascus, a Desert Father from the Levant, discussed 
emotional change in human relationships as a potential sign of thymic disorientation in 
his writings.  In his On the Virtues and the Vices, he wrote that once thymos becomes 
aroused in its aggressive function past the ability of reason to provide a check on its 
power, it breeds “heartlessness, hatred, lack of compassion, rancor, envy, 
[murderousness], and dwelling constantly on such things” (Trans. 1983, p. 337).  In his 
view, a disoriented thymos could lead to a constant preoccupation with violence and 
competitive striving.  John argued that some of the best therapy for such a condition 
could also begin emotionally, if a person with disoriented thymos came into contact 
with someone in relationship who demonstrated a pattern of “deep sympathy, love, 
gentleness, brotherly affection, compassion, forbearance, and kindness” towards them 
(Trans. 1983, p. 337).          
Both Hesychios Presbyteros and Philotheos of Sinai, Desert Fathers writing in 
the centuries following Evagrius, discussed damage to conscience or changes of inner 
orientation towards the good that can occur when thymos is disordered.  Hesychios 
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wrote that if a person’s thymos becomes “ignited unnaturally and uncontrollably,” 
becoming “abusively aggressive” against other people, it can destroy goodness in him 
(Trans. 1979, p. 167).  Philotheos, in his Texts on Watchfulness, wrote that a person has 
some choice before “handing the reigns over to thymos,” and that when he does so he is 
choosing on some level to turn himself over to his aggression (Trans. 1986, p. 22).  At 
that point, Philotheos suggests that the person’s life becomes akin to runaway horse that 
has “unseated his rider,” and which now rides uncontrollably into all kinds of ignorance 
and evil (Trans. 1986, p. 22).  This may provide some account of the feeling of those 
veterans suffering under CCAD who describe their lives as joined with a kind of evil 
which they cannot control, and which suppresses the good in them.    
 
Thymic Disorientation in Maximos of Constantinople  
 
After Evagrius of Pontus, the next great anthropologist and practitioner of the 
desert, especially in terms of written legacy, was Maximos of Constantinople.  Edward 
Moore, a historical scholar specializing in the late Byzantine Empire, writes of 
Maximos that his most important and enduring works were anthropological, and to this 
end he worked to clarify, synthesize, reinterpret, and build on the teachings of those 
who came before him (2004).  Archbishop Chrysostomos of Etna, a scholar in the fields 
of historical theology and psychology, argues that Maximos speaks for almost all of the 
Greek voices in anthropology that came before him, especially from the Desert 
Tradition (2007).  Wolfhart Pannenberg, a scholar in world religions, suggests that 
Maximos had direct connection with the teachings of Plato, especially in his 
anthropology (1985).  Together these scholarly voices develop an appropriate context 
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for Maximos’ teaching on thymos: he stood in a direct philosophical line from Plato, 
and synthesized Platonic anthropology with the anthropological teachings from the 
Cappadocians and Desert Tradition.       
 In his texts On Charity, Maximos makes mention of each of the three capacities 
of thymos that have been common to so many of the philosophers examined in this 
thesis: emotion, instinctual aggression, and moral intuition (Butler, 2012).  Like the 
Cappadocians and the Desert Fathers that preceded him, he also noted the natural 
functioning of thymos, and it potential to be turned against its nature and to cause 
distress and disorientation in the human person.  Timothy Ware, a scholar in the field of 
historical theology, notes that in Maximos, the thymos is naturally designed to aid a 
person in giving himself or herself for the good of others, especially in time of great 
need (1999).  Maximos also described it in his Collection of Various Texts as the human 
capability to know and cling to the good, to act on behalf of peace, and to concentrate 
on love (Trans. 1983).  Maximos’ understanding of this capability included the concept 
of courage and bravery (Butler, 2012). 
 Maximos’ teaching on the disintegration of thymos, or the potential for it to be 
turned against its own nature, includes at least four triggers common to mankind, which 
can accelerate or encourage thymic disorientation.  Michael Butler, a scholar in the field 
of Maximian anthropology, notes two of these accelerants.  First, he notes that every 
human being, according to Maximos, has a “desire that is at the center of the 
unconscious to assert oneself or to prove one’s worth” (Butler, 2012, p. 120).  This can 
become frustrated, according to Maximos, and a person can, while attempting to prove 
his or her own worth, lose contact with reason and be driven uncontrollably in a 
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dangerous direction.  Secondly, Butler notes an emphasis in On Charity of the thymic 
dangers of attachment to material things, especially over human and divine 
relationships, which Maximos believes can disorient a person from his or her own 
capacity of reason, resulting in a “senseless hate of something” or someone that keeps 
him or her from the possession to which he or she is attached (2012, p. 120). 
 Two more potential accelerants in Maximos’ writings come from the collection 
of his Various Texts.  Maximos teaches that, if unwatched, and given free reign in times 
of temptation and stress, thymos will often pull away from reason, urging a person to 
action even if that means making war upon himself or herself (Trans. 1983).  He also 
notes that when a person consents to enter into a frenzied state, presumably in order to 
accomplish some goal or to ward off some perceived threat, it can be very difficult for a 
person to regain control voluntarily (Trans. 1983).  Instead, a person can disintegrate 
into an uncontrollable frenzy, in which he or she can begin to engage in all kinds of 
harmful acts.  Maximos mentions something similar, in fact, in his texts On Charity, 
noting that thymos becomes enflamed when a person loses self-control after allowing 
his or her passions to become aroused (Trans. 1983). 
 At least three of these accelerants have an important connection to the 
experiences of combat veterans.  Many veterans, especially early in their exposure to 
deadly conditions, will act in order to prove their own bravery to themselves and to 
others.  Lieutenant Flournoy Phelps notes that, in his experience, “Marines have been 
instilled with a hunger for bravery and heroism in battle, and sometimes they have to be 
‘reigned in’ after first contact.  They can be like young thoroughbreds, ready to charge 
into a race, and they can lose sight of the reality of the complexity and danger of their 
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situations” (interview, 2014).  This comment reflects the idea of Maximos exactly, as 
Phelps describes the ease with which a young warrior seeking to prove himself may lose 
contact with reason and be driven uncontrollably in a dangerous direction.  
 Similarly, the two accelerants mentioned in Various Texts, in which a person 
under stress may choose to either act without full consideration of his or her actions or 
even willingly enter into a frenzied state, in order to accomplish a goal or protect from a 
perceived threat, have strong potential for occurrence in combat.  Again, Phelps adds 
some helpful perspective on the matter: “today’s Marine is trained to act quickly and 
decisively, and with violence and surprise that will rouse himself and shock his 
enemy…it [is] not that they are not trained to consider their objectives, or to plan well, 
but rather than, when contact [with the enemy] arises, speed and immediate force is 
necessary” (interview, 2014).  One obvious difficulty with this reality, according to 
Maximos, is how difficult it is for a human person to enter into such a state and to retain 
or regain self-control, without becoming thymically disoriented and subject to inhumane 
excesses in battle. 
 Once thymic disorientation has been activated, Maximos listed a number of 
ways in which it is popularly manifested in a person’s thoughts, attitudes, and 
behaviors.  First, in his texts On the Lord’s Prayer, Maximos taught that thymic 
disorientation manifests in an inner “uncouth turbulence,” which is marked by an 
apparent inner conflict that can quickly be projected onto the world, resulting in various 
urges to fight fellow human beings, and to take pleasure in the fight (Trans. 1983, p. 
291).  He also notes in these texts that thymic disorientation can manifest as persistent 
agitation, volatile instincts toward aggression, and explosive anger (Trans. 1983).  
 183 
Butler notes that, in his texts On Charity, Maximos teaches that when thymos is 
“corrupted,” the whole person begins to suffer fragmentation, and “becomes passive 
[towards] and potentially a slave [to]” hatred (2012, p. 120).  Elsewhere in On Charity, 
Maximos notes that disoriented thymos, while aggressive and violent, leads towards 
action that is “cowardly” and ignoble (Trans. 1983, p. 83).  He also teaches that a 
person with disoriented thymos can be oriented towards revenge, and marked by an 
obsessive focus on those who have done him or her injury (Trans. 1983). 
 This portrait of a thymically disoriented person in the writings of Maximos, in 
which a person begins demonstrating a deep inner conflict or fragmentation, and 
experiences persistent agitation, volatile aggressive impulses, explosive anger, and 
obsessive thoughts and feelings of hate-filled revenge, even engaging in violent actions 
that are detached from a sense of honorable or morally sound judgment, is certainly a 
description of the conditions of many veterans who experience CCAD.  Maximos’ 
ability to see these tendencies and features in the people of his time, and his insight into 
the ways that such tendencies and features affect thymos after exposure to combat-like 
conditions is unmistakable, and provides a key addition to the diachronic view of thymic 
disorientation. 
 
Summarizing the Contributions of the Moral & Spiritual Philosophers of Late Antiquity  
 
 Like the teachings of Plato and Aristotle, the primary contribution of the Moral 
and Spiritual Philosophers of Late Antiquity to a diachronic understanding of thymic 
disorientation is a clear continuation of the concept of thymos in a way that further 
illuminates the meaning of the concept in the ancient Greek philosophical tradition.  
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Also like Plato and Aristotle, the Moral and Spiritual Philosophers of Late Antiquity 
applied this ancient concept in their teachings about life in their own historical period, 
and passed it down for future generations.  In doing so, they made a number of unique 
contributions to a contemporary understanding of the ancient concept of thymic 
disorientation, and at least three important examples of this have emerged after a 
thorough examination of their uses of the term.   
 First, Gregory of Nyssa emphasized watchfulness of thymic energy and focus as 
a main philosophical prophylactic against thymic disorientation, which provides an 
addition to Plato’s insistence on a person’s maintenance of a focus on his or her highest 
ideal.  This became an important key for all of the desert teachers after him, and also 
become one of Maximos’ four potential triggers of thymic disorientation.  Secondly, 
Evagrius taught about the potential for a chain reaction of thymic disorientation, 
beginning in its emotional function, and carrying through to its aggressive and moral 
functions.  This is the first recorded teaching of the potential for damage in one area of 
functioning to progress to a complete disorientation of the person.  His discussion of the 
way this chain reaction can occur is a unique contribution to the conceptual 
understanding of thymos.  Third, Maximos’ four triggers highlight common pre-
conditions of human attention that can lead to the origins of thymic disorientation, 
which origins were discussed in the writings of his predecessors, Plato and Gregory of 
Nyssa.  These further insights into how a person moves from thymic health to thymic 
disorientation were widely accepted by his students, and passed on to future 
generations.  They are even influential in the work of modern-day practitioners from the 
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contemporary Deserts Tradition, and they provide some potential for better 
understanding of veterans experiencing the features of CCAD. 
 The moral practitioners of late antiquity known as the Desert Fathers and 
Mothers are not a line of teachers whose thoughts are relegated to pre-medieval history.  
There are in modern times an existing cadre of desert-dwellers who represent an 
unbroken line of philosophical practice that has been passed down from generation to 
generation from the time of the first Desert Fathers and Mothers, and who have carried 
on the teaching and practice of those first desert-dwellers into the modern era (van 
Doorn-Horner, 1995).  A diachronic view of thymic disorientation should also contain 
the perspectives of these modern Desert Fathers and Mothers, as they represent a living 
tradition of thymic understanding that has been passed down through Homer, the 
philosophers of the Golden Age, and the Moral and Spiritual Philosophers of Late 
Antiquity. 
 
Thymic Disorientation in the “Modern Desert” Teaching 
 The modern Desert Fathers and Mothers represent a number of cultural 
heritages, and are located throughout the world, from the Middle East to the Levant, 
North Africa, the Mediterranean, the Balkans, Russia, and even North America, South 
America, and the Far East (Binns, 2002).  They are united in one monastic lifestyle, and 
a common philosophical understanding of human health and wellness, which includes 
an ancient anthropology that descends from Greek metaphysics, and includes a nuanced 
understanding of thymos and its potential for disorientation during adversity, passed 
down with various thematic and experiential developments throughout the centuries.  In 
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order to present an adequate and diverse account of modern desert teaching on thymos 
in this thesis, the perspectives of 9 modern desert teachers are collected and synthesized 
below: three from the Syro-Lebanese Orthodox and Coptic traditions, representing the 
Arabic desert path, three from the Greek Orthodox Athonite tradition, and three from 
the Russian Orthodox Valaamite and Optina traditions. 
 
Thymic Disorientation in the Contemporary Syro-Lebanese and Coptic Desert 
Traditions 
 
 Yousef Nassar is a monastic leader in the Syro-Lebanese Orthodox tradition, 
which has its roots in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine.  In his view, disorientation 
of thymos happens primarily when a person becomes emotionally involved with things 
that are not aligned with his or her sense of the good, and eventually gains a powerful 
attachment of desire to such things (Nassar, interview, 2015).  This situation, in his 
view, has a powerful effect on a person’s moral life, and can aid them in entering a 
painful state of moral confusion in every area of life.  Once a person realizes that he or 
she has entered into such a state of disorientation, he or she might even attempt to 
destroy his or her own emotional capacity in order to re-orient his or her life, but this is 
impossible to do, and can have harmful side effects, including self-alienation (Nassar, 
interview, 2015).  However, he also notes that a person may not realize their 
disorientation for some time, being in a position of “sleep towards oneself,” and 
needing to be awakened so that automatic impulses can be examined with the help of a 
caregiver (Nassar, interview, 2015).  Matta El Meskeen, a recently deceased monastic 
leader in the Coptic tradition, also noted this potential for progressive disorientation, 
describing the danger of how a person’s development of an emotional attachment with 
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something initially rejected by his or her conscience may lead eventually to complete 
self-alienation and moral and narrative confusion about the meaning of life and death 
(Trans. 2013). 
 Nassar also lists a number of features of thymic disorientation.  First, he notes 
the potential for a person to sense the presence of evil in or around him or her, and a 
constant fear of hell that he called “a darkness of space entering the soul” (Nassar, 
interview, 2015).  He teaches that this is especially likely to occur after a person 
commits an act against her or her own conscience.  After such an action, a person may 
feel that “an evil has claimed them” (Nassar, interview, 2015).  He or she will then 
likely cut himself or herself off from loving community, or feel as if loving community 
has been cut off from him or her because of the act that has been committed.  In his 
view, there are new meanings about the world that may arise in a person’s mind, which 
can take over the self, and encourage a belief that there is no goodness left in the world, 
and that “evil is in charge now” (Nassar, interview, 2015).  Again, Matta El Meskeen 
shares this view in his contemporary teaching, noticing that just as a person in the habit 
of scrupulously following his or her conscience may be refined to the point of choosing 
death over wrong action, the person who has engaged willingly in wrong action and 
who now suffers the aftermath of breaking conscience may prefer death to life for any 
number of reasons, and may even seem to experience a personal and active form of 
death within (Trans. 2013). 
These teachings of Nassar and Matta do provide an account for many of the 
phenomena experienced by veterans suffering self-horror at the perceived absorption of 
evil.  In Nassar’s particular view, this feature of CCAD is both a personal experience 
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for the veteran and a certain interpretive approach to that personal experience adopted 
by the veteran, usually in the chaos of shattered meaning following extreme adversity 
(interview, 2015).  The evil experienced by the veteran, therefore, is a voice added to a 
multiplicity of voices in his or her inner life, competing to assign meaning to the horrors 
he or she has committed or experienced (Nassar, interview, 2015).   
 Nassar also comments on certain forms of thymic disorientation he has 
encountered in his caregiving that are similar to the features of CCAD described in this 
thesis as conscious disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation and persistent, 
socially debilitating mistrust.  With regard to the former, he suggests that for adversity 
survivors such as combat veterans, it can seem that they have “withdrawn from love, or 
have banished it,” from their lives, both in community and in specific primary 
relationships (Nassar, interview, 2015).  The adversity survivor still wants to be loved, 
and senses that he or she needs love and needs to express love, but another part of him 
or her has banished love indefinitely - and in this state, he or she can feel “emotionally 
deadened” and disconnected from feeling (Nassar, interview, 2015).  The love of a 
caregiver of some kind, given patiently and steadily, can begin to recall the banished 
love of the injured person, in Nassar’s view, especially if the injured person’s voice of 
steady love can activate the banished part and encourage it to return (Nassar, interview, 
2015).  Nassar teaches that the part that has been banished but returns can sometimes be 
the center of a person’s ability to love, and can become realigned with thymos (Nassar, 
interview, 2015).  Similarly, Matta discusses the powerful potential for a caregiver to 
assume a position of love to call a person back from extreme forms of emotional and 
narrative fragmentation following betrayal, and to aid the the betrayed person forward 
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not only into a new trust of precious others but eventually a meaningful self-donation 
even towards strangers in need (2013). 
 With regard to complex mistrust, Nassar teaches that with damaged thymos, 
there is sometimes a deep grief that has dislocated thymic energy, and this may be 
connected a veteran’s experience of helplessness and vulnerability in combat that they 
cannot bear (Nassar, interview, 2015).  The inability of the adversity sufferer to 
recognize and fully accept his or her own vulnerability in a world where tragedies occur 
will, in Nassar’s view, necessitate their loss of trust, and this loss of trust can be so 
radical that he or she can no longer maintain personal relationships (Nassar, interview, 
2015).  Nassar teaches that, in his or her own time, a person must eventually be able to 
develop and demonstrate “an open reception of our powerlessness, [which might] 
eventually shatter the protective belief that one can remain invulnerable if one can only 
avoid ever trusting anyone again” (Nassar, interview, 2015).  Monk Evlogious, a current 
monastic leader in the Coptic desert tradition, teaches something similar, likening this 
process of learning to place trust in someone again after a radical sense of betrayal and 
resulting social disorientation to the process of a new existential birth (Trans. 2010).  
According to Evlogious, this process is conceived in connection with a determined and 
loving caregiver, and then can be nurtured collaboratively as trust grows larger and 
becomes capable of delivery and a new manner of life (Trans. 2010).  Both Nassar and 
Evlogious share an understanding of thymic disorientation that include themes of being 
alive and yet existentially dead after a great loss, and they also share the idea that a 
person in such a state can learn to existentially come alive again – concepts that are 
certainly reminiscent of Homeric writing on thymos. 
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Thymic Disorientation in the Contemporary Athonite Tradition 
 
Nektaria Dionysiou, a monastic leader in the Greek tradition, is of the desert line 
of the renowned contemporary teacher Aemilianos of the Simonopetra community on 
Mount Athos.  In her view, disorientation of thymos is a consequence of a person’s 
willing override of his or her capacity to discern right and wrong and pursue what is 
right (Dionysiou, interview, 2015).  After such an override, or a pattern of override, a 
person may lose the thymic capacity for moral discernment, and may then begin to 
experience enmity towards people and communities who shared his or her former sense 
of what is good, right, and true.  According to her teaching, thymic energy can then be 
mounted to fuel violent aggression towards himself or herself and anyone else he or she 
meets (Dionysiou, interview, 2015).  Archimandrite Dionysios, another member of the 
line of Aemilianos of Simonopetra, also discusses this phenomenon, and notes that this 
kind of aggression towards oneself and others is a continuation of a battle now turned 
against the world, in which a person seeks to protect the self which has been wounded 
by the pursuit of what he or she knows to be wrong by transforming social interactions 
into attacking skirmishes (2000).  From this position, Dionysios suggest that even 
though people in such situations may no longer need guns against physical enemies, 
they interact with others as if they need guns, because their often self-inflicted 
existential wounds and resulting fears are turned against everyone around them in 
murderous energy (2000). 
Like Dionysios, Dionysiou teaches that initial movement toward the override of 
thymic morality is often conceived by an attempt to avoid an extreme pain or grief 
(interview, 2015).  In the experience of a combat veteran, this movement could occur at 
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any time, because of the radical nature of pain and grief experienced in taking a life, in 
losing a comrade, and in facing constant fear.  In further concert with Dionysios, 
Nektaria Dionysiou’s line of teaching on philosophical anthropology argues that 
thymos, once disoriented, becomes invariably reactive, and remains in a defensive state 
towards all people and all, which can either take the form of extreme social and self-
directed aggression or extreme social withdrawal and self-alienation (interview, 2015).  
In her view, until a person with disoriented thymos can experience an inner thymic 
realignment with his or her capacity of reason, reversing the inner fragmentation, this 
pattern will endure.  She suggests that such a realignment must occur within the context 
of a healing relationship, in which the caregiver represents undefended, open love 
which enacts a restoration of trust and disables unbridled emotion and aggression 
(Dionysiou, interview, 2015).   Once the thymically disoriented person recognizes at 
length that their tendencies of extreme emotional reaction and tendencies of extreme 
motivational deregulation – whether towards aggression or withdrawal – do not draw a 
reaction from their loving caregiver, those patterns of defense can be brought into 
consideration and reflection, aligned with the capacity of reason, and a real encounter 
with oneself in the presence of the caregiver is possible (Dionysiou, interview, 2015).   
In Dionysiou’s view, irrational, uncontrollable anger can be one of a number of 
things that seem to “take over” a thymically disoriented person’s life, and they self-
identify with this new pattern of feeling and behavior (interview, 2015).  Joseph the 
Hesychast, a recently-deceased and still-renowned teacher of another Greek line from 
Mount Athos, supports this idea, teaching that in such a state not only is a person is cut 
off from the adaptive functioning of thymos, but he or she loses the ability to regulate it 
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completely, and becomes a sort of living thymic impulse aimed against anyone in sight 
(Trans. 1999).  From this position, Joseph further teaches that the humanity of the 
person himself or herself begins to become degraded, and the person begins to be 
existentially reduced to physiological impulses: “pounding heart, boiling blood, blurry 
thinking, and diffuse with indignation” and single-minded violent intent toward one’s 
neighbor (Moraitis, 2015, Loc. 1480).  In Dionysiou’s teaching, this phenomenon will 
persist until the care of a persistent, loving caregiver creates a “new possibility” for the 
injured person, as the caregiver fails to react to the adversity of attacks and withdrawals 
by the injured person in the way that the injured person had reacted to his or her own 
adversity (Dionysiou, interview, 2015).  In relation to the caregiver, the injured person 
becomes aware that he or she is not his or her anger, or withdrawal, or even the sense of 
evil that he or she feels has drawn close, and this disrupts a person’s identification with 
his or her own thymic disorientation, adding the chance for complexity, and a re-
visitation of meaning-making, where thymos and reason can realign.  
For Dionysiou, there is one more feature that is common to thymic 
disorientation, in her experience and practice: a scattering of attention that impacts the 
function of human reason, due to its misalignment with thymos (interview, 2015).  In 
her view, attention is lost when human reason is “pulled away” from thymic 
embodiment, and this enhances a person’s experience of himself or herself as 
“scattered” or “shattered” (Dionysiou, interview, 2015).  Because a person’s ability to 
make meaning of what has happened to him or her has often been challenged in a 
radical manner, there can sometimes be no “external constant” by which a person can 
try to repair his or her inner life (Dionysiou, interview, 2015).  If a person can become 
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connected with a loving caregiver, who is intact himself or herself, to some degree, then 
the injured person can sometimes relate to the caregiver as a new “external constant,” 
and can re-engage reason in order to examine himself of herself in relation to the other.  
In Dionysiou’s view, “once the external becomes constant, the injured person can begin 
to observe the pathos in himself without being his own pathos.  This will lessen the grip 
of the pathos, because the person is not blindly or automatically or in despair reacting to 
everything from the pathos” (Dionysiou, interview, 2015).  In her view, an inner 
examination can then become rhythmic, and an injured person can be aided in 
beginning the “daily watchfulness and moral struggle” that will reengage their capacity 
for thymic morality.  (Dionysiou, interview, 2015). 
Dionysiou also comments on a certain form of thymic disorientation she has 
encountered in her caregiving that is similar to the feature of CCAD described in this 
thesis as self-horror at the perceived absorption of evil.  She notes that this feature is  
“a special and rare one, which must be treated carefully and with unusual means.  
A person becomes overrun in conscience and then experiences [the sense of an] 
“unholy wedding” through the resulting complicity with evil.  This “wedding” 
accounts for the confusion, the sense that one does not belong to oneself, or can 
be hijacked, and so on” (Dionysiou, interview, 2015). 
 
In her view, the sense of the “evil” presence in thymically disoriented people is centered 
on some new meaning that has been made by the injured person in the midst of the 
adversity that called into question previously held meaning about the nature of life and 
the world (Dionysiou, interview, 2015).  This “new meaning” seals the injured person 
into a defensive position towards the world, and the defense is such that the particular 
meaning in question can be hidden and very resistant to being uncovered (Dionysiou, 
interview, 2015).  Until the injured person can be united with a caregiver that is able to 
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demonstrate consistent, selfless love that can encourage the defenses to recede slightly, 
so that the troubling “new meaning” can be located and addressed by both reason and 
an active thymos acting in alignment, the person will remain injured (Dionysiou, 
interview, 2015). 
 
Thymic Disorientation in the Contemporary Valaamite and Optina Traditions 
 
Mikhail Arkhangelskoye is a monastic leader in the Russian Valaamite tradition, 
and served as a monastic abbot in that tradition for many years.  In his appropriation of 
contemporary desert teaching, thymic disorientation may occur when a person 
intentionally – or potentially ignorantly – joins his or her will to something he or she 
knows to be wrong (Arkhangelskoye, interview, 2015).  Nikon of Optina, a renowned 
leader of the contemporary Russian Orthodox Optina tradition, supports 
Arkhangelskoye’s teaching, and adds that in this case there is a danger of the complete 
dissolution or loss of conscience, after which a person may no longer feel guilt, shame, 
or discomfort after acting against what he or she had ever before held to be right and 
just (Trans. 2009). 
Arkhangelskoye also considers it possible that a person may become thymically 
disoriented after witnessing what he or she senses to be a great evil, especially if it 
disrupts his or her way of understanding what is good, and there is a great loss or 
betrayal involved in the experience.  In his view, certain kinds of cultural conditioning 
can leave a person especially vulnerable to sustaining thymic damage (Arkhangelskoye, 
interview, 2015).  He gives a specific example for those who have been thymically 
disoriented in contemporary combat: 
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“It may happen that a person is culturally conditioned to comply with evil, such 
as we see today with youthful soldiers who have grown up on violent movies 
and video games, and who can’t wait to get into combat and kill an enemy.  
Once they actually enter into combat, they have no protection against the evil 
found in that place, and a reduced sense of the importance of humane war 
fighting.  It may be that they go into a frenzy in their killing, and may even feel 
joyful and fulfilled in their initial experience of killing.  In this case an injury 
can occur quickly, but it may take the soldier quite some time before they realize 
what they have done, and experience the pain and alienation of the inner 
fragmentation that has taken place” (Arkhangelskoye, interview, 2015). 
 
Arkhangelskoye has a wealth of experience with Western veterans who have come to 
him for care in the aftermath of war, and has noticed features of thymic disorientation 
that are similar the elements of CCAD described in this thesis as self-horror at the 
perceived absorption of evil, conscious disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation, 
and the radical dissolution of moral intuition and narrative coherence.  With regard to 
first of these elements, self-horror at the perceived absorption of evil, he suggests that 
this phenomenon is most likely associated with those who have perpetrated or complied 
in some way with actions or enterprises they know to be evil (Arkhangelskoye, 
interview, 2015).  His ideas are once again supported by the Optina teachers.  Nikon of 
Optina notes that it is possible for a person to know the right path and to act against it 
enough that he or she begins to feel a real sense of collaborating with what is evil 
(Trans. 2009).  He explains that while this felt sense of collaboration with evil may 
initially be troubling, in time a person may simply become indifferent to such a sense, 
in which case his actions become increasingly harmful to his personhood while he is 
increasingly unable to see the depths of such harm (Trans. 2009).  
Arkhangelskoye notes that, when this is indeed the case, it is important for a 
troubled person to collaborate closely with a caregiver to discern how conscious or 
intentional was the turning over of thymic morality in the evil act or enterprise that 
 196 
introduced the injury.  In his experience, the disorientation is more severe the more 
consciously the person gave himself or herself over during the act that precipitated the 
first major incident of collaboration with evil (Arkhangelskoye, interview, 2015).  The 
path forward, in his teaching, is “the path of binding the self together to face the full 
weight of what has been done, and to take as much responsibility as [one] can, until 
[one] can eventually take all of the responsibility, and begin to grieve with the aid of a 
caregiver” (Arkhangelskoye, interview, 2015).  In time even the joy and exhilaration 
present during the time of engagement in evil can be brought to mind, as reason and 
thymos reunite, and one can begin to reflect on what has been done without feeling 
“hijacked” (Arkhangelskoye, interview, 2015). 
 In terms of a conscious disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation, 
Arkhangelskoye suggests that this is often frustrated by depersonalization and 
dehumanization, speaking from a philosophical perspective.  If a person is preparing to 
override thymic morality, he or she may often dehumanize the people who will be 
involved in the evil action at hand – for instance, the people whom he or she will kill, or 
from whom he or she will steal, etc. (Arkhangelskoye, interview, 2015).  In this act, the 
ancient teaching is that one dehumanizes oneself in the process of dehumanizing the 
other, for instance becoming a “killing machine” or “stealing machine” who will kill or 
rob the “other object” – this is all preparation for thymic override, but the consequences 
in the aftermath can be an arrested state of dehumanization (Arkhangelskoye, interview, 
2015).  In such a state, a person may continue to lose feelings, sensations, and 
experiences that are often associated with being human, such as emotional resonance, 
empathy, simple joy, and the fulfillment that comes with philanthropy.  In 
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Arkhangelskoye’s view, this absence of felt experience and of human connection can 
only be regained by the reversal of the fragmentation of thymos and reason through the 
love of a caregiver who is patient and demonstrates steady, non-reactive care (interview, 
2015).  In such a situation, slowly affection can build between these two people that can 
serve as a new possibility for life in community.  If it is possible for the injured person 
to participated in hard physical labor and regular consultation with a caregiver, thoughts 
from the time of the development of the dehumanization will arise, and the caregiver 
can help the injured person make a different decision on how to view himself or herself 
and all other people, and can also encourage him or her towards acts of kindness and 
compassion towards others – even if there is no immediate emotional feeling behind 
such acts (Arkhangelskoye, interview, 2015).   
Anatoly Zertsalov, another renowned teacher in the Optina tradition, writes 
similarly about reorientation after dehumanizing oneself and others in the process of 
perpetrating acts of evil in the world (Trans. 1991).  He suggests that this reorientation 
is in essence a return to following conscience with courage, and that it often requires an 
integrated regimen of physical labor – which re-associates a disoriented person firmly 
within the body and the environment – along with guided acts of compassion and an 
intensive relationship to a seasoned caregiver (Zetsalov, Trans. 1991).  Arkhangelskoye 
insists that in time this can engage thymos in its moral, emotional, and action-oriented 
capacities, as well as work toward realignment with reason.  In his opinion, it is from a 
unity on all of these philosophical levels that sensations of peace, joy, and 
connectedness derive (Arkhangelskoye, interview, 2015). 
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 In discussing meaninglessness, Arkhangelskoye makes note of a possibility that 
is similar to the experience of Burgoyne and his companions, as described in Chapter 
Two of this thesis.  He notes that 
“Morality can become so disoriented as to lose all function and meaning, and 
especially in the presence of human slaughter.  If thymos is damaged, which for 
every human being holds a moral sense that naturally maintains a high view of 
human life, human life can become meaningless, and eventually a person 
develops a love of killing and contempt for the restraint.  If this new and 
“backwards” morality is held upon entry to combat, a long-lasting state of moral 
dissipation will ensue.  If, in another potentiality, a person enters into combat 
with a morality that is intact, it is possible that his moral awareness can be 
seared and blinded by the intensity of the visceral act of killing, especially if his 
comrades celebrate the act, and it seems to the soldier that his killing is a game 
which is to be reveled in.  A person can spiral into a moral free-fall after such an 
experience…” (Arkhangelskoye, interview, 2015). 
 
He continues on this topic, teaching that, from the teaching of the ancient desert 
tradition, once the moral aspect is separated from reason and “turned over” to evil, all 
moral sense can become silenced, especially if again and again one engages in the worst 
kinds of acts:  
“lustful passions can take over completely, and a person can become shameless.  
It is not perhaps possible for the inner moral voice to be completely silenced, but 
external and internal factors can combine.  So, a person engages in an atrocity, 
and they do it again and again.  Their inner voice grows weak and quiet.  But 
even when, in its weakness, it tries to speak, the person may fight to silence it, to 
avoid an inner tension (Arkhangelskoye, interview, 2015). 
 
This, for him, is one of the most difficult potentials for thymic disorientation, because a 
person’s entire personal and social life can crumble.  Anatoly Zertsalov also shares this 
as a primary concern for those whose moral intuition has been lost or damaged, noting 
that it will effect a disoriented person’s ability to remain engaged with elders who have 
either known them for a long time or who have suffered similar experiences in the past 
and survived (Trans. 1991).  Both Arkhangelskoye and Zertsalov agree that in time 
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what Arkhangelskoye describes as an “upside-down moral economy” can follow, in 
which “nothing means anything, and all things are permissible, and a man’s life has no 
value” (Arkhangelskoye, interview, 2015).  People in such a state are “sociopathic and 
spiritually deadened, and see people only in terms of utility – as objects”  
(Arkhangelskoye, interview, 2015).   These are the people that Zertsalov calls “dead in 
spirit,” who are consumed with their thoughts but disconnected to reality, and who are 
fainthearted and unable to struggle for anything they previously believed was important, 
right, or true (Trans. 1991, eLoc 897). 
 
Summarizing the Contributions of the “Modern Desert Teaching”  
 
Like the teachings of both the Golden Age Philosophers and the Philosophers of 
Late Antiquity, the primary contribution of the Modern Desert Fathers and Mothers to a 
diachronic understanding of thymic disorientation is a clear continuation of the concept 
of thymos, and its appropriation and expansion in contemporary times.  In examining 
the three examples of Modern Desert teaching listed in this chapter, proceeding from 
the Syrian, Athonite, and Valaamite traditions, at least three further contributions of 
inestimable value have emerged.  First, the Syrian tradition provides a nuanced 
understanding of the impact of grief as a possible trigger for thymic disorientation, 
which can lead to a person’s eventual loss of emotional, aggressive, and moral 
functioning.  This follows themes from Homer and Maximos, as Homer often portrayed 
thymic disorientation in characters who suffered the loss of a loved one or comrade in 
battle, and Maximos taught about a chain reaction that begins with an extreme 
emotional experience and can eventually lead to the breakdown of thymic functioning 
on all levels.  In addition, the Syrian tradition provides an understanding of this process 
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after grief that provides descriptive accounts similar to the CCAD-related accounts of 
persistent, socially debilitating mistrust, absurd meaningless, and conscious disconnect 
from emotion and bodily sensation. 
Secondly, the Athonite tradition provides an extension of Gregory of Nyssa’s 
teaching on watchfulness, and relates the potential for thymically disoriented people to 
lose the ability to reflect and make sense of their thoughts, feelings and behaviors.  This 
lack of ability for insight leaves a person in a state of increasingly defensive reactivity, 
which can in turn lead to emotional instability, extreme moral confusion, and the 
deregulation of the thymic function of instinctive motivation, which, as Homer depicted, 
leads either to uncontrollable aggression or a radical loss of vitality.  The Athonite 
tradition uses this lens – along with others – to make descriptive accounts of the radical 
dissolution of moral intuition and narrative coherence, complex mistrust, conscious 
disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation, and lustful, uncontrollable rage. 
Third, the Valaamite tradition presents an important perspective on cultural 
conditioning in thymic development, thymic protection, and thymic disorientation.  
When entering into situations that can be extremely confusing and potentially traumatic, 
it is important that people prepare to protect themselves as much as possible for the evil, 
loss and death that can take place.  When they are not prepared – or worse, if they have 
been prepared by being taught to embrace the evil, loss, and death in such a place, they 
are far more likely to commit acts which will quickly disorient them thymically.  In such 
cases, they may lose the ability to know and do good moving forward, and may 
experience a type of evil in or around them.  This has elements of Platonic teaching on 
thymos, in the focus on dogmatically embracing the good and the ideal, even in times of 
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great adversity.  It also provides some clear descriptions of self-horror at the perceived 
absorption of evil and the radical dissolution of moral intuition and narrative coherence. 
 
An Ancient Philosophical Concept Applied to Contemporary Social Care? 
 Having examined in a diachronic manner the continuation and organic 
development of the philosophical concept of thymos and it potential for disorientation 
into contemporary usage, it has been made clear that Homer’s ancient use of the 
concept of thymos, an extremely innovative appropriation of which Shay placed at the 
center of his theory of moral injury, has in fact endured in a context related to Homer’s 
original anthropological assumptions for nearly 29 centuries.  If Shay’s usage of the 
concept, born in his discovery of a connection between Homer’s war narratives and the 
narratives of his own clients and yet developed through a radical departure from 
Homer’s original philosophical context, has become what some of the foremost experts 
in veteran trauma care consider to be a strongly useful paradigm in care to veterans with 
extreme features similar to those described in the accounts of CCAD, how much more 
useful might be a usage of the concept that represents an organic appropriation passed 
down from generation to generation, in systems retaining much of Homer’s original 
anthropological presuppositions, by caregivers who even today are a part of caring for 
veterans of contemporary warfare (Drescher, Foy, Kelly, Lashner, Schutz & Litz, 
2011)?  In answering this question, it may be important to develop a full summary of 
the latter’s ability to offer a coherent and exhaustive picture of CCAD, and to compare 
this picture to CCAD in a systematic way, element by element.  For the sake of 
discussion, it will be useful to label this coherent and exhaustive diachronic picture of 
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thymic disorientation, so that an orderly comparative analysis may be completed.  For 
that purpose, this thesis will use the term combat activated thymic disorientation, or 
CATD.  This term privileges Papadopoulos’ terminology of adversity activation, but 
retains the word ‘combat’ in order to provide a continued focus on the specific type of 
adversity that is the subject of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 7 
  
CCAD & COMBAT ACTIVATED THYMIC DISORIENTATION 
 
 
 It is indeed possible to examine adversity-activated thymic disorientation from 
the standpoint of a diachronic view of its meaning and development from the time of 
Homer until the present day, and this possibility has been demonstrated at length in the 
previous chapter.  Before comparing the phenomenon of Combat Activated Thymic 
Disorientation with the phenomenon of Complex Combat Activated Disorientation, it is 
important to summarize the former, by way of synthesizing concepts from the writings 
of the philosophers and teachers of the previous two chapters.  This summary will take 
place in three parts: (1) what evidences a healthy thymos, (2) how CATD occurs, and 
(3) what evidences a disoriented thymos. 
 
What Evidences a Healthy Thymos 
 
 From a diachronic perspective, a healthy thymos is one that allows a person to 
maintain a connection with reason in his or her emotional life, allowing him or her to 
experience joy, sorrow, sympathy, disappointment, and pleasure concurrent with a 
capacity for reflection that helps them make meaning of their emotional experiences and 
also guides their emotional expression.  Homer, Plato, Aristotle, Maximos, and John of 
Damascus each speak about this in some way, as highlighted in the previous two 
chapters.  Each of these teachers also mentioned that a healthy thymos would be 
evidenced by a person’s ability to engage or commit to people around them in trust and 
love, and to engage reason in order to help regulate potentially incendiary emotions like 
despair, rage, and infatuation.  Plato, John of Constantinople, John Cassian, and John of 
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Damascus each mentioned that a healthy thymos enables a person to experience regret 
and, with the help of reason, to make use of regret in effecting positive life changes.  
The dominant concepts in emotional health from a thymic perspective, then, are positive 
community engagement and continued connection to reason. 
 A healthy thymos is also demonstrated, from a diachronic point of view, by the 
exercise of inner vitality under control, allowing a person to move into action towards 
his or her highest ideals of what is good, and to refrain from action towards what is not 
good.  Homer, Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, Evagrius, and John Cassian were each 
credited in the previous two chapters with the idea that that keeping thymic vitality 
under control is a consequence of the process of inner watchfulness, which happens in 
conjunction with reason.  Plato, Aristotle, Evagrius, Maximos, John Cassian, and John 
of Damascus each mentioned in some way that the most dangerous threat to 
maintaining watchfulness over the thymic capacity for motivation and aggression is 
when a person’s physical self, loved ones, or deep interests are threatened, because a 
person is most likely in those situations to quiet reason and act without its help or 
restraint.  For Homer, Aristotle, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Evagrius, and 
Maximos, this process can be discussed with the use of moral language; each of them in 
some way treated action towards the good with the use of restraint as a type of courage, 
and inaction towards the good – or action without restraint – as types of cowardice.  In 
addition to this concept of reason ideally guiding and restraining the thymic capacity of 
human aggression, a diachronic view also contains the opposite potential.  Plato, 
Aristotle, Evagrius, Maximus, and Dionysiou each were mentioned in the previous 
chapter as having noticed that when a person becomes persuaded by reason to move in a 
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direction that seems wrong to the moral capacity of thymos, the motivational capacity of 
thymos can demonstrate healthy functioning by overriding reason, providing inertia 
against movement towards what is not good and exercising implacability, stubbornness, 
and resoluteness.  Thymic health, then, as demonstrated in its capacity for instinctive 
motivation, is marked once again by a connection with reason, which in this case helps 
a person regulate aggressive impulses toward what is not good, protects a person against 
being hijacked by disoriented directions from reason, and protects a person against 
inappropriate or unrestrained energy towards what is good. 
 Lastly, a healthy thymos is demonstrated, from a diachronic point of view, by a 
disciplined observance of following moral intuition.  In the previous two chapters, 
Homer, Plato, Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, Maximos, and Mikhail Arkhangelskoye 
were each credited in some way for describing thymic moral intuition as a separate 
process from moral reasoning, but as one which ideally functions in tandem with moral 
reasoning.  Each of these teachers also noted that a healthy thymic moral intuition, when 
joined with reason, serves to both discern the right action and to activate the thymic 
capacity for motivation towards that right action.  When thymos is functioning ideally in 
tandem with moral reasoning, a person is able to sense even in times of adversity the 
boundaries of right action, and also to discern which action to take inside of those 
boundaries. 
 
 
What Evidences a Disoriented Thymos 
 
 Having examined the summary evidence of a healthy thymos, it will now be 
helpful to examine the summary evidence of a disoriented thymos.  Since it has been 
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clearly established that thymic disorientation can originate in any of the three capacities 
of thymos, it follows that the features of CATD can be discussed in terms of their 
appearance in each capacity, and that these appearances can be triangulated to describe 
CATD as a whole.  This will be accomplished once again by making use of a diachronic 
synthesis of teaching on thymos and its potential for lost function. 
 In terms of disorientation in the emotional capacity of thymos, two main features 
are commonly present, and have been evident in the previous two chapters of this 
thesis: (1) a complex fear that results in the loss of ability to trust in oneself and others, 
leading to a breakdown in social functioning, and (2) a loss of connection with one’s 
own felt sensations and emotional life, leading to an experience of self-alienation and 
inner deadness.  Beginning with the first feature, Plato and Aristotle were each 
mentioned in the previous chapter as teaching that thymic emotion, which, when 
correctly oriented, provides the foundation for trust, peacefulness, harmonious 
interaction, and loving care, is easily distorted when the thymos is disoriented, and 
instead generates feelings of mistrust, hatred, and violent feelings towards oneself and 
one’s community.  Yousef Nassar, Matta El Meskeen, and Monk Evlogious were noted 
in the previous chapter as teaching that this kind of disorientation will also likely feature 
an inability to bear helplessness and vulnerability, and can be so radical that a person 
can no longer maintain any relationships that require a degree of trust.  Mikhail 
Arkhangelskoye added that since the disorientation of thymic emotion usually begins 
with a powerful loss or betrayal, whether set in motion by another person or by oneself, 
there are often experiences of pointed bitterness at either oneself or authority figures.  
The diachronic view of this feature, evident even in Homer’s work, is one in which a 
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person who has suffered a great adversity can no longer allow himself or herself to be 
entrusted to anyone else, for fear of experiencing loss and betrayal on the same scale 
again.  At the same time there develops painful feelings of hateful rage and bitterness 
towards oneself and others that often drives a person simultaneously into both alienation 
from any supportive community and self-alienation. 
 The second feature, described as a sense of lost emotional connection with one’s 
social environment, when viewed from a diachronic perspective, also dates to Homer’s 
work.  In the chapter in this thesis dedicated to Homeric teaching on thymos, evidence 
was given on Homer’s observation that some warriors who experience great loss in 
battle experience a sense of emotional deadening afterwards, and may be unable to 
access passion and to sustain feelings normally associated with interpersonal 
relationships.  In the following chapter, Yousef Nassar and Monk Evlogious were 
credited with the teaching that some extreme adversity survivors such as combat 
veterans often withdraw from community life upon homecoming, especially if they 
have become emotionally disoriented through the loss of a comrade, in order to create a 
distance from the possibility of losing more friends or loved ones due to events beyond 
their control.  In such cases, they noticed that these veterans may often sense that they 
have become “emotionally deadened” and disconnected from feelings of emotional 
closeness when coming back into contact with people or places that were previously 
important to them.  In addition, Mikhail Arkhangelskoye was mentioned in the last 
chapter as teaching that if thymic disorientation has occurred after an action that 
depended on an advanced dehumanization of a rival or opponent, the ancient teaching 
suggests that the disoriented person may himself or herself experience a type of self-
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depersonalization, in which he or she may lose and continue to lose feelings, sensations, 
and experiences that are often associated with being human, such as emotional 
resonance, empathy, simple joy, and the fulfillment that comes with philanthropy.   
 CATD becoming evident in the capacity of emotion, then, may present as a clear 
and painful change in a person’s ability to trust himself or herself, or to trust others with 
whom he or she was close before exposure to adversity.  This mistrust can grow, from a 
diachronic view of thymic disorientation, to encompass all of a person’s relationships, 
including distant or formal relationships to anyone in authority, and anyone in a helping 
role in the community.  CATD may also present in the loss of a person’s ability to 
remain emotionally connected with his or her social environment, beginning with the 
people with whom the person was most close at the time previous to exposure to 
adversity, and potentially expanding into all community relationships.  
In terms of CATD becoming evident in the aggressive capacity of thymos, or the 
capacity for instinctive motivation to action, once again two main features are 
commonly present, and have been evident in the previous two chapters of this thesis: (1) 
an over-regulation of the aggressive instinct, leading to a lost sense of inner vitality, and 
(2) an under-regulation of the aggressive instinct, leading to a tendency towards 
extremely aggressive behavior and even violent action which a person cannot easily 
control.  According to Homer, Plato, John of Constantinople, Evagrius, Maximos, John 
Cassian, and Mikhail Arkhangelskoye, the most common precondition for either over-
regulation or under-regulation is a situation in which a person is engaged in heated 
action, when strenuous physical force or effort is involved in the action, and when a 
person is not able to maintain watchfulness over his or her own aggressive instincts.   
 209 
Beginning with the overregulation, Homer, Plato, John of Constantinople, 
Evagrius, Maximos, and John Cassian each were referenced in the previous two 
chapters as teaching that once human persons become disoriented in thymos, and 
especially if they have been engaged in aggressive action during the adversity that 
contributed to their disorientation, they may feel as if their inner motivation to act has 
been disconnected or disabled, leaving them unable to respond quickly to future threats, 
and even effecting a feeling of deadness.  Further, John of Constantinople, Evagrius, 
Maximos and John Cassian were each noted in some way as mentioning that there may 
appear to be a delay between rational decision-making and motivation to act after 
thymic disorientation, especially if the disorientation occurred after a person acted to 
override their moral intuition.  In such cases, each of these four teachers were shown to 
agree that a person with disoriented thymos can feel like his or her embodied impulses 
are estranged from rational processes and he or she may experience a diminished ability 
to pair action with reflection.  
 In addition, Nektaria Dionysiou and Archimandrite Dionysios were mentioned 
in the last chapter as teaching that if thymic disorientation has occurred after an 
aggressive action that depended on an override of moral intuition, and especially if this 
action has resulted in the death or extreme injury of another person, the offender may 
condemn himself or herself to a kind of living experience of death, in which by self-
punishment he or she wishes to die, not being able to find another way to face what he 
or she has done.  This is similar to Plato’s mentioning of the intent to self-harm during 
thymic disorientation in the previous chapter, in which he also noted a parallel potential 
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– that a person disoriented in this way may experience an inability to motivate himself 
or herself in response to any positive idea or ideal. 
 The second feature evidencing thymic disorientation that may present in the 
capacity for motivation to action also originates in the writings of Homer, and was first 
mentioned in the chapter of this thesis dedicated to his ideas of thymos.  However, it 
was also present in the chapter following, through the teachings of Plato, Evagrius, 
Maximos, and John Cassian.  Each of these five philosophers were mentioned as 
teaching that, when thymically disoriented, a person can be overcome with patterns of 
aggression that can rage explosively, leading to animal-like actions that evidence little 
or no regard for humane considerations.  According to both Plato and Evagrius, as noted 
in the previous chapter, this rage will most often be directed at anything which threatens 
or disrupts access to a person’ most powerful desires in any given moment, and often 
functions without reflection or moral hesitation.   
Plato, John of Constantinople, and John Cassian were each credited in the 
previous chapter as also noting that under-regulation of the aggressive function can in 
some cases turn inward, presenting as self-hatred with impulses towards self-harm and 
suicide.  Yousef Nassar and Matta El Meskeen were credited as noting that when the 
extreme aggression is turned inward, a person may either intentionally or unwittingly be 
trying to destroy what is left of his or her own moral sense or emotional capacity in 
order to quiet a painful underlying conflict, especially if he or she has committed an act 
of inhumanity.  Yousef Nassar, Nektaria Dionysiou, and Joseph the Hesychast 
mentioned that perhaps the most painful potentiality of thymic disorientation as 
presented in the aggressive capacity is that a disoriented person might identify 
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completely at some point with his or her rage, and willingly follows its lead without 
dissent, no matter where it is directed. 
CATD becoming evident in the capacity of instinctive motivation to action, 
then, may present as an apparent over-regulation of the aggressive instinct.  This may 
result in a lost sense of vitality, and disconnectedness between one’s ability to make 
decisions and one’s ability to respond with action.  A person may also find it difficult to 
pair action and reflection, and may experience a sense of inner deadening in terms of 
motivation.  Conversely, it may also present as an apparent under-regulation of the 
aggressive instinct.  This may result in a lost ability to control oneself when the instinct 
toward aggression is activated, leaving the person in a position where violent rage can 
seem to take over the self, following powerful desires without easy ability to be checked 
by reflection or inner moral feedback.  In both cases, a person is prone to feel impulses 
towards self-harm or suicide. 
In terms of CATD becoming evident in the thymic capacity for moral intuition, 
two main features are commonly present, and have been evident in the previous two 
chapters of this thesis: (1) an unusual form of meaninglessness, in which a person can 
no longer make meaning of the events of his or life, and (2) a sense of the perceived 
absorption of evil or complicity with evil in one’s environment.  Beginning with the 
first feature, Homer, Plato, Aristotle, Evagrius, Maximos, and John Cassian each were 
referenced in the previous two chapters as teaching that thymic disorientation can often 
present as a lack of proper moral engagement, or more specifically, a person’s lack of 
ability to engage circumstances from a moral position.  Each of these six philosophers 
taught that this particular feature is most likely to be presented after a person overrides 
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moral intuition and engages in an action that he or she believes to be deeply wrong, and 
each of them suggested that after such an action a person can experience an erosion of 
the ability to discern right action either by intuition or reasoning.  In the chapter of this 
thesis dedicated to his ideas on thymos, Homer was credited with the idea that as a 
person progresses in this condition of moral disorientation, he or she may have 
difficulty maintaining a sense of coherent meaning in the world as a whole, and can 
experience a collapse of his or her ability to function in society, as moral norms seem to 
be arbitrary and can become easy to transgress.  Aristotle, Evagrius, Maximos, John 
Cassian, and Nektaria Dionysiou were each credited in the following chapter with a 
similar idea, and each of the five of them also in some way noted a potential for the 
breakdown or scattering of a person’s ability to make meaning of his or her own 
experiences in life in general, the diminishment of a person’s ability for self-reflection, 
and the inability to integrate one’s experiences into a coherent narrative whole. 
In the previous chapter, Mikhail Arkhangelskoye and Nikon of Optina were 
mentioned as teaching that thymic morality can become so disoriented after a person 
either joins his or her will to something he or she knows to be wrong – or else witnesses 
what he or she senses to be a great evil – that it can eventually lead to the loss of all 
moral functioning, and can activate a sense that life is meaningless.  They also warned 
that, alternatively, a person’s moral intuition may be reduced to an impulse to fulfill his 
or her strongest desire at any given moment, at which point he or she may appear to 
pursue as good any number of things that his or her society as a whole views as wrong – 
for instance developing a high view of killing and a contemptuous response to ideas 
such as restraint on humanitarian grounds.  Arkhangelskoye and Anatoly Zertsalov 
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mentioned that, in either case, one of the most common outcomes of such a moral 
disorientation is a situation in which a person lives as if common moral ideas are 
ultimately meaningless, making it almost impossible for a person to live in society. 
The second feature of thymic disorientation that may become evident in the 
capacity for moral intuition was insinuated by Homer, and later treated directly by 
Plato.  In the previous chapter of this thesis, Plato was mentioned as teaching that once 
a person’s desire for his or her highest ideals is compromised, he or she may first pursue 
lesser things, but eventually will experience a drive for things that are antithetical to his 
or her highest ideals, culminating in the willing practice of evil.  Evagrius and John of 
Constantinople both were mentioned in the same chapter as teaching that when a person 
overrides his or her moral intuition, and acts aggressively against his or her own sense 
of right and wrong, that it is likely for such a person to begin to do things he or she 
believes to be evil, and to begin cooperating with acts of evil that are occurring in his or 
her social environment. 
Yousef Nassar was mentioned as teaching that after intense combat action, a 
veteran might feel as if the inhumanity experienced in the midst of war can has become 
attached to him or her in some way, and can seem to speak out to him or her from 
within and accuse him or her of being evil.  In agreement with Matta El Meskeen, he 
also taught that this internalization of what was present in the pain and chaos of extreme 
adversity can distort the moral voice of thymos, and can encourage a person to over-
identify with the worst things he or she saw and witnessed.  Nektaria Dionysiou’s 
teaching on the matter, as recorded in the previous chapter, was similar, in that she 
mentioned the potential for a thymically disoriented person to sense that he or she has 
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had a personal encounter with something evil and that the evil has become attached to 
him or her.  For Nektaria Dionysiou, this phenomenon may become evident in a 
person’s frantic self-isolation from all loved ones, as the person attempts to shield loved 
ones from the evil he or she experiences to be present in or around him or her.  In that 
same chapter, Mikhail Arkhangelskoye and Anatoly Zertsalov mentioned that this 
phenomenon is most likely associated with those who have actively and consciously 
complied in some way with actions or enterprises they know to be evil, and noted that 
the sense of having internalized something evil is more severe the more consciously the 
person gave himself or herself over in the moment to an evil act, having overridden 
moral intuition.  
CATD becoming evident in the capacity of moral intuition, then, may present as 
either an unusual form of meaninglessness, or as a sense that one has become identified 
with an evil that was present in the midst of one’s experience of adversity.  A person 
may have trouble engaging his or her ability to reflect on past actions, and may have 
difficulty assigning meaning to events that have happened to him or her.  He or she may 
also have difficulty categorizing events and actions along moral lines, and may find 
existing moral codes – even those previously present in his or her own social and moral 
development – to be arbitrary and empty.  When sensing that one has become attached 
to evil, or has even become evil oneself, through participation in actions that one 
believes to be morally wrong, intense self-fear or self-loathing may ensue.  All of these 
features may result in a painful breakdown in social relationships. 
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Transitioning to a Comparison of CATD and CCAD 
Having now summarized CATD from a diachronic view of its meaning and 
development from the time of Homer until the present day, by way of synthesizing 
concepts from the writings of the philosophers and teachers of the previous two 
chapters, this thesis has generated a concise picture of what evidences a healthy thymos 
and what evidences a disoriented thymos.  By doing so, this thesis has made it possible 
to examine the five elements of Complex Combat Activated Disorientation from the 
standpoint of the ancient but still living philosophical concept of thymos, represented by 
CATD.  After that examination, which will be undertaken directly, it will be further 
possible to meaningfully assert whether or not CATD provides a more adequate 
approach to CCAD than either the psychiatric or moral injury paradigms. 
 
Approaching CCAD from the Perspective of CATD 
 In order to attempt to approach CCAD from the perspective of CATD, each of 
the five elements of CCAD will be listed in the order in which they were first treated in 
Chapter Two: (1) self-horror at the perceived absorption of evil, (2) chronic, conscious 
disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation, (3) persistent, socially debilitating 
mistrust, (4) the radical dissolution of moral intuition and narrative coherence, and (5) 
uncontrollable, lustful rage.  Each will be examined in turn from a diachronic 
perspective of thymic disorientation, using the summary evidence for healthy and 
unhealthy thymos as outlined earlier in this chapter.  At the end of this examination, it 
will be possible to comment on the ability of CATD to adequately capture the 
complexity, uniqueness, and totality of the features of CCAD. 
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Self-Horror at the Perceived Absorption of Evil 
 In Chapter Two, the narrative accounts of veterans such as Tim Segrest, John 
Wolfe, D. C. Hoop, Nathan Everly, Harold Miller, and a soldier named Lois each 
detailed distinct experiences in which, during or after exposure to extreme adversity in a 
combat environment, they gained a connection with something they considered to be 
evil or monstrous.  This connection has caused them to mistrust or loathe themselves, 
and to isolate themselves from their loved ones for fear of passing on the evil, or hurting 
them in some way.  Some seemingly connected features of this phenomenon include 
impulses towards homicide and suicide, painful identification with monstrous images or 
memories, and a sense of having been overtaken by evil and being no longer in control. 
A diachronic view of thymic disorientation does indeed address this element of 
CCAD. It has been summarized in this chapter that Homer, Plato, Evagrius, John of 
Constantinople, Yousef Nassar, Matta El Meskeen, Monk Evlogious, Nektaria 
Dionysiou, and Mikhail Arkhangelskoye each discussed just such a phenomenon as 
self-horror at the perceived absorption of evil, and considered it to be a feature of 
thymic disorientation presenting in the thymic capacity of moral intuition.  In this 
summary, such disorientation was described to be evident in the development of a sense 
that one has become attached to evil after exposure to adversity, or has even become 
evil oneself, through either intentional or unintentional participation in actions that one 
believes to be morally wrong.  It was noticed that, in such cases, a person may 
experience intense self-fear or self-loathing, and may forcefully isolate himself or 
herself from important relationships, to protect love ones from the evil now residing 
within – all key descriptions of the element of CCAD under examination. 
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Indeed, in Chapter Two of this thesis, each one of the veterans experiencing 
self-horror at the perceived absorption of evil described the process by which they 
became intentional or unintentional participants in extreme actions that they believed to 
be morally wrong.  Tim Segrest and Harold Miller both described a certain moment in 
the war where he began to enjoy killing.  John Wolfe described the process of 
witnessing seemingly meaningless acts of violence in war, including the mutilation of a 
young boy.  Lois experienced a rape at the hands of her comrades while in a combat 
environment.  Nathan began to feel disdain for human beings, seeing them only as 
bodies, and treating them as such.  Each of these veterans clearly regrets what has 
happened to them, or what they have done in combat, and they have each experienced a 
clear feeling of the perceived absorption of evil ever since the time of these events, 
which is in line with the teaching of philosophers dealing with the concept of thymos, as 
presented in the previous two chapters. 
 
Conscious Disconnect from Emotion and Bodily Sensation 
 The narrative accounts of veterans such as Jim, Art, John, Dan, Scott and Tim 
presented in the section of Chapter Two addressing chronic, conscious disconnect from 
emotion and bodily sensation describe a situation in which veterans develop a sense of 
extreme emptiness or ghost-likeness, leaving them unable to connect with other people 
in meaningful ways and unable to access the inner vitality that makes life seem 
interesting, beautiful, and worth living.  This loss of feeling alive, combined with a 
sense of not being whole, leaves them without a felt connection to themselves, the 
world, and the circumstances of their lives.  They feel haunted, feel distant from the 
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center of themselves, and desperately long to become whole again.  Their experiences 
seem to describe an intense experience of alienation of which they are acutely aware in 
the present, and which causes them not only great suffering, but a sense of the painful 
dissolution of their personalities. 
 A diachronic view of thymic disorientation does also address this element of 
CCAD, and in two parts, potentially developing and becoming evident in two different 
capacities of thymic functioning.  First, it was summarized earlier in this chapter that 
Homer, Yousef Nassar, and Mikhail Arkhangelskoye each discussed the potential for a 
particular type of disorientation to occur in the emotional capacity of thymos, resulting 
in a loss of connection with one’s own embodied sensations and emotional life, leading 
to an experience of self-alienation and a sense of inner deadness.  It was suggested that 
this potential was most likely to occur in combat veterans who have experienced the 
following circumstances: (1) a betrayal by a leader or close comrade in combat, (2) the 
loss of one or more leaders or comrades to whom they were very close, or (3) an 
advanced dehumanization of the enemy.  Indeed, a number of the veterans listed in 
Chapter Two as experiencing this element of CCAD did seem to experience one or 
more of the circumstances listed under CATD as common pre-dispositions for the 
disorientation of thymic emotion.  Jim expressed sentiments suggesting that he had 
dehumanized the enemy, and also a sense that his leaders had lied to him about the 
meaning of war.  Tim claimed to have been ordered to shoot a little girl, which again 
suggests both leadership betrayal and dehumanization, and since that time has 
experienced a persistent feeling of emotional deadness. 
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 Secondly, it was summarized earlier in this chapter that Homer, Plato, John of 
Constantinople, Evagrius, Maximos, and John Cassian each were referenced in the 
previous two chapters as teaching that once a person becomes disoriented in the thymic 
capacity for instinctive motivation to action, they may feel as if their inner motivation to 
act has been disconnected or disabled, leaving them unable to respond quickly to future 
threats, and even effecting a feeling of inner deadness.  It was suggested that this 
potential is most likely to occur when embodied impulses are estranged from rational 
processes after the capacity for reason overrides moral intuition in order to accomplish 
something a person feels to be wrong.  In such cases, and especially cases in which the 
immoral action has resulted in the death or extreme injury of another person, a summary 
of CATD suggested that the offender may attempt to condemn himself or herself to a 
kind of living experience of death, in which by self-punishment he or she wishes to die, 
not being able to find another way to face what he or she has done.  Once again, there is 
some connection with at least one of the veteran accounts that were related in Chapter 
Two, in the section on chronic, conscious disconnect from emotion and bodily 
sensation.  Harold Miller claimed to have done things in combat for which he could 
never forgive himself, but over which he felt great exhilaration at the time, evidencing 
an internal sense that he had gone against what he believed to be right in order to act in 
a certain manner in combat.  After that point – and until today – he has had trouble 
feeling connected with his own embodied sensations.  In addition, some of his recorded 
comments in that section suggested a kind of self-imposed social death penalty for his 
actions, as he argues that he should not be allowed to get close to anyone else, or to feel 
for anyone else in the way that he did before the war.  
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 In general, it should be concluded that the various aspects of conscious 
disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation mentioned in the accounts of veterans in 
Chapter Two are indeed accounted for by a diachronic view of thymic disorientation, 
and bear remarkable resemblance to the teaching of the philosophers who have been 
informed by the ancient metaphysical concept of thymos.  In addition, CATD gives 
some insight into two potential origins of this element of CCAD, and the way each 
origin impacts a certain function of thymos.  CATD also provides some insight into pre-
existing circumstances that might aid entry into disorientation under conditions of 
extreme adversity. 
 
Persistent, Socially Debilitating Mistrust 
The narrative accounts of veterans such as Richard Howard, Nathan Everly, 
Cantrell and Dean’s special forces soldier, and John Needham, as presented in the 
section of Chapter Two addressing persistent, socially debilitating mistrust, describe a 
situation in which veterans experience an enduring and debilitating sense of mistrust 
after their experiences in combat, leaving them unable to rely on any way of making 
sense of the experiences of their lives or entering into and maintaining meaningful 
relationships.  In some cases this mistrust predisposed them to dangerous and unusual 
patterns of social interaction, from homicidal thoughts and actions to extreme sensitivity 
to any claims of support or authoritative positioning from caregivers.   
A diachronic view of thymic disorientation does also address this element of 
CCAD.  Earlier in this chapter it was summarized that Homer, Plato, Aristotle, Yousef 
Nassar, and Mikhail Arkhangelskoye each discussed just such a phenomenon as 
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persistent, socially debilitating mistrust, and considered it to be a feature of thymic 
disorientation presenting in the thymic capacity of emotion.  The diachronic view of this 
feature suggests that such extreme mistrust is most likely to develop when (1) a warrior 
is exposed to an unbearable emotional experience in combat such as the loss of a close 
comrade or a leadership betrayal, (2) a warrior’s develops a deep emotional attachment 
to something that is either evil in itself or else draws the warrior towards privileging it 
above human relationships, and the warrior himself becomes a betrayer of his comrades, 
or (3) a warrior’s frustrated desire to be respected by his leaders and comrades or to 
prove his worth is frustrated, and he instead turns on them, becoming a betrayer.  In any 
of these cases, the central accelerant towards thymic disorientation is either the radical 
loss of a leader or comrade or an act of betrayal in one direction or the other.  Viewing 
this situation from the standpoint of CATD, once veterans have suffered a great 
adversity of this kind they can no longer allow themselves to be entrusted to anyone 
else again – or even to be entrusted to themselves – for fear of experiencing loss and 
betrayal on the same scale again.  At the same time there develops painful feelings of 
hateful rage and bitterness towards oneself and others that often drives a person 
simultaneously into both alienation from any supportive community and self-alienation. 
This does connect with the experiences of the veterans as recounted in Chapter 
Two.  Richard Howard was described as extremely frustrated in his attempt to prove 
himself in battle, and his social relationships deteriorated progressively.  He was 
described as turning his energy against his own comrades, then isolating himself, then 
beginning to aggressively challenge his leaders, and eventually to not trusting anyone 
and engaging in paranoid behavior.  Nathan Everly returned from combat feeling 
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neglected and mistreated by his leaders, and feeling betrayed by comrades both in 
combat and after returning home.   As described in Chapter Two, he now feels fearful to 
extend trust to anyone in relationships, and often displays bizarre behavior aimed at 
dominating and controlling others.  John Needham saw war crimes in his time in 
combat that seemed to be condoned by his leadership, and felt both betrayed by them 
and powerless to stop them.  Upon homecoming, he isolated himself from anyone who 
claimed to ant to help or protect him, and eventually completed suicide.  Each of these 
combat veterans has experienced an element of CCAD that is accounted for by CATD, 
and in fact both the pre-conditions suggested by CATD and the common features listed 
by CATD have closely described their experiences. 
 
The Radical Dissolution of Moral Intuition and Narrative Coherence  
The narrative accounts of veterans such as Mac, Martinez, Burgoyne, Edward 
Tick’s My Lai veteran, and Richard Howard, as presented in the section of Chapter Two 
addressing the element of CCAD labeled as the radical dissolution of moral intuition 
and narrative coherence, describe a situation in which veterans seem to first experience 
a significant break from the valuing of human life in combat, and then secondly present 
a kind of radical and enduring loss in the ability to understand right and wrong from 
almost any perspective.  In these situations, society’s expectations of humane behavior 
can seem to them to be irrelevant or absurd, and they can find themselves unwittingly 
breaking moral codes without any kind of inner pause or ability to engage in reflection.  
Each of the veterans in Chapter Two were exposed to intense and extreme combat, and 
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each seemed to receive mixed messages from leadership on what is and is not 
acceptable behavior in war.  
A diachronic view of thymic disorientation does also address this element of 
CCAD.  Earlier in this chapter it was summarized that Homer, Plato, Aristotle, 
Evagrius, Maximos, John Cassian, Nektaria Dionysiou, and Mikhail Arkhangelskoye 
each discussed just such a phenomenon as the radical dissolution of moral intuition and 
narrative coherence, and considered it to be a feature of thymic disorientation presenting 
in the capacity of moral intuition.  The diachronic view of this feature suggests that such 
extreme meaninglessness is most likely to develop when three concurrent pre-
conditions converge in a person’s experience: (1) a person overrides their intuitive sense 
of right and wrong in the midst of extreme adversity, (2) when this moral override is in 
the midst of intense and dangerous activity, calling for frenzied aggression, and (3) 
when, as a result of this aggressive, immoral action, a vulnerable person is killed or 
seriously injured.  Once these things have all occurred, the viewpoint of CATD suggests 
that a person may likely experience a simultaneous erosion of the ability to discern right 
action by use of thymic intuition and to discern right action by engaging moral 
reasoning.  As a person progresses in this condition of moral disorientation, he or she 
may have difficulty maintaining a sense of coherent meaning in the world as a whole, 
and can experience a collapse of his or her ability to function in society, as moral norms 
seem to be arbitrary and can become easy to transgress.  Ultimately such disorientation 
can, from the perspective of CATD, lead to the erosion of a person’s ability to make 
meaning of his or her own experiences in life in general, diminish of a person’s ability 
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for self-reflection, and render him or her unable to integrate experiences into a coherent 
narrative whole. 
This does connect with the experiences of the veterans recounted in the section 
on the radical dissolution of moral intuition and narrative coherence in Chapter Two.  
Richard Howard claimed in that chapter to have in some way overcome any empathy 
towards the enemy during his time in combat, and as a result began to enjoy the act of 
killing.  In the aftermath of his combat tours, he explained that he had gained an 
increasing sense that the events of his life before the war were disconnected from his 
life after the war, and he further sensed that this separation was not the result of some 
previous naiveté about the world being a good place, where only good things happen to 
good people.  Rather, he explained this sense as a lost ability to make meaning of any 
circumstances in life, because he had lost his foundation for understanding what is 
ultimately, real, or good, or true.  Similarly, Harold Miller claimed in Chapter Two to 
have lost any previously held belief in God, and any belief in an objective foundation 
for kindness or goodness after his time in combat.  He mentioned that this time on 
combat included actions that he felt others would consider deeply wrong and perhaps 
unforgiveable, but also mentioned that although he could understand their position, he 
did not necessarily know where ideas like right and wrong could exist in a war zone. 
The section on absurd meaningless in Chapter Two also contained accounts 
from four war criminals, each of whom evidenced some occasion of overriding their 
sense of right and wrong while in combat, and afterwards developing a pattern of 
inhumane, brutal actions in warfare with steadily diminishing moral restraint.  Edward 
Tick’s My Lai veteran described his life after combat in Vietnam as one in which moral 
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norms in society seemed absurd and arbitrary.  Martinez and Burgoyne were described 
in Chapter Two at their trial as seeming notably disconnected to the moral implications 
of their actions, and, far from able to reflect on their actions with moral reasoning in 
hindsight, they seemed surprised at the outrage their actions produced in the public.  In 
the case of each of these veterans, an evident progression as taught from the perspective 
of CATD is present: an override of moral intuition in the midst of extreme adversity 
leads to a frenzied activity that leads to death or harm of another person, and this is 
followed by an erosion of the ability to follow moral intuition or to engage moral 
reasoning in the future.  Eventually, this situation can devolve into one in which a 
person is internally estranged from any moral codes, becomes alienated from previously 
held beliefs about what is ultimately good or true, and, in the most extreme cases, loses 
the ability to make coherent meaning of the events of life. 
 
Uncontrollable, Lustful Rage 
The narrative accounts of veterans such as Specialist Marquez, Nathan Everly, 
Harold Miller, D. C. Coop, Mifflin, and Steck, as presented in the section of Chapter 
Two addressing the element of CCAD labeled as uncontrollable, lustful rage, describe a 
situation in which veterans return from combat experiencing unpredictable episodes of 
rage in which they feel elation and strong compulsions to inflicting pain and destruction 
in their physical and social environments.  Although these veterans claim to sometimes 
be able to reflect on their rage in hindsight, and to see the consequences of their actions 
and wish to change, they feel powerless to restrain themselves once they enter into such 
episodes, and feel powerless to learn how to predict such episodes from being activated.  
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A diachronic view of thymic disorientation does address this element of CCAD.  Earlier 
in this chapter it was summarized that Homer, Plato, Evagrius, Maximos, John Cassian, 
and Mikhail Arkhangelskoye each discussed just such a phenomenon as uncontrollable, 
lustful rage, and considered it to be a feature of thymic disorientation presenting in the 
capacity of instinctive aggression or motivation. 
The diachronic view of this element of CCAD suggests that such complex and 
unpredictable patterns of rage are most likely to develop when (1) a person is engaged 
in a heated action where an extreme danger to one’s life or the lives of loved ones is 
present, (2) when a person is engaged in strenuous physical activity in response to the 
threat, especially when this seems to require violent force, and (3) when a person is 
either unwilling or unable to remain watchful that his or her action remains restrained 
on humane grounds.  If all three of these conditions are met, it is likely that the 
aggressive function of thymos will outpace its ability to remain in contact with reason 
and with its sister function of moral intuition, and a person will begin to lose control of 
his or her own aggression.  From the viewpoint of CATD, once this occurs a single 
time, it is more likely that it will occur the next time a similar threat is presented. 
Eventually, if the threats in one’s environment remain steady, a thymic pattern can form, 
with very painful and disorienting consequences.  From a diachronic view of thymic 
disorientation, such consequences may include a disoriented person’s engagement in 
violent and inhumane actions towards lesser threats, and eventually towards anything 
which disrupts access to a person’ most powerful desires in any given moment, without 
reflection or moral hesitation.  It may also include a turning inward, in which a 
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disoriented person may experience violent episodes of self-hatred, with powerful 
impulses toward self-harm and suicide.   
This does connect with the experiences of the veterans recounted in the section 
on uncontrollable, lustful rage in Chapter Two.   In that chapter, Marquez’s tour of duty 
in Iraq was described as one in which he faced constant threats that required violent 
force for self-preservation and the protection of his comrades.  At one point near the 
middle of his tour, after witnessing the gruesome death of some of his comrades, he 
described himself as becoming extremely exhausted, and as having trouble accessing 
any feelings about what he was doing in war.  This seems to have been a moment in 
which he began having trouble being watchful, and soon afterwards his leaders began to 
notice some slightly inhumane behavior in combat, which in time become more 
pronounced, and developed into a concerning pattern.  Marquez was described in 
Chapter Two as beginning to enter into some episodes of unpredictable violence when 
not engaged in combat.  Harold Miller began to experience exhilaration in his combat 
tour to Iraq, as described in Chapter Two, and lost what the teachers of thymic 
disorientation would call watchfulness in the process of learning to love the act of 
killing.  Upon homecoming he has had experiences of rage and violence that have 
thrilled him, and which can certainly be described as lustful.  Mifflin and Steck each 
described something similar, as was related in Chapter Two.  They both experienced a 
sensation of exhilaration in combat that they compared to sexual activity, and which 
powerfully disoriented their experience of rage and violence upon homecoming. 
In the case of each of these veterans, an evident process as taught from the 
perspective of CATD is present: extreme danger which requires intense and violent 
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physical action seems to eventually outpace a person’s ability to remain watchful with 
the capacities of thymic moral intuition and reason, after which time a person’s 
aggressive instincts can act wildly and without restraint.  This experience itself can be 
exhilarating, but the exhilaration is paired with disorientation, especially when 
unrestrained aggression becomes a pattern.  Upon homecoming, when only very small 
threats are present, or when a person faces a much smaller adversity, he or she may find 
that thymic aggression is activated in its most extreme form, exhilarating but 
unrestrained, and causing painful and dangerous consequences in a person’s 
environment. 
 
A Summary of CATD on CCAD 
 In summary, it must be concluded that Combat Activated Thymic Disorientation, 
as a representation of a diachronic view of the potential for disorientation in the human 
capacity of thymos, does indeed account for all five elements of Complex Combat 
Activated Disorientation, as summarized in Chapter Two of this thesis, and does so in a 
manner that represents the complexity, uniqueness, and totality of the disorientation of 
these veterans.  There is not a feature of any one of the elements of CCAD, as presented 
in Chapter Two, that is not addressed from the perspective of CATD, and each feature 
of each element has been accounted for not only in its presentation but also in its pre-
conditions and its potential connection to the other elements.  For the sake of 
completing the argument, it may now be helpful to briefly readdress the reasons why 
CATD provides a superior account of the five elements of CCAD than either of the 
dominant paradigms of approach taken by contemporary caregivers – the paradigms of 
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Complex PTSD and Moral Injury, which were discussed in Chapters Three and Four of 
this thesis. 
 
CATD Rather Than Complex PTSD or Moral Injury 
 In Chapter Three it became evident that the psychiatric paradigm has significant 
difficulty in accounting for CCAD, and especially when it is limited to one specific 
diagnostic spectrum, even with the latest extrapolations of PTSD into the informal sub-
category of Complex PTSD.  Using the diagnostic criteria of the DSM-5, one of the 
elements of CCAD is altogether unaccounted for, and the remaining four elements are 
only accounted for using criteria from three distinct psychiatric disorders: two have 
some significant connection to PTSD criteria, a third element is related to criteria listed 
under the Dissociative Spectrum of disorders, and a fourth has a tenuous connection 
with a disorder in the Schizophrenia Spectrum.  It has been demonstrated in this thesis 
that such an incomplete account of CCAD adds significant challenges to already heavily 
challenged veterans, as they will need to be concurrently diagnosed with at least three 
disorders, each of with will indicate its own treatment plan for specialized 
psychotherapy and psychopharmacological support, and none of which completely 
addresses their the complexity and totality of their needs.   
 In Chapter Four it was made evident that the paradigm of Moral Injury, a 
complementary approach growing out of the psychiatric paradigm in response to its 
inadequate ability to account for CCAD, has indeed proven capable of providing a 
meaningful – if not exhaustive – account for four of the five elements of CCAD.  In 
order to accomplish this, the Moral Injury paradigm makes use of the philosophical 
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concept of thymos, and particularly the earliest recorded use of thymos in the epic 
poetry of Homer, innovatively appropriating its meaning into contemporary usage with 
the help of modern psychiatric presuppositions.  However, inasmuch as the Moral 
Injury paradigm was able to approach four of the five elements of CCAD, it was also 
demonstrated in Chapter Four that the Moral Injury paradigm was unable or unwilling 
to provide an account for the fifth and perhaps most unusual feature of the phenomenon 
under consideration: perceived self-horror at the perceived absorption of evil.  
Furthermore, the Moral Injury paradigm only includes two general categories to explain 
the development of the elements of CCAD: (1) some type of betrayal in combat and (2) 
entering into a berserk state in combat.  Although these two categories are clearly linked 
with the elements of CCAD, some veterans do not clearly fit into either of these two 
categories, and are therefore left incompletely addressed. 
 Beyond the critique of whether the psychiatric and Moral Injury paradigms are 
able to account for the uniqueness, complexity, and totality of the elements of CCAD, 
this thesis also gave sufficient evidence to question the efficacy of the philosophical 
presuppositions of each paradigm to provide an underlying epistemological foundation 
for holistically understanding the circumstances of veterans experiencing CCAD.  The 
psychiatric approach has been critiqued in its mechanical presuppositions, which 
renders it unable to account for any complex features that cannot be coherently 
addressed by making use of into its diagnostic categories, and to a larger extent the 
dominant scientific approach to healthcare, which seeks to explain all human difficulties 
in terms of physiological morbidity.  These presuppositions keep caregivers working 
strictly from the psychiatric paradigm in a position in which they must either ignore the 
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experiences of veterans that are inexplicable according to physiological categories or 
else reframe them according to these categories. 
 The Moral Injury paradigm has been critiqued as partially suffering from the 
same pre-suppositional poverty as the psychiatric paradigm, which is not surprising 
given that it grew out of the psychiatric paradigm as a complementary approach.  This is 
evident in Jonathan Shay’s general insistence on taking the ancient philosophical ideas 
he uncovered in his research and attempting to immediately convert them into 
contemporary psychiatric categories.  Accordingly, the most important philosophical 
critique of the Moral injury paradigm offered by this thesis is related to Shay’s work in 
understanding applying the ancient Greek metaphysical concept of thymos.  It has been 
demonstrated in this thesis that, although his appeal to thymos in order to transcend the 
constrictions of physiological morbidity in understanding the elements of what this 
thesis has labeled CCAD was a work of superior quality, Jonathan Shay’s 
appropriations of thymic content was accomplished in poor philosophical fashion, and 
this limited his ability to address CCAD in its complexity and totality.  Shay’s 
acknowledged disinterest in understanding the original and continued historical context 
of the concept of thymos kept him from fully appreciating its ability to serve as an 
ancient foundation for understanding human disorientation in the functions of emotion, 
aggression, and morality.  Although Shay was able to find some meaningful 
connections with these ideas through vignettes from Homer’s epic poetry, the larger 
efficacy of the concept in approaching CCAD was left untouched. 
 In contrast to these critiques, it is now clear that CATD, as a representation of a 
diachronic view of thymic disorientation, is able to address each of the 5 elements of 
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CCAD, and to address them with a greater appreciation for their uniqueness, 
complexity, and totality than either the psychiatric or Moral Injury paradigms.  It is able 
to do so by maintaining a contextual philosophical approach that has allowed the 
concept of thymos to be seen both in its ancient context and in its organic development 
over time into contemporary philosophical thought.  It is now possible, having made 
thorough use of the term Complex Combat Activated Disorientation throughout this 
thesis, to substitute it for the term Combat Activated Thymic Disorientation, as this 
thesis has essentially argued that the elements categorized under the former term can be 
best understood by using the approach of the latter. 
 
The Usefulness of the CATD Paradigm, and Transitioning to Care 
Having argued the sufficiency of the CATD paradigm in understanding complex 
disorientation among veterans after exposure to adversity in armed combat, a practical 
question remains about the usefulness of the CATD paradigm, which indeed also 
concerns an essential aspect of the nature of this thesis: is the thesis asking caregivers 
and theorists to abandon their previously-held paradigmatic approaches to the 
disorientation of their most troubled veterans in favor of this one, or is it offering this 
paradigm as a complementary one – as a more historically competent way of tracing 
ancient anthropology into a modern context for use alongside of other orientations 
which themselves do not alone capture the uniqueness, complexity, and totality of the 
situation?  The answer itself is complex.  In Chapters Six and Seven of this thesis, 
attention was given to modern desert teachers who continue to approach disoriented 
human persons in a way that is primarily informed by the same ancient philosophical 
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anthropology that has been demonstrated as useful in understanding CATD in its 
complexity, uniqueness, and totality.  Although the entirety of their paradigm was not 
addressed in this thesis, because such an inquiry lies outside of the scope of this thesis, 
their understanding of thymic disorientation in its unbroken and living tradition is the 
primary paradigm by which they would – and in certain cases do – provide care to 
veterans experiencing CATD.  Given this reality, it is possible to suggest that certain 
caregivers might wish to explore the modern desert approach to human disorientation in 
general, including its particular theoretical assumptions and interventions, and to 
consider adopting the CATD paradigm as a new primary orientation to their work with 
veterans and other adversity survivors. 
However, this thesis has not suggested that CATD is the only efficacious 
paradigm for understanding any aspect of any one or more of the five related features 
that have been the subject of the thesis, even if it has argued that the psychiatric 
paradigm alone is insufficient to understand these features in their totality and 
interrelation, and that the moral injury paradigm, while helpfully looking into an ancient 
philosophical paradigm to form a complementary approach to psychiatry, ultimately 
falls short of either remaining faithful to the ancient context of that paradigm or 
accounting for the full complexity of the features it seeks to better understand.  Rather, 
this thesis has succeeding in illuminating some significant limitations for both the 
psychiatric paradigm and the moral injury paradigm in addressing CATD, while 
avoiding the summary dismissal of these paradigms, and while discussing what efficacy 
they do maintain in understanding disoriented veterans.  This thesis has also 
acknowledged the realities of organized care in response to adversity survivors of all 
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kinds, and the manner in which the psychiatric paradigm appears to often be 
inextricably linked with resource management in organized care. 
There are a wide number of reasons for a caregiver to maintain a primary 
paradigm of orientation to a particular phenomenon that does not itself address the 
totality of that phenomenon, and it must be admitted that most widely employed 
paradigms of orientation to any phenomenon contain a significant degree of efficacy.  
Accordingly, this thesis suggests that, in addition to its potential use as a primary 
paradigm, the CATD paradigm should also be considered for its potential use as a 
secondary, complementary paradigm.  This may be most appropriate for caregivers 
choosing to primarily use the psychiatric paradigm in their work with disoriented 
veterans, or whose professional responsibilities constrain them to lead with the 
psychiatric paradigm.  It should also be considered for its potential as a tertiary 
complementary approach for caregivers choosing to primarily use the psychiatric 
paradigm and to and secondarily use the moral injury paradigm in their work with 
disoriented veterans.  The use of the CATD paradigm may be used, then, in a primary 
or complementary manner, given that the main argument of this thesis has not included 
the assertion that other paradigms have no efficacy or insight, nor has it been blind to 
the various reasons for which a caregiver might be compelled to operate within certain 
paradigms that cannot fully address CATD veterans. 
Having discussed the potential for the CATD paradigm to be adopted as either a 
primary or complementary paradigm of approach for the most disoriented combat 
veterans, it is now possible to make a connection between caregivers interested in 
making use of the CATD paradigm and the work of the Centre for Trauma, Asylum, 
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and Refugees (CTAR) at the University of Essex, which center has provided a platform 
for this thesis.  Specifically, it will be useful to examine the ways in which the center’s 
psychosocial framework for approaching adversity survivors, developed by Renos 
Papadopoulos, may prove useful for caregivers working with veterans experiencing 
CATD.  It must be noted that, related to the manner in which this thesis does not 
compel any caregiver to make the CATD paradigm his or her primary paradigm of 
orientation in order to find it useful, this thesis will not make suggestions about any 
specific form of intervention or treatment for CATD from any existing orientation to 
therapeutic care.  Rather, the following chapter will proceed to offer relevant comments 
on Papadopoulos’ framework in helping caregivers from any orientation to therapeutic 
care to more competently approach CATD veterans with an optimal epistemology.  
Papadopoulos’ epistemological aids will protect caregivers from developing polarized 
stances in their care, and will help them to avoid both oversimplification in their 
interventions and the pathologization of ordinary responses to human suffering among 
veterans (Papadopoulos, 2015, p. 15).  Avoiding such severely limiting and potentially 
damaging tendencies in care may be discussed as the “sharpening of epistemological 
vigilance” in work with adversity survivors, which is a chief preoccupation of the 
Centre for Trauma, Asylum, and Refugees, and the following chapter of the thesis will 
be concerned with highlighting specific applications with the unique population of 
CATD veterans (Papadopoulos, 2015, p. 15). 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
CATD AND THE CTAR FRAMEWORK FOR PSYCHOSOCIAL CARE 
 
 Papadopoulos’ framework for caregivers working with adversity survivors has 
many facets, but two of these facets can be seen as especially essential for work with 
disoriented veterans: (1) caregivers must develop and maintain an epistemological 
vigilance against polarization in their approach to veterans to avoid traumatizing them, 
and (2) caregivers must develop and maintain an epistemological vigilance protecting 
against pathologization in their approach to veterans, which includes protecting against 
a de facto medicalization or psychologization of all forms of human suffering, in order 
to avoid traumatizing them.  Key elements from both of these facets will be discussed in 
this chapter, and their potential relevance to caregivers working with CTAD veterans 
will be considered thoroughly.  This will be accomplished in order to establish a strong 
connection between caregivers seeking to integrate the predominant themes of this 
thesis into their care and the work of the Centre for Trauma, Asylum, and Refugees, 
which has supported the research underlying the thesis and which remains committed to 
supporting therapeutic care for adversity survivors of all kinds. 
  
Avoiding Polarization in Care for CATD Veterans 
 
 Papadopoulos insists that all events of collective adversity involve polarization, 
and that in fact the relationship of communal polarization on any devastating events is a 
defining one (2014).  War is no different.  In war there is not only a deep political 
division between opposing parties, but there are also sharp divisions between strategic 
military commanders and frontline ground troops, and often sharp divisions between 
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societies which send their youth to war and the youth that are sent by the will of the 
people.  Upon homecoming, there continues to be a polarization between returning 
warriors and the communities that offered them to the war effort, and polarization 
between disoriented warriors and the caregivers who attempt to support them – 
especially if those caregivers have no experience in war.  If caregivers do not 
adequately locate and consider these divisions, and work to understand the manner in 
which persons in their context of care tend to become fixated on one pole and lose the 
ability to meaningfully encounter people and ideas at any distance from that pole, they 
will likely view the caregiving relationship in a polarized way (Papadopoulos, 2014).  
From this polarized position, caregivers will tend to encourage veterans to both examine 
and identify with their circumstances in an equally simplistic way, keeping both 
themselves and the veterans under their care blind to the impact of powerful archetypal 
forces.  
Papadopoulos argues the point in this way: 
“Polarization seeps through every facet of individual and collective areas of 
functioning…[and] under ordinary conditions, people [find ways to] 
combine…polarities and also both collective and personal dimensions, [but] 
under polarized conditions, such as when mass catastrophic events occur that 
create adversity victims and survivors, this balance…is destroyed and replaced 
by…dangerous and elusive [imbalances]. Under conditions of polarization and 
archetypal unipolarity, the ability to bear complexity is destroyed and replaced 
by oversimplification at all levels. This means that no person or phenomenon 
can be appreciated in terms of its complexity. Everything is experienced either 
as being positive or negative and without any shades, nuances or doubt” (2005, 
p. 37; 2014, p. 23).  
 
Beverly Chapman is a military caregiver who has worked extensively with combat 
veterans experiencing significant disorientation upon homecoming, and has experience 
working with veterans experiencing the elements of CATD described as persistent, 
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debilitating mistrust and the radical dissolution of narrative coherence.  Beverly is well-
trained in a specific approach to psychotherapy, and describes an encounter with a 
veteran in which he did not adequately consider the polarized manner in which his 
client viewed all members of society, including those in the military: those who had 
been in combat, and those who had not (Chapman, interview, 2014).  In hindsight, 
Chapman was able to consider that by not recognizing this phenomenon, he was quickly 
placed into a polarized struggle with his client, in which he – by not sharing the 
assumption that there is a profound difference between combat veterans and others – 
was not only representative of the ‘others,’ but also part of the problem, in his client’s 
perspective, since his client felt that society in general sent its citizens to war and then 
ignored their unique needs upon homecoming (Chapman, interview, 2014).  Chapman 
eventually found himself unwittingly taking up a position on the opposite pole, 
struggling to help his client see another perspective and to begin to trust again, but using 
simplistic, preconceived means to do so which further threatened his client.  This may 
be seen as a clear example of the kind of danger a caregiver may face in caring for 
disoriented veterans if he or she has not developed an adequate epistemological 
foundation. 
 Papadopoulos offers a further warning to caregivers on this topic: 
“The areas that are affected by this [type of] oversimplification are many and 
include: the perception of the causes and effects of the catastrophic events, the 
accounts people give about the effects of the adversity, the perception of what 
would be an appropriate remedy to the situation, the expectations they have 
from the humanitarian agencies and their staff, etc. Equally, those who go out to 
offer help as well as ‘the public opinion’ tend to become victims of polarized 
discourses that also affect them at all levels, including their own perceptions and 
experiences of themselves and of those affected by the adversity, their views 
about what happened and how it can be remedied etc.” (2014, p. 23). 
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It is important to recognize that Papadopoulos’ warning about the reality of polarization 
after adversity includes its potential effect on the perspectives of both survivors and 
caregivers.  Although Chapman was able, after reflection upon his care to the veteran, 
to see how polarization affected his client’s worldview, introducing a cycle of mutual 
reactivity that profoundly complicated their ability to relate to each other, he still 
appears to miss the possibility that he was the one who first acted from a polarized 
position, and whose actions activated that cycle.  Chapman’s strong therapeutic 
orientation and his sense of success in working with previous veterans seemed to arm 
him with the unexamined assumption that he was an ideal caregiver, and the feeling of 
surety that his care would be efficacious (Chapman, interview, 2014).  This confident 
entry into the relationship may have quickly activated a polarized setting for the 
encounter, as from the caregiver’s point of view the ‘strong caregiver’ had come to in to 
rescue the ‘needy veteran,” or from the client’s point of view the ‘non-combat, crisply 
dressed leadership professional” had come in to rescue the “broken-down warrior who 
could not take care of himself.” 
 This latter potential seems likely, given that Chapman’s veteran described a 
struggle with persistent, debilitating mistrust.  In the previous chapter, veterans 
struggling with this element of CATD were described as experiencing a thymic 
disorientation presenting in the capacity of emotion that is most likely to develop when 
(1) a warrior is exposed to an unbearable emotional experience in combat such as the 
loss of a close comrade or a leadership betrayal, (2) a warrior’s develops a deep 
emotional attachment to something that is either evil in itself or else draws the warrior 
towards privileging it above human relationships, and the warrior himself becomes a 
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betrayer of his comrades, or (3) a warrior’s desire to be respected by his leaders and 
comrades or to prove his worth is frustrated, and he instead turns on those whose 
respect he craves, eventually betraying them in some way in combat.  In any of these 
cases, it was argued that the central accelerant towards thymic disorientation is either 
the unexpected and painful loss of an important leader or comrade in combat or else an 
act of betrayal in one direction or the other.  In the case of veterans whose acceleration 
towards persistent, debilitating mistrust happens in relation to an authority figure, or in 
relation to the society which sent them to war – as highlighted in Chapter Two by the 
narratives of Sergeant Nathan Everly and Cantrell and Dean’s Special Forces soldier – 
caregivers must carefully account for power dynamics in their epistemological approach 
to caring.  Such veterans will have an acute sense of the power differential in the 
helping relationship – including therapeutic overconfidence, self-assurance, or the use 
of an oversimplified or packaged approach to care – and can easily enter a defensive 
and polarized position towards the caregiver. 
 The Centre for Trauma Asylum and Refugees at the University of Essex, in an 
approach to therapeutic care for adversity survivors developed by Papadopoulos, insists 
that caregivers avoid a therapeutic stance towards survivors that emphasizes survivor 
disorientation, or which emphasizes the caregiver’s ability to help or save survivors 
from disorientation (2015b).  Papadopoulos insists that “ultimately, theoretical 
approaches that tend to view the survivors of these forms of adversity only as mere 
‘traumatized victims’ can…be seen as the product of [epistemological distortion] in that 
they do not allow for the appreciation of the wide range of responses to adversity…” 
(2015a).  Chapman’s illustration of this potentiality is one among many, but it 
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sufficiently portrays the risk that caregivers to CATD veterans face when they are not 
armed with an adequate degree of epistemological complexity in their care. 
 
Concepts Protecting Against Polarization in the CTAR Model 
CTAR concepts protecting against polarization include systemic illustrations 
such as the ‘victim-savior-violator triangle,’ which portrays the potential for survivors 
and caregivers to enter into systemic projective locks characterized by powerful 
enactments around polarized positions towards each other and the world (Papadopoulos 
2002, 2014b, 2015b).  Papadopoulos regularly uses this illustration in trainings and 
workshops, and encourages caregivers to consider how to avoid entering such projective 
locks, usually centering on intentional caregiver avoidance of the pathologization of 
survivors from the first establishment of the caregiving relationship (2002, 2014b, 
2015b).  The efficacy of the triangle illustration is its usefulness as a dynamic object 
lesson, which the presenter uses in collaboration with a collected group of caregivers 
who by place themselves into positions relating to each of the particular poles.  As they 
do so, they allow themselves to experience in a collective way the powerful gravity of 
each position in the closed triad, and also the way that locked triadic systems can 
quickly transfer a person from one position to another, for instance making victims into 
violators who remain tightly related to saviors that have become victims.  This systemic 
lock can even be viewed with more complexity when working with caregivers who 
have greater experience in working with adversity survivors.  Chapman may, had he 
attended a CTAR training, have been able to see how in positioning himself 
simplistically as a savior in relation to client, he actually appeared to his client to be a 
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violator, and was subsequently treated aggressively.  The confusion of this complex, 
polarized relationship cannot be understated, as Chapman quickly became disoriented to 
find the ‘victim’ he was preparing to save turn against him as a ‘violator,’ and 
responded in a way that enforced his client’s sense of him as a ‘false-savior violator.’ 
Essentially, the use of such an illustration is a part of continuing education in the 
realm of epistemology of care.  A related continuing education activity used by CTAR 
in its various caregiver trainings is the collaborative exploration of an extended Jungian 
concept focused on the dangers of causal reductivity in responding to human suffering 
(Papadopoulos 2002, 2006).  Papadopoulos argues that Jung’s “teleological 
epistemology,” which saw human disorientation as more than solely pathological, but 
rather inclusive in the “purpose and goal of [a person’s] development” at large, is 
necessarily at odds with causal-reductive epistemologies, which identify various forms 
of discomfort and disorientation as strictly pathological and attempt to reduce their 
existence to a compact symptom or traumatic origin that can be treated (2006, p. 17, 
19).  In terms of the application of this concept to work with adversity survivors, 
Papadopoulos argues that “[what is commonly labeled as] trauma is not just an intra-
psychic condition which is created in a linear way by external violent events.  It is also a 
social construction and it fits within wider social constructs which also permeate the 
function and structures of…services that are set to address refugee difficulties” (2002, 
p. 40).  In many CTAR trainings, this concept is collaboratively discussed, with 
participants using examples from their own work to describe situations in which clients’ 
particular forms of distress and disorientation are treated strictly pathologically, and in 
which neither the meaning that clients are making of their own distress nor the way that 
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this meaning relates to clients’ overall understanding of themselves and their lives is 
considered (Papadopoulos, 2014b, 2015b). 
D. C. Hoop’s description of the various approached of his caregivers, as 
partially described in Chapter Two of this thesis, would serve as an example in which 
causal-reductivity exacerbated his disorientation and also activated a skepticism within, 
marked by questioning whether any caregiver could ever understand him.  Hoop’s 
description of feeling as if he had been connected with a sense of evil in combat was 
quickly labeled by his caregivers in a way that did not capture the complexity of his 
disorientation, and which treated his disorientation as pathological without examining 
its impact on his self-understanding, his worldview, or his development as a human 
person (2010).  As a result, it appears that his psychiatric label became a source of 
despair for him, as it awakened a victim stance that served to separate him from 
whatever resources he had to make meaning of his experience in the war and his current 
experiences after homecoming (Hoop, 2010). 
The introduction of the Trauma Grid is a third CTAR concept that has the 
potential to protect caregivers from adopting polarized stances towards their CATD 
veterans (Papadopoulos, 2002, 2010, 2014b, 2015b).  Papadopoulos designed the grid 
for the purpose of offering caregivers a tool that would help them to simultaneously 
organize what they see in the field and to reflect on what they see with maximum 
complexity (2015b).  By offering various categories for triaging the particular responses 
to adversity that caregivers encounter with their clients, including categories for 
negative, neutral, and positive responses, caregivers are encouraged to view their 
clients’ responses with greater complexity – thereby increasing the chance that they will 
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view clients themselves with greater complexity.  In turn, this results in caregivers 
relating to their clients in ways that resist unipolar identification, and, through 
relationship, results in clients viewing themselves in ways that resist unipolar 
identification. 
Jonathan Black, a uniformed caregiver who has served extensively with combat 
veterans, claims that his introduction to the Trauma Grid had a revolutionary effect on 
his approach to care for combat veterans experiencing the element of CATD described 
as lustful, uncontrollable rage (interview, 2015).  He describes it this way:  
“Just by choosing to use the grid my vision expands, and my viewpoint is 
changed.  If I see a helpless, angry man whose life is unmanageable, then of 
course I will tend to feel anxious about saving him, and will treat him as 
‘broken.’  But if I see man whose life after combat has contained many things – 
moments of wild rage, yes, but also a spirit that wants to get better, and an 
interest in giving to the world in some way, and an abiding love for his son and 
daughter – now I am seeing someone else, and I can relax and look closer.  What 
can I do to support him in his journey towards being whole again?  How can I 
walk beside him?  And the grid naturally asks you to do this” (Black, interview, 
2015). 
 
In Black’s experience, then, caregivers making use of the Trauma Grid are practically 
constrained to approach their clients with greater complexity, as the categories of the 
grid demand a complex view of the person.  
 By exposing caregivers to the concept of the victim-savior-violator triangle, by 
aiding them in recognizing the dangers of causal reductivity in triaging the suffering of 
adversity survivors, and by empowering them in the employment of the Trauma Grid, 
the Centre for Trauma, Asylum, and Refugees provides epistemological protection for 
caregivers in a variety of setting.  These three protective concepts certainly do not stand 
alone, and indeed there are many others.  However, these three have been chosen 
because they are especially salient in the work of veteran care.  Epistemological 
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complexity is important when caring for any adversity survivors, but it is particularly 
important for CATD veterans who experience persistent, debilitating mistrust, as 
described earlier in this section of the chapter.  Because of the extreme sensitivity 
among CATD veterans in relationships with persons in authority of any kind, it is 
crucial that CATD caregivers make use of epistemological protection, so that they can 
avoid the dangers of polarization in their care. 
 
Avoiding Pathologization and Medicalization While Caring for CATD Veterans 
 Papadopoulos is also sensitive to the dangers of pathologization in care to 
adversity survivors, and for this reason he has made it another central tenet of his 
trainings to caregivers (2014b, 2015b).  He insists that “suffering is not necessarily a 
pathological condition; suffering is part of the human condition and it is inappropriate 
to either attempt to eradicate it completely or to understand it exclusively as a medical 
or psychiatric condition, i.e. ‘medicalize it’ or pathologize it” (Papadopoulos, 2015, p. 
20).  Elsewhere, he notes the dangers of what he calls ‘psychologization,’ in addition to 
the dangers of pathologization and medicalization: 
Within the cloud of the inherent epistemological confusion and the anguish 
emanating from the unintelligibility of…complex phenomena [observed when 
working with adversity survivors], the theories mental health experts advance in 
attempting to understand destructiveness may ultimately amount to being not 
much more than ornate psychologizations and pathologizations which are 
intended to ease the resulting distress.  Thus, unwittingly, I would argue that we 
are used by society, as experts, to explain away the disturbing complexity of 
destructiveness and replace it with sanitized theories” (Papadopoulos, 1998, p. 
459). 
 
The ultimate danger of pathologization, medicalization, and psychologization, from 
Papadopoulos’ perspective, is that caregivers often gravitate – under the emotional 
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pressures inherent in attending to survivors of adversity – towards understanding their 
clients within philosophically limited societal discourses about the nature of human 
suffering, thereby remaining blind to certain aspects of their clients’ experiences and 
meaning-making, and ultimately activating the potential for harm to occur within the 
caregiving relationship (2002). 
There are two essential concepts contained within this warning that are 
especially and directly relevant to work with CATD survivors.  First, the tendency 
among caregivers towards medicalization and psychologization of both ordinary and 
certain extraordinary forms of suffering is an acute issue in contemporary veteran care.  
David Wooten, a combat veteran and family therapist who works exclusively with 
fellow veterans, active duty servicemen, and their families, recognizes this tendency 
clearly: 
“Words cannot describe the frustration many caregivers have – especially those 
coming from systemic orientations who view ‘pathology’ in a different way that 
the DSM prescribes, at the way that veterans are categorized by supposed 
symptoms before their stories are even allowed to be told.  We give them a 
label, and we are trained to think that this label will bring relief, as they will 
supposedly realize that their suffering is not unique, and that the experts have a 
plan to make everything better.  By the way, can we then be surprised, when 
after they don’t respond to treatment, they are angry and feel betrayed by those 
who have promised they will be well soon?   But this actually works in two 
ways…some veterans who are going through the normal trials of homecoming 
are labeled in a way that almost victimizes them by making them believe that 
they have returned with a mysterious disease…other veterans return with severe 
difficulties that don’t cleanly fit into the DSM criteria, but we ‘make them fit’ in 
order to allow them entry into the care system – no matter whether these 
diagnoses correspond to the way veterans themselves make meaning of their 
suffering – after which time they are placed on an evidence-based care plan 
corresponding with a psychiatric disorder that nobody is perfectly convinced 
they have, if they are being honest” (interview, 2015). 
 
Considerable attention has been given in Chapter Three of this thesis to the apparent 
inadequacy of the psychiatric paradigm in addressing the elements of CATD, and that 
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inadequacy will not be readdressed in this chapter.  However, Wooten’s comments are 
salient here, in that they recognize a dual danger of pathologization, medicalization, and 
psychologization in veteran care that is only partially addressed in Papadopoulos’ work.  
This dual danger certainly applies to veterans experiencing painful but ordinary 
responses to homecoming from combat who receive psychiatric diagnoses that actually 
complicate their recovery.  It also applies to veterans experiencing very unusual 
responses to homecoming from combat, including those veterans with CATD, who 
receive psychiatric diagnoses that do not correspond to the complexity of their 
experience.  In either case, caregivers with good intentions find themselves limiting the 
human suffering they observe to the confines of a certain paradigm – and this especially 
appears to be common with medical and psychological paradigms, which often 
theoretically dominate the field of professional psychosocial care.  As Papadopoulos 
notes, the potential harm resulting from this situation should compel caregivers to 
mobilize their epistemological awareness to the greatest extent possible (2002). 
 One additional intersection occurring between Papadopoulos’ warning and 
Wooten’s frustrations as a caregiver is the impact of limited discursive perspectives on 
an adversity survivor’s process of meaning making, which may occur either during and 
after exposure a person’s exposure to adversity.  Wooten notes that the tendency for 
initial caregivers to immediately refer to the DSM when working with disoriented 
veterans – often in order to help them to gain access to care resources – can result in a 
distraction from encouraging veterans to tell the “story” about what they have 
experienced, which will necessarily include indications of the manner in which they are 
integrating their experience and making meaning of it (interview, 2015).  Further, he 
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worries that the diagnoses these veterans receive are sometimes dissonant with the way 
that they make meaning of their experiences.  Similarly, Papadopoulos warns that by 
labeling adversity survivors as “traumatized,” caregivers can tend to “ignore 
all…considerations of how people process experiences” (2002, p. 28).  Ignorance of this 
kind can be damaging indeed, considering that the processing of experiences, when 
understood in terms of teleology or “meaning in the making,” is the result of a universal 
human motivation towards inquiry about the experiences of life, which can be linked 
with the continual development of morality (Papadopoulos, 2006, p. 17, 26). 
 The potential damage associated with this danger is perhaps particularly 
devastating when caregivers work with CATD veterans who have experienced the 
radical dissolution of moral intuition and narrative coherence.  In Chapter Seven, this 
feature of CATD was described as a feature of thymic disorientation presenting in the 
capacity of moral intuition which is initially marked by an erosion of the ability to 
discern right action and which progresses into a loss of coherent meaning in the world 
as a whole.  Persons in such disorientation may be particularly harmed when their 
caregivers either do not notice the state of their inability to make meaning of their 
experiences or else medicalize this phenomenon by placing it into a diagnostic category 
that does not account for all of its aspects and then initiating a poorly matched treatment 
plan. 
 The second essential concept in Papadopoulos’ warning about pathologization, 
medicalization, and psychologization is his insight into the manner in which caregivers 
can be unwittingly ‘used by society’ as agents of sterilization, containment, and relief 
for the collective conscience (1998).  This is also a crucial insight for CATD care, 
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especially for caregivers working with CATD survivors who have experienced a 
perceived betrayal by society or family, as it opens up the potential for a parallel 
process between caregiver and survivor that could be either useful or harmful, 
depending on the circumstances and the caregiver’s awareness of the parallel.  Daniel 
Dawson, a caregiver for both veterans and active duty warriors, speaks of an instance in 
which he was compelled to see a disoriented veteran who was equally compelled to see 
him by military leadership (interview, 2015).  This veteran described the feeling of 
having been deeply betrayed by his leadership upon homecoming; he had been close 
with his leaders and teammates overseas, but after homecoming he was quickly 
transferred to another unit, and felt disenfranchised and discarded (Dawson, interview, 
2015).  Dawson described having been briskly pulled from an important personal 
engagement by his leaders in order to consult with the veteran, and had the strong 
feeling that his leaders had inserted him into the situation so that they could avoid the 
difficulty of engaging with the veteran themselves.  Thus, a parallel process of some 
kind existed.  In this case, Dawson became aware of the parallel, and, after a few 
minutes of silence, offered his sense of it to the veteran in the caregiving encounter 
(interview, 2015).  From Dawson’s perspective, this intervention – which certainly 
contained risk – opened up communication with the veteran, who was able to relate his 
perceived betrayals in a manner that forged a connection for future work. 
 Dawson’s experience as a caregiver is not unique, but neither is it particularly 
common.  His ability to notice the parallel by maintaining a degree of epistemological 
vigilance in both his understanding of the complexity of his position in care and his 
developing understanding of the complexity of his client’s position allowed the 
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caregiving encounter to move forward.  Had he not maintained such vigilance, it is 
possible that he would have acted as an agent of sterilization for the relief of his leaders 
who had labeled the veteran as ‘a problem,’ and that his client would have been further 
violated by yet another seemingly disinterested betrayer in his leadership structure.  
This potentiality is one among many, but it sufficiently portrays the risk that a caregiver 
to CATD veterans may face when remaining unaware of tendencies in care towards 
pathologization. 
 
Concepts Protecting Against Pathologization in the CTAR Model 
CTAR concepts protecting against pathologization and medicalization of both 
ordinary and unusual forms of human suffering in work with adversity survivors include 
unique formulations about the impact of adversity on identity formation and 
maintenance, and the way that this impact influences meaning making (Papadopoulos 
2002, 2014b, 2015b).  Papadopoulos notes that adversity survivors who have been 
dislocated from a previous status, way of being, or geographic place tend to sense the 
impact of a “multi-dimensional, deep and pervasive loss and…feel [further] disoriented 
because it is difficult to pinpoint the clear source and precise nature of this loss, 
especially due to its complex and dichotomous nature” (2002, p. 15).  Elsewhere he 
refers to this as an “ungraspable pain…which has an elusive nature but very clearly and 
painfully felt effects” (Papadopoulos, 2008, p. 3).  He highlights the natural tendency 
for misunderstanding or pathologizing such an unclear and complex experience of loss, 
arguing that “to understand this…loss in the ordinary psychological sense is to miss the 
rich complexity that [it] entails,” and insisting that both caregivers and survivors must 
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consider how they are making meaning of the various aspects of leave-taking, changes 
in identity, and homecoming surrounding the loss (Papadopoulos, 2002, p. 15). 
In order to address this clearly, CTAR invests up to a third of their training time 
with caregivers in helping them to expand their epistemology of loss (Papadopoulos, 
2014b, 2015b).  With regard to a more adequate view of the phenomena of leave-taking, 
movement in identity, and homecoming during and after adversity, Papadopoulos 
addresses each with internal complexity in his trainings, noticing “binary dichotomous 
elements” within each one (2002, p. 15, 2014b, 2015b).  These phenomena and their 
dichotomous elements will not each be examined here, but it will be necessary to 
examine at least one of them in order to comment on the efficacy of the training in 
protecting caregivers from tendencies in pathologization.  Papadopoulos notices the 
internal binary dichotomy inherent within movement in identity during and after 
adversity, which he describes distinctly – and yet relatedly – as movement in both 
“tangible and intangible” aspects of identity (2002, p. 15).  Incidentally, he also writes 
at length on the dichotomous aspects of group and individual identity during and after 
adversity, although that will not be addressed here (Papadopoulos, 1998).  
Papadopoulos classifies tangible elements of identity as a coherent conglomerate of 
physical, vocational, ideological, psychological, social, recreational, ethnic, aspirational 
aspects of one’s sense of self (2015c).  He classifies intangible elements of identity as a 
“mosaic substrate of identity,” conceptualized as an ecological base of order, belonging, 
and a degree of predictability upon which one’s tangible elements of identity rest, and 
consisting of aspects such as sensory input, rhythms, habits, and relationships 
(Papadopoulos, 2015c). 
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In the CTAR framework, “the sum total of the unique combination and fit” 
between tangible and intangible elements of identity is described as creating a dynamic 
but stable state in which “a settled…pattern of life” naturally establishes familiarity; this 
pattern is discussed as “onto-ecological settledness” or OES (Papadopoulos, 2015c, p. 
19).  The concept of onto-ecological settledness is essentially an attempt to account for 
a certain established condition of living and making meaning of life that is often 
unexamined and therefore underappreciated in its totality when considering loss after 
exposure to adversity.  When the onto-ecological settledness of an individual, family, or 
group is radically affected, caregivers are often able to consider perceived changes to 
certain tangible aspects of a survivor’s identity, but the extreme disorientation that can 
accompany loss or radical change in intangible aspects of identity are often 
inadequately considered.  The state of such change creates an unclear, painful state in 
which a person “aches” for specific tangible losses but also for more elusive intangible 
losses, and this state is discussed as “nostalgic disorientation” in the CTAR model 
(Papadopoulos, 2002, p. 18).  Papadopoulos notes that although there is pain involved 
in nostalgic disorientation that is difficult to describe, it often underlies various 
reactions that are easier to describe, such as “panic, depression, apathy, suspiciousness, 
splitting – [all of which] can be easily misunderstood” as the primary issue so that the 
actual primary disorientation becomes pathologized by caregivers and survivors alike 
(2002, p. 18). 
Lieutenant Flournoy Phelps noted after attending a CTAR training that the 
concepts of onto-ecological settledness and nostalgic disorientation were among the 
most important concepts to which he had ever been exposed as a military leader in 
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terms of gaining a foundation for understanding the disorientation of young warriors in 
combat (interview, 2015).  He voices this in the following way:  
“Our warriors often come to us to work up for deployment after having recently 
finished initial combat training.  In that process they have been uprooted from 
their homes and placed together with strangers into an intense environment, and 
once they come to us we are already preparing them to be placed with a new 
group of strangers into a new, far more intense – and lethal – environment.  Is it 
any wonder they are disoriented?  They seem depressed, so we send them to 
[doctor], but is this going to address the need?  They have undergone some 
major movement in their tangible elements of identity, with a new vocation, new 
name of sorts, new relationships, and we consider these things to some 
extent…but the intangible changes of being so far from where life was stable 
and made sense must take a larger toll than most of us realize.  Of course, then 
comes the chaos and confusion of combat and killing” (Phelps, interview, 2015). 
 
Phelps’ comments clearly capture the efficacy of the CTAR framework in helping the 
caregivers of combat veterans avoid certain tendencies towards pathologization.  In his 
formulation, the potential for veterans experiencing the radical dissolution of narrative 
coherence to experience particular harm is especially clear.  Although more research is 
required on the topic of serial dislocation, and a potential compound effect on onto-
ecological settledness, it is clear by inference that onto-ecological settledness could 
become more disturbed the more often a person is dislocated, whether the dislocation is 
either voluntary or involuntary.  In that sense, perhaps Phelps’ most salient observation 
is that what Papadopoulos describes as nostalgic disorientation or a disturbance in onto-
ecological settledness is often observed in warriors by their military leadership before 
those warriors ever leave their primary duty stations to travel into a combat zone.   
Veteran caregivers should carefully consider all of the various aspects of leave-
taking and homecoming that a warrior experiences in the process of training for combat, 
entering combat, enduring combat and returning from combat when attempting to 
understand particular forms of veteran disorientation.  These aspects include not only 
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geographical and social changes, but involve all of the changes relating to a person’s 
experience in the world.  Papadopoulos coined the term “onto-ecological” in the hope 
that it might aid caregivers in considering all of the aspects of personhood combined 
with all of the elements of one’s sense of place and belonging in the world (2015b, 
2015c).  Phelps is correct in his concern that if a warrior’s response to disturbances in 
onto-ecological settledness is not considered and understood by caregivers, it will risk 
either being ignored by operations-focused leadership as unimportant or else 
pathologized in the focus on its secondary effects by the military’s managed care 
continuum. 
Homecoming from combat is a unique phenomenon, and the experiences of 
combat veterans returning home contain important differences from the leave-taking 
and homecoming realities of involuntarily dislocated people, the demographic with 
whom CTAR is most commonly concerned.  For instance, the dislocation of most 
Western combat veterans during deployment to the war is not precisely involuntary, and 
their return after a relatively pre-determined length of time in combat to their 
geographical point of departure is generally guaranteed.  Upon first exposure to the 
term, a caregiver to veterans may question whether nostalgic disorientation is an 
appropriate label for what veterans experience during and after service in combat, 
proceeding from a concern that a veteran’s primary focus on homecoming is not the 
reclamation of a certain physical space, neighborhood, or plot of land.  However, 
Papadopoulos’ formulation of the concept of nostalgic disorientation also allows for 
important aspects of the experience of the veteran’s focus on reclaiming a certain way 
of life or relation to the world, and perhaps in part because it was influenced by the 
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works of Homer, which were essentially ballads of war and homecoming after war to 
both physical places and ways of being.  Papadopoulos notes that, in essence, Homer’s 
Odyssey is “about the struggle to get home [after war], or, to use a colloquial 
expression, it is about Odysseus ‘dying to return home’…” (2002, p. 10).  He also urges 
his readers to notice that Homer does not use the Greek work oikos for home, which 
would be the most commonly translated word for home under normal circumstances of 
translation, but rather  
“the word gaia, which simply means earth, soil land.  It is the same word that 
Lovelock chose for his theory that our planet Earth functions in remarkably 
well-regulated ways, as if it was a single organism.  So where oikos emphasizes 
the inhabited space, gaia refers more to the land itself.  However, both address 
the relational aspects of the inhabited and uninhabited spaces and certainly both 
highlight the collective dimensions of home rather than a definition of home as 
an excluded and isolated space.  Thus, the specific Homeric home – gaia – 
accentuates the concreteness of the collective and relational nature of space and 
it refers to the actual soil, one’s own land, in a sense of inclusion rather than 
exclusion” (Papadopoulos, 2002, p. 11).  
 
It would be naïve to imagine that a warrior’s return from combat has no physical 
dimension, just as it would be naïve to imagine that an involuntarily dislocated person’s 
longing to return home has only a physical dimension.  For a veteran of combat, there 
are complex issues of dislocation to be addressed that can significantly affect onto-
ecological settledness, and which may include physical, geographical, social, 
psychological, spiritual, vocational, and emotional dimensions, as well as a dimension 
of meaning-making and narrative coherence.  If the disorientation of returning warriors 
is never considered in relation to this disturbance of onto-ecological settledness, the 
potentially ignorant care which results – which may take either the form of dismissal or 
pathologization through medicalization or psychologization – can further complicate the 
veteran’s ability to recover from any of the five related features of CATD, each of 
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which can either contain reactions to or result in the development of the very real albeit 
elusive pain of nostalgic disorientation.  Some aspects of these potential reactions may 
be briefly considered in the following general manner, although these should not be 
considered a complete summary of possibilities.  
Concerning self-horror at the perceived absorption of evil: the veteran may not 
feel able to re-integrate with family for fear of contaminating loved ones with the horror 
of war, as illustrated by the narratives of Hoop and Miller in Chapter Two.  Concerning 
conscious disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation: veterans may have an acute 
awareness of being unable to relate to others and to experience life in the way they did 
previously, and may long to return to a previous way of being, as illustrated by the 
narratives of Dan, Art, and Tim in Chapter Two.  Concerning persistent, socially 
debilitating mistrust: veterans may find themselves unable to become or to remain 
vulnerable with previously precious others, or to extend trust to authority figures, and 
may find their previous way of relating terrifying, as illustrated by the narratives of 
Howard and Everly in Chapter Two.  Concerning the radical dissolution of moral 
intuition and narrative coherence: veterans may find themselves unable to relate to 
previously-held social norms or moral patterns, and unable to relate to others who 
continue to ascribe to those norms and patterns, causing confusion and disorientation as 
illustrated by the narratives of Mac, Martinez, and Burgoyne in Chapter Two.  
Concerning uncontrollable, lustful rage: veterans may feel powerless to restrain 
themselves from potentially harming precious others, and may isolate themselves upon 
homecoming, as illustrated by the narratives of Everly and Miller in Chapter Two.  In 
addition to understanding the thymic aspects of these features of CATD, caregivers of 
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any orientation should consider the nostalgic aspects of disorientation associated with or 
accompanying each of these features, to avoid the danger of psychologizing or 
medicalizing these aspects and to aid in the development of a creative and 
epistemologically sound approach to care.  Each of these examples evinces a painful 
experience for the veteran, but that is not to say that this pain is pathological.  It should 
also be considered – in order to avoid polarization in care – that aspects of nostalgic 
disorientation can have what Papadopoulos calls “refreshing effects,” in that they may 
eventually aid a person in “dismantling outdated stagnant, rigid, static, and sterile 
identities” and in activating “new meanings, identities, and values” (2015c). 
 A second CTAR concept protecting against pathologization is described by 
Papadopoulos as the “meaning attribution process” or MAP, which he also uses as a 
tool to combat causal-reductivity and polarization (2014b, 2015b, 2015c).  The meaning 
attribution process is the process used by all human beings to assign meaning to an 
event that occurs in life, occurring in-between a person’s exposure to an event and a 
person’s response to an event (Papadopoulos, 2015d).  According to Papadopoulos, the 
MAP contains the following: 
“[The MAP contains] a host of contributing factors such as personal history, 
psychological characteristics, coping mechanisms, strengths and weaknesses, 
status, education, pre-morbid personality, supporting systems, family, 
community, gender, power position, degrees of isolation, helplessness and 
humiliation, cultural factors, circumstances of experienced adversity – i.e. 
predictability, duration, lasting effects, hope, current conditions, [and] future 
prospects” (2015d). 
 
Papadopoulos stresses that understanding an adversity survivor’s meaning attribution 
process is an essential task for a caregiver seeking to understanding a survivor’s 
eventual response to adversity – and also in understanding the usually wide diversity in 
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responses observed among individuals, families, and communities after exposure to the 
same adversity.  He also argues that without consideration and exploration of meaning 
attribution processes, caregiver discourses will tend rely on problematic generalizations 
and assumptions about how people respond to certain constructed categories of 
adversity, leading them to “blissfully ignore [all survivor differences] and maintain a 
crude understanding that certain events are ‘traumatic’ by themselves…” (2015d).  He 
also highlights the collective potential for caregivers to determine categories of care by 
prizing an apparently logical but inherently illogical relationship between (1) 
perceptions about the severity of the adversity that was experienced, (2) perceptions 
about the damage inflicted on individuals by the experience, and (3) perceptions about 
the amount of help to survivors that is required to address the damage inflicted 
(Papadopoulos, 2015d). 
 Beverly Chapman will provide some further illumination to this concept as it 
applies to warrior homecoming, and also to CATD veterans:  
“One thing that concerns me is how we tend to categorize and treat anger issues 
after homecoming.  [Warriors] return from combat, and their tempers are often 
shorter than before, to use a simple vocabulary.  When leaders see outbursts of 
anger occurring regularly in the workplace, or receive reports of violent anger 
from the barracks or from a [warrior’s] spouse or significant other, most take the 
[warrior] into an office for a talk.  But if it needs to go further than that, there are 
basically two ‘tracks’ of professional help: anger management classes or 
professional counseling if they meet enough criteria for a PTSD diagnosis.  The 
problem here is that these categories are pretty small – either anger must be part 
of a disease or else able to be resolved in a few lunchtime classes.  I think this is 
not simply an issue of the scarcity of helping resources…to me there is also an 
issue of how to understand every [warrior’s] post-combat reactions as unique, 
and worthy of a more detailed exploration” (interview, 2014). 
 
Chapman is recognizing a possibility that is often unaddressed by managed veteran 
care, and which was discussed at length in Chapter Three of this thesis: there are 
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significantly painful responses to service in combat that are apparent to a veteran’s 
leaders, teammates and significant others after homecoming and that can neither be 
either ignored nor necessarily be viewed as pathological.  Secondly, he is also offering a 
call for change that is parallel to Papadopoulos’ in that it suggests that a more detailed 
exploration – and presumably one that accounts for all dimensions of a particular form 
of pain or disorientation, and also accounts for the way in which a person understands 
this pain, and what has happened in their lives during and after combat – is the way 
forward for better care to veterans. 
 The particular form of disorientation that Chapman mentions will prove useful 
for connecting this theme to CATD veterans.  Veterans experiencing uncontrollable, 
lustful rage can often be referred to anger management classes as their periods of rage 
are exposed to leadership.  Such was the case of Sergeant Nathan Everly, whose 
leadership later expressed disappointment and even impatience with him as his episodes 
of rage continued after class attendance, in addition to blaming him for not taking his 
treatment seriously (interview, 2010).  However, these classes often focus on coping 
skills, and aim to effect short-term behavioural change rather than to seek a nuanced 
understanding about how such changes have developed, and the meaning made of these 
developments by attendees.  Veterans experiencing periods of rage similar to Everly’s 
can also be referred to mental health caregivers, who struggle to find a pathological 
classification for their disorientation that will allow them to develop an evidence-based 
care plan, and when unable to provide a diagnosis, send them to less professional 
avenues of follow-up care.  This tendency of either denying the severity of a person’s 
pain, ignoring the way in which a certain person’s pain is unique, or else placing a 
 260 
person’s pain into pre-determined medical categories connects veterans with other 
adversity survivors addressed by Papadopoulos’ concern for persons who are often 
called “victims of trauma,” and his warning that systems of care that pathologize, deny 
the complexity of, or minimalize the pain of adversity survivors has a “traumatizing” 
effect on them even as it “weaves a highly deterministic framework that affects directly 
all [of the] conceptualizations of ‘trauma’ [used by their caregivers]” (2015d). 
 In CTAR trainings, Papadopoulos often shows a slide or provides a sketch of an 
overly simplistic linear model of cause and effect that caregivers sometimes use in 
understanding adversity (2014b, 2015b, 2015c).  This sketch includes three distinct 
elements of this simplistic approach, with arrows connecting them, to show assumed 
causation: (1) a devastating event occurs, (2) it is assumed that survivors will respond to 
the event in this way, (3) it is assumed that because survivors have responded this way, 
this is what they need to become whole again (2015c).  He then asks the participants of 
his training: “what is missing from this slide?” (2015b).  After fielding a number of 
answers, he begins to make connections between the answers, which inevitably contain 
questions and comments about survivor differences, both in terms of responses to 
adversity and needs after certain responses to adversity.  In time, he especially focuses 
on or introduces the concept of meaning making and the meaning attribution process, 
and leads a discussion about the impact of the MAP on caregiver understandings when 
responding to those who have experienced a devastating event (2014b, 2015b).  He also 
makes a distinction between “initial responses” and “constructed responses” to 
adversity, both of which can vary significantly according to all of the aspects of the way 
a person makes meaning of both past and present life events (2014b, 2015b).  This 
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relatively straightforward activity cannot be underestimated in its ability to stimulate 
conversation and to motivate caregivers towards maintaining a greater degree of 
epistemological vigilance in their work. 
 A third CTAR concept protecting against pathologization is contained within the 
Trauma Grid.  The Trauma Grid was mentioned above as a concept protecting against 
polarization, but indeed polarization is often co-activated with pathologization, and the 
presence of one often works to advance and support the presence of the other.  
Therefore, it should not be surprising that concepts protecting against one may likely 
also protect against the other.  It was mentioned earlier in this chapter that the Trauma 
Grid offers various categories for triaging the particular responses to adversity that 
caregivers encounter with survivors, including categories for negative, neutral, and 
positive responses.  However, in the category for negative responses, there are three 
distinct sub-categories, which Papadopoulos describes as (1) psychiatric disorders, (2) 
distressful psychological reactions, and (3) ordinary human suffering (2007).  When 
using the Trauma Grid, caregivers are asked to view painful responses to adversity in a 
manner that allows them to address pain without necessarily labeling this pain in 
psychiatric terms, or addressing it within psychiatric treatment parameters.  Certainly 
Papadopoulos acknowledges that some adversity survivors will develop a form of 
disorientation that clearly fits into the psychiatric criteria for PTSD or another disorder, 
but he also argues that many survivors clearly will not, and he stresses that caregivers 
must be able to carefully and competently address both painful psychological reactions 
and painful reactions in other dimensions of survivor experience that do not fit into 
psychiatric categories (2007).  Further, Papadopoulos suggests that caregivers must not 
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only avoid the de facto medicalization and psychologization of human suffering, but 
that they must recognize that even in human pain there are simultaneously resilient 
functions at work (2007). 
 Wooten notes that, in working with combat veterans, the distinctions made in 
the Trauma Grid subcategories of negative reactions to adversity are crucial in both 
maintaining precision in triage and in maintaining a therapeutic stance towards 
disoriented veterans: “Only in developing a process and an appropriate language for 
triaging suffering can our veterans each be seen as uniquely both damaged and resilient.  
The Trauma Grid gives caregivers a process for triage that forces them to see suffering 
in the complicated light that it deserves” (interview, 2015).  Wooten notices that, in his 
experience, managed care for veterans often makes use of the psychiatric paradigm 
itself as a manual for the triage of human suffering, when in essence it was not designed 
to triage all aspects of human suffering (interview, 2015).  This line of thought makes 
another strong connection between caregiver efforts with disoriented combat veterans 
and the work of CTAR with involuntarily dislocated people.    
 
In Summary 
It has been demonstrated in this chapter that, regardless of a caregiver’s 
particular theoretical orientation to intervention with distressed adversity survivors, and 
regardless of whether a caregiver wishes to use the CATD paradigm as a primary or 
complementary approach to the most unusual forms of veteran disorientation, the 
framework employed and taught by the Centre for Trauma, Asylum, and Refugees is 
useful for aiding all caregivers in the development of epistemological vigilance in their 
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work with veterans.  Papadopoulos’ epistemological aids protect caregivers from 
developing polarized stances in their care, and also help them to avoid both 
oversimplification in their interventions and the pathologization of ordinary responses 
to human suffering among veteran populations.  It has been specifically demonstrated 
that (1) employing aids against polarization will particularly protect veterans 
experiencing persistent, debilitating mistrust and self-horror at the perceived absorption 
of evil from being traumatized by their caregivers, and that (2) employing aids against 
pathologization, including reductive forms of medicalization and psychologization of 
human suffering, will particularly protect veterans experiencing uncontrollable, lustful 
rage and the radical dissolution of narrative coherence from being traumatized by their 
caregivers.  However, it has been shown that indeed polarization is often co-activated 
with pathologization, and the presence of one often works to advance and support the 
presence of the other.  Therefore, it is very likely that concepts protecting against one 
may likely also protect against the other, and that employing CTAR’s epistemological 
aids in care, whatever a caregiver’s primary orientation to intervention, will protect their 
clients in overlapping ways. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In its introduction, this thesis noted the universal dangers toward 
epistemological over-simplicity present among care organizations and professionals in 
the modern Western world, and further noted as an amplifying factor the tendency of 
such professionals to fail to elicit adequate feedback from adversity survivors on the 
nature of their own suffering, both on and in their own terms, before and during crisis 
response.  A number of epistemological correctives to this danger were then offered 
from the principles of psychosocial care to adversity survivors developed at the Centre 
for Trauma, Asylum, and Refugees at the University of Essex.  Later in the 
introduction, the danger of epistemological over-simplicity in caregiving was extended 
to the field of combat veteran care, and it was argued that the most unusual forms of 
disorientation among veterans, while resistant by symptomology to categorization 
according to the psychiatric criteria, nevertheless were often reduced to categorization 
by psychiatric criteria in order to simplify and expedite diagnosis and treatment, and as 
a result remained misunderstood, clinically pathologized, and further disoriented.  
Several specific correctives to this specific danger, following on CTAR principles, were 
suggested as the subject of this thesis, and can be listed as follows: (1) Could the 
common mistake of oversimplification through pre-conceived caregiver biases towards 
veterans be avoided by taking as seriously as possible the totality, complexity, and 
uniqueness of their actual experiences, using their own contextual understandings and 
languages of orientation as much as possible? (2) Could use of the widest possible 
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epistemological base for understanding the experience of veterans be a mitigating 
factor, accounting for the “onto-ecological” complexity of their experiences, to include 
psychological, physiological, social, emotional, behavioral, cultural, spiritual, and 
meaning-attributive dimensions?  (3) Could investment in understanding veterans’ 
sense of changes to both tangible and intangible forms of their self-identity be a 
mitigating factor? (4) Could making a collaborative use of the Trauma Grid with 
combat veterans mitigate over-simplification in their assessment and treatment, along 
with an attempt to understand all of the aspects of their disorientation in terms of what 
may have been lost, what may have been retained, and what manner of growth may 
have been – or may yet become – activated in the aftermath of their exposure to intense 
combat? 
This thesis has demonstrated that, indeed, epistemological over-simplicity in the 
assessment and treatment of combat veterans with the most unusual features can be 
mitigated by the creative appropriation of CTAR principles.  In the course of its 
investigation, beginning in Chapter 2, this thesis has taken the actual experiences of 
such veterans – making use of first and second person narratives and organizing the 
themes of their experiences in a therapeutically neutral manner – into account in order 
to consider the features of their disorientation on and in their own terms.  Next, in 
Chapter 3, these features were considered in connection with categories from the 
psychiatric paradigm, and both the aspects of these features which were not accounted 
for and some of the philosophical and epistemological limitations of the psychiatric 
paradigm itself were noted.  The same activity was repeated in Chapter 4 using 
Jonathan Shay’s moral injury paradigm, and one of the chief epistemological limitations 
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of that paradigm opened a new possibility for continuing research in Chapters 5, and 6 
into ancient Greek anthropological formulations that could account for aspects of these 
features which were not adequately accounted for in either the psychiatric or moral 
injury paradigms.  This new possibility allowed for a full examination of the features of 
these veterans in Chapter 7 – one which provided an avenue of understanding that took 
into account the full complexity, uniqueness, and totality of the features, and which is 
useable in tandem with the psychiatric and moral injury paradigms. 
Lastly, in Chapter 8, the thesis returned to the CTAR model in order to add specific 
principles from CTAR that might prove especially beneficial for caregivers to veterans 
experiencing these unusual features, and in so doing, the CTAR Trauma Grid was also 
finally applied to veteran care. 
 
Frontiers for Further Research 
Many frontiers for further research remain.  This thesis did not fully specifically 
address the indicated treatment methods for each of the five features of CATD 
according to the pastoral psychotherapy practices of Eastern Christianity.  Although the 
field of Eastern Christian pastoral psychotherapy has not been popularly packaged or 
manualized, several practitioners have suggested major approaches that combine 
contemporary trauma care with ancient Eastern Christian pastoral care, including 
Vasileios Thermos, Alexis Trader, and Stephen Muse.2  The applications of these ideas 
                                                
2 Author’s Note: See Vasileios Thermos’ Thirst for love and truth: encounters of 
Orthodox theology and psychological science, 2010, Alexis Trader’s Ancient Christian 
wisdom and Aaron Beck’s cognitive therapy, 2nd Ed., 2012, and Stephen Muse’s When 
hearts become flame: an Eastern Orthodox approach to the dia-logos of pastoral 
counseling 2015). 
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in contemporary veteran care has yet to be adequately explored, and the potential 
efficacy of these ideas has yet to be determined by qualitative research.  However, it is 
certain that each of these approaches would bear significant connection with the CATD 
approach to combat veteran care. 
The CATD approach may also prove to be quite compatible with several existing 
approaches to combat veteran care which have themselves proved efficacious in treating 
the disorientation of some combat veterans, and may enhance these approaches by 
offering the potential of complementary treatment opportunities.  Sears and Chard’s 
Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for post-traumatic stress disorder, although 
limited in its epistemological approach to veteran disorientation, offers existential 
techniques for examining impulses that can have an impact on thymic disorientation, 
and especially on the feature of CATD described as lustful, uncontrollable rage (2016).  
Their work, along with the work of David Kearney and Michelle Martinez3 and Victoria 
Follette and John Briere4 offers some connection with the ancient concept of nepsis in 
the Eastern Christian tradition, although mindfulness-based interventions – with their 
dependence on Buddhist psychology – do depart from Eastern Christian interventions 
on the basis of the personal and impersonal aspects of identity and inter-personal 
communion.  More research into this potential compatibility has yet to be accomplished. 
Especially considering the role of thymos in containing and activating emotion, one 
last suggestion for further research is regarding the potential compatibility of the CATD 
approach with certain emotionally focused theories and techniques for veteran care.  
                                                
3 Author’s Note: See Teaching mindfulness to veterans: a resource, 2015. 
4 Author’s Note: See Mindfulness-oriented interventions for trauma: integrating 
contemplative practices, 2014. 
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Susan Johnson’s emotion-focused therapeutic approach to working with couples when 
one or more partners has been exposed to extreme forms of adversity has received 
significant attention in the field in since 2005.5  Her ability to develop and make use of 
loving, attentive, primary attachment figures in re-orienting veterans to relational health 
bears significant connection to Nektaria Dionysiou’s comments on potential healing 
from the features of lustful, uncontrollable anger and conscious disconnect from 
emotion and bodily sensation in Chapter 6.  Similarly, Paivio and Pascual-Leone’s 
integrative emotion-focused approach to what they label “complex trauma,” although 
inadequate in its consideration of the most unusual features of veteran disorientation, 
such as has been described by the CTAD paradigm, also bears significant connection to 
Nektaria Dionysiou’s comments, in that their approach uses a safe, wise, all-loving 
archetypal figure as a platform for closing with memories of a devastating nature (2010, 
p. 1).  Paivio and Pascual-Leone’s approach does significantly depart from Eastern 
Christian interventions on the basis of its use of fantasy for establishing archetypal 
figures, and its interest in relying on clients’ inter-subjectivity to find a sense of 
objectivity in re-orienting to universal, coherent meaning in life.  However, more 
research into this potential compatibility is worthwhile, and could yield evidence of the 
efficacy of a complementary approach. 
 
In Closing 
 Eastern Christianity is a relatively closed system, in that it does not easily offer 
its concepts and existential practices to non-adherents, nor do the efficacy of its 
                                                
5 Author’s Note: See Emotionally focused couple therapy with trauma survivors: 
strengthening attachment bonds, 2005. 
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practices easily endure separation from its central teachings.  Other researchers have 
tried to attempt the packaging of Eastern Christian practices as universal, transferable 
and cross-contextual techniques only to find that they seem divorced from their depth 
and organic foundations.6  This thesis has not offered specific Eastern Christian 
practices for use in veteran care specifically for this reason, although it has made use of 
some therapeutically neutral philosophical approaches to human disorientation that may 
prove helpful to caregivers from any orientation, and may inform or restrain theories 
and techniques derived from those foundations.  The difficulty of caring for seriously 
disoriented combat veterans is a phenomenon that will not abate soon.  A brief glance at 
research into trauma care for Vietnam veterans in America shows that it is a still-
burgeoning field, and the American involvement in Vietnam ended in 1975.  The more 
recent conflicts involving Western coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are still 
ongoing, and will continue to produce disoriented combat veterans whose features are 
difficult to understand and whose care can easily be complicated by epistemological 
failures.  This thesis has been written in part to provide an example of the potential 
efficacy for creative consideration of these unusual features, in the hopes that 
researchers and caregivers will refuse to reduce what they are seeing among veterans in 
the field to the categories they find in popular manuals.  Further, it has been written in 
hope that Western combat veterans can be aided in their paths to re-orientation, and to a 
greater reunion with their families and their societies. 
 
 
                                                
6 Author’s Note: See, for example Andrew Vujisic’s Orthodox neptic psychotherapy in 
response to existential and transpersonal psychology, 2011. 
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